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ABSTRACT
THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF THE PERFECT
Matthew Zdon
Marquette University, 2015
The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect
(CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior
to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter
presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. The
goals of this study are to provide an account and defense
of the Cartesian argument for CPP, to determine the
consequences of this priority for the relationship between
our concepts of human and divine properties, and to explore
its implications for bottom-up accounts of theological
concept formation.
I argue that the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in
Descartes’ version of CPP are equivalent to “true” or
“genuine” and thus function in the same way they would in
geometrical examples where the perfection at issue is
definitive of the kind and where imperfection constitutes
falling short of the kind. I can thus be said to have the
idea of a “perfect” circle (of that which is “infinitely”
circular, as it were) merely by virtue of having the idea
of a circle, yet I cannot apprehend something as imperfect
or finite insofar as it resembles but fails to be a circle
unless I already possess a concept of the kind in question—
a true or perfect circle.
CPP thus implies a qualitative distinction between the
perfect and imperfect that, when applied to God and
creation, is consistent with a theory of analogy. Unlike
traditional ‘bottom-up’ theories of analogy, however, CPP
entails a ‘top-down’ order of derivation in which concepts
of creaturely perfections are derived (via a sort of
‘partial negation’) from concepts of divine ones.
The ‘top-down’ order of derivation yields
epistemological advantages over the traditional approach,
which had always struggled to explain how we can derive
analogical concepts of God from creatures. Further, CPP
enables its proponents to address the classic
anthropomorphism critiques leveled at practitioners of
Perfect Being Theology. Though I acknowledge that CPP is
not without its own weaknesses, I present a largely
sympathetic account of the argument and its relevance for
contemporary philosophy of religion.
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Introduction
The doctrine of the conceptual priority of the perfect
(CPP) is the claim that the concept of the perfect is prior
to that of the imperfect insofar as possessing the latter
presupposes a grasp of the former, but not vice versa. In
Descartes’ philosophy, as well as in that of his
rationalist successors such as Leibniz and Malebranche, CPP
is most often used to show that our idea of God, or
infinite being, is conceptually prior to the idea we have
of ourselves.1 Despite the fact that Descartes appeals to
CPP throughout his philosophical works and even though it
plays an important role in his arguments concerning the
nature and origin of our idea of God, the Cartesian account
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Examples from Descartes will follow. Malebranche, in The Search After
Truth, quotes Descartes’ statement of the priority in his April 1649
letter to Clerselier almost word for word: “But not only does the mind
have the idea of the infinite, it even has it before that of the
finite. For we conceive of infinite being simply because we conceive of
being, without thinking whether it is finite or infinite. In order for
us to conceive of a finite being, something must necessarily be
eliminated from this general notion of being, which consequently must
come first” (232). In his own statements of the priority, Leibniz
prefers to use the term “absolute” to characterize divine infinity. In
the New Essays on Human Understanding, a dialogue written in response
to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the character
espousing the Leibnizian position argues that “the true infinite,
strictly speaking, is only in the absolute, which precedes all
composition and is not formed by that addition of parts” (157) and
further that the “idea of the absolute is internal to us, as is that of
being: these absolutes are nothing but the attributes of God; and they
may be said to be as much the source of ideas as God himself is the
principle of beings” (158). Spinoza will also employ something like
CPP, but for him the priority seems to be the same as the priority of
substance to that of mode.
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of CPP has been largely neglected by scholars. It is too
easy, perhaps, to view it as a relic of Descartes’
religious milieu—as one more regrettable respect in which
the Enlightenment philosopher failed to be a fully modern
thinker—or to dismiss it as a sop to religious authorities,
served to make his less-palatable philosophical innovations
more appetizing. Especially when viewed in light of his
occasional expressions of apparent fideism, e.g., “I have
never written about the infinite except to submit myself to
it” (CSMK 172), one might forsake CPP as impenetrable to
philosophical analysis.
Such interpretations lose much of their appeal when
CPP is correctly understood. In the first chapter, I
explain how CPP shows that our concept of “perfect” or
“infinite” being is not produced by merely negating the
qualifications “imperfect” or “finite.”

I argue that the

predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in CPP are equivalent to
“true” or “genuine” and thus function in the same way they
would in geometrical examples where the perfection at issue
is definitive of the kind and where imperfection
constitutes falling short of the kind. In this sense, I can
be said to have the idea of a “perfect” circle (of that
which is “infinitely” circular, as it were) merely by
virtue of having the idea of a circle, yet I cannot
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apprehend something as imperfect or finite insofar as it
resembles but fails to be a circle unless I already possess
a concept of the kind in question—a true or perfect circle.
Descartes’ own application of CPP to our cognition of
geometrical figures, his assertions that our unqualified
notion of being or substance is an idea of infinite (or
perfect) being or substance, his denial that “being” or
“substance” can be predicated univocally of creatures and
God, and his use of the image/model analogy to describe the
relationship between the perfect and the imperfect, all
lend support to this interpretation.
In the next chapter, I explore the role CPP plays in
Descartes’ response to his critics’ claims that our idea of
God is constructed by amplifying our concepts of creaturely
properties. Descartes believes that such amplification is
guided by an innate concept of God. Though other
interpreters have suggested that this follows from the fact
that amplification presupposes an awareness of absolute
imperfection, I argue that it is necessary given the
qualitative gulf that, according to CPP, must separate
creaturely from divine properties. I conclude that
amplification is, for Descartes, a heuristic tool employed
to guide the “natural light” in rendering explicit the
contents of our innate idea of God.

4

If creaturely goodness or wisdom falls short of
goodness and wisdom as such, what could justify the
extension of the predicates “good” or “wise” to creatures?
In the third chapter, I evaluate various ways of making
sense of the positive relation that CPP implies. I argue
that Descartes’ commitment to the principle that creatures
are images and likenesses of God suggests that the positive
relation is one of resemblance. I proceed to evaluate
various ways of making sense of this resemblance,
concluding that it cannot be attributed to any form of
qualitative identity. For a number of historical and
textual reasons, including Descartes’ explicit denial of
univocity as well as his defense of analogical predication
in the context of his analysis of divine self-causation, I
argue that the resemblance between creatures and God ought
to be interpreted as analogical and hence irreducible or
primitive.
In the following chapter, I step away from Descartes
to provide a historical overview of the theory of analogy.
I emphasize that the traditional theory of theological
analogy does assume that there is a primitive ontological
resemblance between creatures and God. I also isolate a
feature of the traditional theory that is inconsistent with
CPP, namely, the assumption that our concepts of God are
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derived from our concepts of creatures. Instead, I argue
that CPP will require a ‘top-down’ theory of analogy in
which concepts of creaturely properties are derived, via a
sort of ‘partial negation,’ from concepts of divine ones.2
The fifth chapter is devoted to explaining and
defending the ontology and cognition of analogical
resemblance. Analogy assumes that a single term can,
through concepts that resemble one another without sharing
content, signify things that resemble one another without
sharing a common nature or form. I first show how late
scholastic advocates of analogy such as Cajetan and John of
St. Thomas responded to the Scotistic critique that such
analogical concepts possess insufficient unity (or
resemblance) to be employed in reasoning without committing
the fallacy of equivocation. They suggest that analogically
similar concepts can be ‘confused’ in thought such that
they can be regarded as a single concept, which is neither
a generic concept derived by abstracting shared content nor
the concept of a mere arbitrary collection. I argue that
the very same examples of scalar properties (e.g., colors)
that Scotus employs to illustrate his own account of
univocity by way of modal distinction show that theories of
abstraction by confusion are themselves plausible. Finally,
2

The terms ‘top down’ and ‘partial negation’ are from Robert Merrihew
Adams (2008).
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I will attempt to render the ontology and cognition of
primitive analogical resemblance a little less mysterious
by connecting it to more contemporary accounts of concept
formation in cases of inexact similarity.
Abstraction by confusion assumes, however, that we
already possess determinate concepts of the analogates in
question. Scotus had argued that this leaves advocates of
the bottom-up approach to analogy with a dilemma: either
they must hold that we can obtain determinate concepts of
divine properties from concepts of creaturely ones (which
appears to violate the ontological difference between
them), or they must accept that we can derive only
indeterminate concepts of divine properties (which appears
to undermine the scientific character of theology). In the
sixth chapter I argue that, insofar as it is our concepts
of the creaturely versions of perfections that are derived,
via ‘partial negation,’ from concepts of divine ones, CPP
does not face Scotus’ dilemma. I then show how Descartes’
explicit application of analogy to divine-self-causation
illustrates the advantages of such top-down derivation for
philosophical theology. I end the chapter with a discussion
of a few examples of top-down derivation suggested by
Charles Hartshorne.
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In the next chapter, I explore the significance of CPP
for contemporary perfect being theology (PBT). PBT is the
effort to understand God’s nature by appealing to our
intuitions about what properties a greatest or most perfect
being must have. Critics have alleged that PBT yields an
idolatrous and anthropomorphic concept of God insofar as it
suggests that the divine perfections differ merely by
degree from our own and because it appeals to fallible and
biased notions of perfection when identifying candidate
properties. To the extent that Descartes’ philosophy of
religion is an example of PBT, it has been subjected to the
same criticism. However, I argue that Descartes’ commitment
to CPP would enable him to overcome these objections. Our
possessing innate concepts of qualitatively distinct divine
perfections not only enables us to apprehend our own
properties as absolutely imperfect, but guides our own
intuitions regarding which properties must be possessed by
a perfect being.
I dedicate the final chapter to a general analysis and
critique of CPP. Taken as a transcendental argument, I
argue that the weakest aspect of CPP is the premise that we
apprehend ourselves as imperfect in the absolute sense.
Though Descartes argued that we could never attain explicit
concepts of qualitatively unique divine perfections by
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amplifying concepts of our own unless we were at least
implicitly aware of such absolute imperfection, both the
claim that we do in fact possess these concepts as well as
the assumption that we could not construct them solely by
modifying concepts of our own properties are questionable.
While one could appeal to more general and universal
features of human experience as evidence for an awareness
of absolute imperfection, such appeals are no less
controversial than the alleged presupposition relations of
amplification arguments. I end the chapter by noting how
the purported primitive resemblance of simple properties
(such as different shades of a single color) is
disanalogous to the resemblance relation between creatures
and God within CPP insofar as the latter assumes a
resemblance between various complex (creaturely) properties
and a metaphysically simple thing.

9

Ch. I. CPP and the Argument from Negation
I. Contemporary Reception of Cartesian CPP
The Cartesian doctrine of CPP, says Robert Merrihew
Adams, “astonishes readers today.”3 The claim has indeed
struck many readers as remarkable, and not merely because
it, as Adams explains, “is so contrary to the modern
tendency to seek to understand the more perfect, the more
developed, in terms of the less perfect, the more
rudimentary.” Many commentators have found it to be obscure
if not downright incredible. “It is not obvious how exactly
to take this priority,” says John Carriero, expressing what
seems to be the opinion of many Descartes scholars.4 Other
interpreters have been less restrained in their criticism.
Anthony Kenny, for example, has argued that the “principle
that the positive is prior to the negative is worthless.”5
John Cottingham agrees, noting that “this alleged priority
or ‘basicness for understanding’ evaporates under
scrutiny.”6 More charitable interpreters have thrown up
their hands as well. Janet Broughton, despite her best
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2008, 91.
2009, 191.
5
1968, 136.
6
John Cottingham, 1976. In some of his more recent work, however,
Cottingham seems to view the argument more positively, though he does
not discuss it in detail. See Cottingham, 1994. See also Cottingham’s
article in Gaukroger, 2006.
4
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effort to construct a plausible argument for the claim,
concludes with regret that it is ultimately based on
nothing more than an “abstract and contentious metaphysical
doctrine.”7
Not all recent commentary has been negative, however.
Though Robert Rubin finds the priority claim “paradoxical,”
he suggests that it might be analogous to the conceptual
priority of the notion of substance to that of mode (in
this sense aligning Descartes with Spinoza).8 Adams and
Stephen Menn stand out amongst recent interpreters in
defending the argument largely on its own terms. It is
significant that both of these authors approach the
argument with an eye towards its Platonic ancestry.9 Menn,
however, is less interested in defending it than in drawing
historical parallels to Neo-Platonic and Augustinian
arguments for God.10 Adams is chiefly interested in the
consequences the priority has for the broader rationalist
program of constructing concepts of the attributes of
finite beings from the concepts of the attributes of
infinite being (and for this reason focuses on Leibniz,
7

2002, 152.
Rubin, 2008. Anat Schectman also understands the priority relation as
an instance of the same sort of ontological dependence relation that
obtains between substance and mode. See chapter three of her
dissertation, 2011.
9
For a general account of the Platonic features of Descartes’
philosophy, see Buckle 2007.
10
1998, 281-93.
8
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rather than Descartes).11 Though he provides a plausible
reconstruction and defense of the argument, his account is
relatively brief and, as he himself notes, leaves important
questions unanswered.

II. The Correlative Concept Critique
Anthony Kenny, John Cottingham and Georgette Sinkler
have advanced the most pointed critique of Cartesian CPP.
They have all argued that the concept of a perfect being
cannot be prior to the concept of an imperfect one since
the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” must be viewed as
correlative—i.e., neither concept can be understood without
the other. Needless to say, I believe the correlative
concept critique is wrong. Yet understanding why it is
wrong will help us to clarify the nature of CPP. As I will
show, the critique fails to appreciate that when Descartes
uses the predicates “perfect” or “infinite” in this
context, they are synonymous with “real,” “true” or

11

2008, 91-9. Descartes will sometimes use the term “attribute” in the
technical sense to refer to that which is the “essence of a thing”
(CSMI 210). This sense is shorthand for “principal attribute.” The
principal attribute of a body is extension, the principal attribute of
a mind is thought. Yet there is also a looser sense of the term in
Descartes’ works, where it is roughly equivalent to “property” or
“mode.” I will use the term “attribute” interchangeably with “property”
or “quality” throughout this work, unless I indicate otherwise. For a
detailed account of this and other terminological ambiguities, see
Garber 1992, 63-70.
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“genuine.”12 He therefore does not employ the
perfect/imperfect distinction as describing a degree of
perfection within a given kind, but invokes it with respect
to a narrower range of cases in which one thing falls short
of a perfection that is definitive of another thing’s
nature. This is indicated by Descartes’ application of CPP
to the case of our idea of a perfect triangle, the only
12

It should be noted that, within the Cartesian account of CPP, the
terms “perfect” and “imperfect” are (at least implicitly) always
modifying something (usually being). Further, in the context of
Descartes’ arguments for CPP with respect to being, the terms
“infinite” and “finite” are used interchangeably with the terms
“perfect” and “imperfect.” Recognizing one’s limitation can thus be
described as either an awareness of finitude or as an awareness of
imperfection. This seems to be due to the fact that, for Descartes, an
infinite or a perfect being is simply a being possessing every
perfection (or reality). Thus I disagree with Philip Clayton (2000,
145) who suggests that Descartes uses the notion of perfection to
control or limit the notion of infinity. What this suggests is that in
ascribing infinity to God, Descartes thinks he has left himself open to
the objection that God would thereby possess attributes incompatible
with a perfect being (e.g., extension) and thus must invoke divine
perfection to exclude such attributes. Yet Descartes never suggests
this; rather, his use of “infinite” indicates that attributes such as
extension are actually incompatible with the notion of an infinite
being. Indeed, Descartes explicitly states that when he uses the term
“infinite” it is synonymous with “greatest being.” He tends to avoid
using the term “infinite,” however, because he believed its grammatical
construction encourages the mistaken view that it is equivalent in
meaning to “not-finite.” When Descartes applies CPP to the case of our
awareness that a given triangle is imperfect, however, triangle and not
being is the subject and hence he does not use the terms “finite” and
“infinite.” As I will explain in chapter two, Descartes also describes
the human will as “infinite” insofar as it absolute or perfect in
essence (i.e., qua kind faculty of the will). That he here uses the
term “infinite,” rather than just “perfect” as he does in the case of
triangles, can be attributed to the fact that Descartes thinks that the
human faculty of the will does not appear to be any less perfect, qua
faculty of the will, than God’s. Thus his use of “infinite” to describe
the human will retains its theological significance. Since the terms
“perfect” and “imperfect” are applicable however to every instance of
CPP within Descartes’ works, since Descartes prefers these terms, and
since the construction of “imperfect” as a grammatical negation of
“perfect” corresponds with the conceptual priority asserted by CPP, I
will describe the doctrine as the priority of the perfect rather than
the priority of the infinite.
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instance where he applies it to something other than our
idea of God. There he argues that the notion of an
imperfect triangle presupposes that of a perfect one
insofar as the notion of a triangle as such is the notion
of a perfect one. The priority at issue in CPP is thus
simply the claim that the negative predicate “imperfect” in
“imperfect being,” like the predicate “imperfect” in
“imperfect circle,” has significance for us only if we
already possess a notion of, respectively, being or
circularity. Since we can nevertheless possess a concept of
being or circularity without possessing a notion of
something that is like a being or a circle but falls short
of these kinds (imperfect being and imperfect circularity),
the former concepts have priority.
When Descartes invokes CPP in his arguments for the
existence of the idea of God, it is typically as a rebuttal
to the (anticipated) counterargument that, since the term
“infinite” (infinitum) is a grammatical negation of the
term “finite,” the notion of infinite being is nothing more
than the idea of a being that is not-finite (non finitum).
That the idea of the infinite might be a negation of our
idea of the finite is not the only argument Descartes’
interlocutors (real and imaginary) can and did wield
against CPP. In the objections to the Meditations, for
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example, Gassendi as well as others argue that the idea of
infinite being could be created by amplifying our notion of
finite being. As we shall see, Descartes believed that CPP
overcomes this argument as well. Yet perhaps one of the
reasons why he focuses on the negation counterargument is
the fact that he believed that the relation between the
ideas of infinite and finite being is a sort of negation
(more precisely, a sort of partial negation). Addressing
the negation argument is thus also a way for Descartes to
clarify the relation between these ideas. In the famous
Third Meditation assertion of CPP, the negation relation is
not rejected but shown to run in the opposite direction:

And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of
rest and darkness are arrived at by negating movement
and light, so my perception of the infinite is arrived
at not by means of a true idea but merely by negating
the finite. On the contrary, I clearly understand that
there is more reality in an infinite substance than in
a finite one, and hence that my perception of the
infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my
perception of the finite, that is myself. For how
could I understand that I doubted or desired—that is,
lacked something—and that I was not wholly perfect,
unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect
being which enabled me to recognize my own defects by
comparison. (CSMII 31)
To say that the ideas of rest or darkness are produced by
negation is simply to say that they are equivalent to,
respectively, “not-light” and “not-moving.” Their

15

intelligibility is here presented as being entirely
parasitic on the ideas of light and motion. The
aforementioned critics of CPP find these examples to be
less than convincing. Kenny, for example, observes that
“there is no way of sorting predicates into positive and
negative in the manner required by Descartes’ argument. He
says that we perceive rest by the negation of movement; but
one could as well say that we perceive movement by the
negation of rest.”13 We ought to conclude, says Kenny, that
“[t]he argument from doubting, if valid, proves only that
the idea of perfection must be simultaneous with the idea
of imperfection, not that it must be prior. […] The ability
to use a predicate is not prior to, but identical with, the
ability to use its negation.”14 Sinkler agrees with Kenny:
“Does one come to recognize the light only after having
recognized the dark, the dead after the living, or vice
versa? Surely not. One can only recognize or understand
these terms together; not one before or after the other.”15
These critics have misunderstood the significance of
the examples of negation in this passage. Descartes is
using them to illustrate only how conceiving of something
as the absence of a perfection or reality (for Descartes,
13
14
15

1968, 135.
Ibid., 136.
1989, 79.

16

as we shall see, these terms are often synonymous)
presupposes an idea of the perfection in question. He did
indeed adopt the traditional view that things like darkness
are, ontologically, merely the absences of something real
and positive (the perfection of light).16 This ontological
disparity ostensibly gives rise to a conceptual asymmetry:
while we can conceive of darkness only by conceiving of the
absence of the corresponding perfection (light), the
perfection itself (light) can be conceived without
comparing it to (and so conceiving of) its absence. Yet
Descartes need not be read as denying that our ideas of
rest and movement are correlative. Given his commitment in
his physics that both rest and movement are equally real as
modes of extended substance, he would not hold that there
is “more reality” in the latter.17 There is no reason to
believe that he wouldn’t endorse Kenny’s suggestion that we
can also conceive of movement as the absence of rest.
Descartes’ point is simply that if we conceive of rest as
the absence (negation) of movement, then we must possess an
idea of movement. The same presupposition relation would
follow for conceiving of movement as the absence of rest.
As Cecilia Wee puts it, “Descartes is merely using the
16

See Wee 2006, 97-101. Another example Descartes cites is the idea of
blindness as the absence of sight (CSMII 134).
17
Wee 2006, 157 endnote # 18.
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example of rest and movement […] as an illustration of the
point that some perceptions are of absences of perfections,
rather than perfections.”18
Aside from the issue of whether these examples of
negations are correlative or not, however, the question we
should be asking is this: what do these examples tell us
about the significance of the predicates “infinite/finite”
and “perfect/imperfect” as employed within CPP? In fact,
Descartes does not hold that the purported negation pairs
are examples of the same relation that holds between our
notions of finite and infinite being. He will argue that
the notion of finite or imperfect being is obtained via a
partial negation of the idea of being as such.19 Creaturely
being is not apprehended as the absence of being in the way
that rest can be apprehended as the complete absence of
movement, for this would render the idea of finite being
equivalent to the idea of nothingness (i.e., non-being).20

18

Ibid. As I will later argue, this same point is suggested by
Descartes’ description of the idea of an imperfect triangle as a
(partial) “negation” of a perfect one. This should be interpreted as
simply the claim that we cannot conceive of a given figure as an
imperfect triangle unless we possess the concept of a triangle. This
claim does not preclude the possibility that we could conceive of the
latter as a negation (imperfect instance) of the former.
19
In a late letter to Cleselier, Descartes argues that “in order to
conceive a finite being, I have to take away something from this
general notion of being” (CSMK 377). In the Fourth Meditation, the
narrator portrays his ontological status as falling somewhere “between”
being and non-being (CSMII 38).
20
For Descartes, the idea of nothingness is equivalent to the idea of
non-being and is thus obtained via a complete negation of being. It
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Rather, to grasp being as finite or imperfect is to
apprehend it as falling short of being while nevertheless
resembling it. Yet the fact that the relation is still a
form of negation is significant, for it underscores that
there is a distinction in kind between the two relata. Just
as darkness is not a kind of light nor rest a sort of
motion, so it will turn out that imperfect (finite) being
is not really an instance of being, strictly speaking.
In his otherwise excellent commentary on Descartes’
Conversation with Burman, Cottingham is similarly misled by
purported examples of negations.21 His account is worth
analyzing in detail, however, since his interpretation will
prove instructive. In response to Burman’s questions about
the significance of CPP within a passage in the Discourse,22
Descartes alludes to the above passage in the Third
Meditation and provides the following explication:

follows that we could conceive of being without conceiving of
nothingness, but we could not conceive the latter without the former.
21
It should be noted that the actual text of the Converstation with
Burman was not written by Descartes himself, but represents notes taken
by Burman (and perhaps dictated to another). Cottingham, however, makes
a strong case for treating the Conversation as an accurate
representation of Descartes’ views. See 1976, xvi-xviii.
22
The passage in question is the following: “reflecting upon the fact
that I was doubting and that consequently my being was not wholly
perfect (for I saw clearly that it is a greater perfection to know than
to doubt), I decided to inquire into the source of my ability to think
of something more perfect than I was; and I recognized very clearly
that this had to come from some nature that was in fact more perfect”
(CSMI 127-8).
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In that part of the Discourse you have a summary of
these Meditations, and its meaning must be explicated
by reference to the Meditations themselves. In that
part of the Discourse, then, the author recognized his
own imperfection by recognizing the perfection of God.
He did this implicitly if not explicitly. Explicitly,
we are able to recognize our own imperfection before
we recognize the perfection of God. This is because we
are able to direct our attention to ourselves before
we direct our attention to God. Thus we can infer our
own finiteness before we arrive at his infiniteness.
Despite this, however, the knowledge of God and his
perfection must implicitly always come before the
knowledge of ourselves and our imperfections. For in
reality the infinite perfection of God is prior to our
imperfections, since our imperfection is a defect and
negation of the perfection of God. And every defect
and negation presupposes that which it falls short and
negates. (CSMK 338)
Cottinham observes that the priority in question is due to
the fact that the idea of finite being is in some sense a
negation of that of infinite being. Further, he correctly
describes the relation of presupposition at the heart of
CPP: “A possible answer [to what is meant by this relation
of presupposition] is that X presupposes Y if in order to
have the concept of X one must have the concept of Y, but
not vice versa.”23 Yet Cottingham errs, like the others, in
focusing on the difficulty of determining which of two
opposite predicates is the negative and which is the
positive one. He notes that Descartes’ examples of
negations are always defects or privations of some sort,
and allows that some cases, such as the pair “sighted” and
23
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“blind,” look “intuitively plausible” as examples of this
priority: “in order to understand what ‘blind’ means, we
have to have some concept of what it is to be sighted,
while the converse does not seem to hold.”24 Using the
example of an apple, however, he argues that when we apply
this example to the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect,”
no such priority can be found: “To understand what an
imperfect apple is, it seems I must have the concept of a
perfect apple; but the converse seems equally to hold: I
could not know what was meant by a perfect apple unless I
had the concept of an imperfect apple. There does not seem
to be any priority at all here: in order to understand
either of the two terms one must understand what is meant
by the other. The two terms rank pari passu.”25
Cottingham’s example is a useful one because it allows
us to identify precisely how he has misunderstood the
function of the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” in
CPP. When Descartes employs these predicates within CPP, he
is actually describing the relationship between the concept
of a perfection definitive of a kind and the concept of
imperfection as falling short of this kind. As I will
argue, the actual claim is that in order to grasp that
something is an imperfect X, I must already possess the
24
25

Ibid., 73.
Ibid.

21

notion of X, which in this case is the notion of a perfect
X. Indeed, Descartes makes just this point in his
correspondence with Clerselier, his last writing on the
doctrine of CPP:

I say that the notion I have of the infinite is in me
before that of the finite because, by the mere fact
that I conceive being, or that which is, without
thinking whether it is finite or infinite, what I
conceive is infinite being; but in order to conceive a
finite being, I have to take away something from this
general notion of being, which must accordingly be
there first. (CSMK 377)
The notion of being is the notion of infinite being. The
predicate “infinite” doesn’t modify or add to the concept
of being. Indeed, in the paragraph preceding this,
Descartes explicitly states that the predicate “infinite”
has the same significance when joined with substance: “By
‘infinite substance’ I mean a substance which has actually
infinite and immense, true and real perfections. This is
not an accident added to the notion of substance, but the
very essence of substance taken absolutely and bounded by
no defects.” The predicates “infinite” or “perfect” as
applied to being or substance clearly do not have the
significance suggested by Cottingham’s example. If the
predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” functioned in his
example as they do in these cases, then 1) we could be said
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to necessarily possess the concept of a perfect apple
simply by virtue of possessing the concept of an apple, for
the perfection at issue would not be an ideal degree of
sweetness or crispness but that which is definitive of the
kind; and 2) our concept of an imperfect apple would not be
the idea of something that is an imperfect instance of the
kind (e.g., a mushy and bland apple), but the concept of
something that is imperfect insofar as it fails to be an
apple at all.

III. CPP and the Perfect Triangle
That the comparative predicates in CPP do not function
in the way suggested by Cottingham’s example can be seen
more clearly if we consider Descartes’ application of CPP
to the idea of a triangle in the Fifth Replies and his
explanation of this argument in the Conversation with
Burman, the only time he explicitly applies CPP to
something other than the idea of God. Though critics and
defenders of Cartesian CPP have largely neglected this
example, it is important for understanding Descartes’
argument for two reasons.26 First, it shows that the sense
26

One interpreter who has discussed the triangle example’s significance
for Descartes’ argument for an innate idea of God is Deobrah Boyle. See
2009, 128-136. To my knowledge, however, no one has yet used the
geometrical example in an effort to understand Descartes’ application
of CPP to the idea of God.
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of “perfect” used in CPP is equivalent to “true” and
second, it clarifies a distinction between conceiving of an
object as perfect and merely conceiving of a thing that is
perfect.

A. Perfect as ‘True’
In response to Gassendi’s claim that our ideas of
geometrical figures must be derived from ideas of
sensation, Descartes responds that the figures available to
the senses could not provide us with the concepts of
geometrical objects since they fail to exhibit essential
properties of these objects (in this case, perfectly
straight lines). The “true triangle,” he says, “is
contained in the figure only in the way in which a statue
of Mercury is contained in a rough block of wood.” He then
proceeds to explain, using the example of a face drawn on
paper, what actually occurs in childhood when we seem to
form a concept of a triangle through sense experience of
triangle-like shapes:

[S]ince the idea of the true triangle [veri trianguli]
was already in us, and could be conceived by our mind
more easily than the more composite figure of the
triangle drawn on paper, when we saw the composite
figure we did not apprehend the figure we saw, but
rather the true triangle. It is just the same as when
we look at a piece of paper on which some lines have
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been drawn in ink to represent a man’s face: the idea
that this produces in us is not so much the idea of
these lines as the idea of a man. Yet this would
certainly not happen unless the human face were
already known to us from some other source, and we
were more accustomed to think of the face than the
lines drawn in ink; indeed, we are often unable to
distinguish the lines from one another when they are
moved a short distance away from us. Thus we could not
recognize the geometrical triangle from the diagram on
the paper unless our mind already possessed the idea
of it from some other source. (CSMII 262)
Descartes later discusses this passage with Burman who
argues that we derive the notion of a perfect triangle from
our idea of an imperfect one obtained through experience.
Notice that “true” in “true triangle” is here treated as
equivalent to “perfect,” and that Descartes’ argument for
the priority of our concept of a “perfect triangle” mirrors
his CPP arguments regarding the idea of God insofar as it
explains the priority in terms of (partial) negation:

Burman: But it is from the imperfect triangle that you
frame in your mind the perfect triangle.
Descartes: But why then does the imperfect triangle
provide me with the idea of a perfect triangle rather
than an idea of itself?
Burman: It provides you with both: firstly itself, and
then, from that, the perfect triangle. For you deduce
the perfect triangle from the imperfect.
Descartes: That cannot be. I could not conceive of an
imperfect triangle unless there were in me the idea of
a perfect one, since the former is the negation of the
latter. Thus, when I see a triangle, I have a
conception of a perfect triangle, and it is by
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comparison with this that I subsequently realize that
what I am seeing is imperfect.27
The notion of a perfect triangle is here equivalent to the
notion of a “true” one because the perfection at issue is
the presence of those features (e.g., straightness of
lines) that must be included within the concept for it to
be a concept of a triangle. Triangularity is not a feature
that admits of degrees—a figure either exhibits it or it
doesn’t. An imperfect triangle is therefore a false one,
i.e., not really a triangle at all. We may judge that an
apple is imperfect because it is mushy and bland and thus
falls short of the crispness and sweetness that we, at
least implicitly, take to constitute apple perfection, but
there is no sense in which the poor specimen thereby fails
to be an apple. If we were to modify Cottingham’s example
to fit the correct sense of perfection within CPP, an
imperfect apple would be something along the lines of a wax
replica of an apple, while a perfect one would just be an
apple.

B. Resolving an Ambiguity in CPP
Aside from its demonstrating that the sense of
“perfect” in CPP is equivalent to that of “true,”
27
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Descartes’ account of the process by which we come to form
the notion of a triangle is also important because it helps
us to address an ambiguity in the account thus far. Applied
to this example, the correlative concept critique is that
the predicate “perfect” in the phrase “perfect triangle” is
intelligible to me only if the predicate “imperfect” is
too. I cannot judge that a given shape is a perfect
triangle without also possessing a concept of triangle
imperfection. Despite appearances to the contrary, CPP is
entirely consistent with this observation, for the argument
does not hold that the predicate “perfect” in “perfect
triangle” could be intelligible without its correlate being
intelligible too. When Descartes argues that “I could not
conceive of an imperfect triangle unless there were in me
the idea of a perfect one,” what he means by “the idea of a
perfect one” is just the idea of a triangle as such. If I
possess the concept of a triangle and yet never conceive of
it as a standard against which to measure imperfect (false)
triangles, the predicate “perfect” or “true” isn’t going to
have significance for me in this sense (as far as triangles
go). Yet since the perfection in question is definitive of
a triangle as such, there is a sense in which I could be
said to possess a concept of a perfect triangle simply by
virtue of possessing the concept of a triangle; I do not
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have to be aware of its perfection relative to nontriangles. This feature distinguishes the idea of a perfect
triangle from the idea of a perfect apple in Cottingham’s
example—I could not, in this sense, be said to possess the
concept of a perfect apple merely by virtue of possessing
the concept of an apple, so long as the perfection in
question (e.g., an ideal level of sweetness and crispness)
is not definitive of an apple as such.
The concept of an imperfect triangle within CPP is,
however, intrinsically comparative. Thus when Descartes
claims that, without the idea of a triangle, “I could not
conceive of an imperfect triangle” he is not claiming that,
unless he had the concept of a perfect triangle, he could
not conceive of a figure that happens to be an imperfect
one. There is a sense in which I could be said to conceive
of an imperfect triangle merely by conceiving of, for
example, a drawing of a triangle on a chalkboard, or a
three-sided figure the angles of which add up to 181
degrees, for both of these things happen to be imperfect
triangles. Descartes, however, does not hold that my being
able to conceive of things that are imperfect triangles is
contingent upon my possessing the concept of a perfect one.
What does require a comparison and hence a concept of a
perfect triangle is the apprehension of this figure as, or

28

the judgment that it is, an imperfect triangle. In order to
judge that a given figure is an imperfect triangle, I must
already posses the concept of a triangle as such. And if I
did not apprehend this triangle as imperfect, there would
be nothing to distinguish my conception from that of which
is in fact a perfect triangle.
Descartes’ example of the drawing of a face
illustrates this distinction. Were I not already familiar
with what is in fact a real face, I could not be said to
conceive of the drawing as an image of a face, for if the
object of my thought is to be something more than a mere
assembly of lines on paper, I must relate what I see to an
actual face. But, of course, I don’t need to recall the
image of a face to be said to conceive of what is in fact a
real face, for I can conceive of one of those simply by
conceiving of a face. And if I, upon seeing the drawing,
conceive of a face without noticing that the thing before
me is, strictly speaking, only the image of a face (and
hence imperfect), the object of my thought is a real face,
not the image of one. So when Descartes concludes that “I
could not conceive of an imperfect triangle unless there
were in me the idea of a perfect one,” what he means by
“the idea of a perfect one” is just the idea of a triangle—
not the apprehension of this triangle as perfect, which
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indeed presupposes a comparison to imperfect ones. On the
other hand, the phrase “conceive of an imperfect triangle”
should be read as “conceive of a triangle as, or judge a
triangle to be, imperfect” and hence presupposing a
comparison to the standard (perfect) triangle. For
Descartes, the idea of the imperfect within CPP is
intrinsically comparative; the idea of the perfect is not.
An example Cottingham cites from the philosophy of
language can help us to further disambiguate the roles of
the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” within CPP. In his
critique of CPP, he notes that the presupposition criterion
for distinguishing positive from negative predicates is
similar to J.L. Austin’s observation that the affirmative
usage of a term is typically a “trouser word,” i.e., a term
that needs to be understood if its opposite is to be
intelligible.28 In fact, Austin’s analysis of the
presupposition relation of the terms “real” and “fake” can
be used to illustrate the true presupposition relation
within CPP. Austin observes that, when it comes to these
terms, it is actually the “negative use that wears the
trousers,” since the assertion that something is real has
significance only in comparison with ways in which it might
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be fake.29 “‘A real duck’,” says Austin, “differs from the
simple ‘a duck’ only in that it is used to exclude various
ways of being not a real duck.”30 Thus the term “real” and
“fake” belong to the family of what Austin calls “adjuster
words,” words that allow us to describe ambiguous or
borderline cases by shifting the meaning of the terms they
modify.31 If we discover an animal that looks and behaves
somewhat like a duck, instead of inventing a new term for
this animal we might simply say that it is like a duck, but
it isn’t a real one.
We can grant Austin and critics of CPP that the
affirmative usage of “perfect/real” can be understood only
if we can grasp ways in which a given thing can be
“imperfect/fake.” This is quite in line with our previous
observation that we can be said to conceive of a triangle
as perfect only if we can conceive of imperfect instances.
Yet this is not the presupposition relation identified by
CPP. Rather, the claim is that in order to conceive of
various ways of being a fake duck, we must already possess
the concept of a duck. According to CPP, therefore, it is
the notion of a duck that “wears the trousers,” for the
terms “real” and “fake” as applied to ducks have
29
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significance only insofar as the term “duck” does. As Coval
and Forrest have argued in an article criticizing Austin’s
account on just this point, the term “real” is not an
adjuster word so much as a “re-adjuster word” since it not
only excludes particular ways of being not-real but adjusts
the meaning of the term it modifies back to the standard,
“for if it merely excludes then it ambiguously leaves open
the matter of whether or not other ways obtain under which
it might still be not a real x, i.e. whether it might still
be a temptingly aberrant rather than a re-adjusted x, a
real x.”32 Even though it is true that the term “perfect” in
the phrase “a perfect triangle” has significance for us
only in comparison with an imperfect one, the concept of
“an imperfect triangle” has significance only by reference
to the standard it adjusts (a triangle), and it is this
original notion of the standard that constitutes the idea
of the perfect in CPP.
Descartes’ argument is thus fully consistent with
Kenny’s claim that “the ability use a predicate is not
prior to, but identical with, the ability to use its
negation.” The predicate “infinite” in “infinite being” can
have significance for us only in light of the notion of
finite being (which is the apprehension of being as
32
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finite). But Descartes’ actual claim is not that it is the
apprehension of being as infinite or perfect that is the
prior notion, but merely the idea of being itself. Yet we
cannot be said to possess a notion of finite being without
the notion of being as such, for the notion of finite being
in CPP is the apprehension of being as finite. Though he
was aware that the term “infinite” could lead to such a
misunderstanding, Descartes explained that he retained it
since “usage demanded that I use the negation of a
negation. It was as if, to refer to the largest thing, I
had said it was not small, or had no smallness in it. But
by this I did not mean that the positive nature of the
infinite was known through a negation, and so I did not
contradict myself” (CSMK 192). The term “infinite” is a
“negation of a negation” because it is a re-adjuster word,
modifying (i.e., negating) the original negation, the
adjuster word, “finite.” Yet it does not follow that the
standard presupposed by the original negation (“finite”)
does not expresses “the positive nature of the infinite,”
for the positive nature of the infinite is being itself.
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C. The Standard of Perfection
It is clear that in order to apprehend a figure as an
imperfect triangle we must already possess the idea of a
triangle as such. Similarly, in order to apprehend a
creature as a finite or imperfect being, we must already
possess a concept of being as such. Yet there are two
further features of the triangle example that may not apply
to the case of infinite and finite being. First, the
standard of perfection appears to be arbitrary. If we
possess the concept of a figure that happens to be an
imperfect triangle, it seems we could employ this concept
as the standard and apprehend a figure that happens to be a
perfect triangle as an imperfect instance of this nontriangular figure. Second, employing a standard of
perfection here appears to be unnecessary. Even if we
lacked the idea of a triangle as such, we could still
conceive of a figure that happens to be an imperfect
triangle—we would merely be unable to apprehend it as an
imperfect triangle.33
The Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth raises these
concerns in his own, more extensive analysis of the process
by which we apprehend the imperfection of corporeal
33

Or we would be unable to conceive of it (mistakenly) as a perfect
triangle.

34

shapes.34 Clearly basing his discussion on the selections
from Descartes noted above, Cudworth also uses the analogy
of a portrait to explain the relationship between the
sensation of an imperfect triangle and the innate idea of a
(perfect) triangle. Noting how the idea of a perfect
triangle was only “occasionally or accidentally invited and
drawn forth from the mind” by the sensation of an imperfect
one, he argues that a similar process occurs when a drawing
of a face leads us to think of a man, or when a portrait in
a gallery prompts the idea of a friend.35 If one did not
possess a prior idea of a man or this friend, one “could
think of nothing but just that was impressed upon him by
sense, the figures of those inky delineations, and those
several strokes and shadows of the pictures.” But what
makes the idea of a man, or a triangle, the standard
according to which we measure the imperfection of other
things? After all, says Cudworth, “an irregular line and an
imperfect triangle, pyramid, cube, are as perfectly that
that they are [sic], as the other [perfect thing] is.”36
Descartes believes the idea of a “true” triangle is
the standard because the “idea of the true triangle was
already in us, and could be conceived by our mind more
34
35
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easily than the more composite figure of the triangle drawn
on paper.” Since innate concepts are both the earliest (as
present from birth) and the simplest in terms of their
intelligibility, they are naturally the standards according
to which we judge other ideas. In the Rules, for example,
Descartes characterizes those ideas he would latter deem
innate as “pure and simple nature[s]” (CSMI 22) that we can
grasp through “intuition,” i.e., a “conception of a clear
and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that
there can be no room for doubt about what we are
understanding” (CSMI 14).

Cudworth seems to explain the

priority in terms of these criteria as well. He claims that
“the mind naturally delights more to think of simple and
regular, than of compounded and irregular figures.”37
Further, he argues that

If there were no inward anticipations or mental ideas,
the spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer,
and every irregular and imperfect triangle being as
perfectly like to that, which is the most perfect
triangle, the mind now having no inward pattern of its
own before it, to distinguish and put a difference,
would not say one of them was more imperfect than
another; but only comparing them one with another,
[the mind] would say that this individual figure would
be as imperfectly the imperfect triangle as the
imperfect was the perfect.38
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Thus for both Descartes and Cudworth, there is nothing in
principle preventing us from treating the figure of what is
in fact an imperfect triangle as the standard. It is only a
psychological fact about us—our prior awareness of the true
triangle and the ease with which we grasp it in comparison
to the imperfect one—that leads us to treat the true
triangle as the “rule, pattern, and exemplar” for our
judgment.39

Descartes’ claim, in his conversation with

Burman, that “I could not conceive of an imperfect triangle
unless there were in me the idea of a perfect one, since
the former is the negation of the latter” need not
therefore be read as excluding the possibility that we
could conceive of the drawn figure of a triangle in some
other way or as possessing features a perfect triangle
lacks.

Rather, the significance of the claim that an

imperfect triangle is a “negation” of a perfect one is
simply that we cannot conceive of the thing before us as an
imperfect triangle except by comparing it to a triangle as
such. To conceive of an imperfect triangle in CPP is to
think of something exclusively in terms of the “real and
positive” feature of triangularity that it lacks.
Does the same analysis follow for being? Descartes
does believe that the idea of God is innate and supremely
39
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intelligible. In the Meditations, the narrator asserts that
the idea of God is “the first and most important” of “the
true ideas which are innate in me” (CSMII 46) and that the
content of this idea (or a perfect being) is “self-evident”
(CSMII 47).

Nevertheless, just as we may, somewhat

perversely but nevertheless coherently, apprehend a real
man as imperfect in comparison to an image of him (e.g.,
his lacking various features present in the image), so one
might argue that we could, in principle, treat creaturely
being as the standard according to which divine being is
apprehended as imperfect. However, Descartes believes we
cannot apprehend God as falling short of his creation since
there is nothing “real and positive” found in creation that
is absent in God. Note, for example, the following passage
in his 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes:

It is quite true that we do not understand the
infinite by the negation of limitation; and one cannot
infer that, because limitation involves the negation
of infinity, the negation of limitation involves
knowledge of the infinite. What makes the infinite
different from the finite is something real and
positive; but the limitation which makes the finite
different from the infinite is non-being or the
negation of being. That which is not cannot bring us
to the knowledge of that which is; on the contrary,
the negation of a thing has to be perceived on the
basis of knowledge of the thing itself. (CSMK 192)
(emphasis mine)
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In the triangle example, what distinguishes the drawn
figure from a perfect triangle could be attributed to
features of the drawn figure that the triangle lacks. For
example, the drawn figure could be said to possess a line
with a certain curvature absent in a true triangle. It
seems we could thus conceive of that which is a perfect
triangle in terms of its lacking features of the drawn
figure. Yet while each of these figures can be apprehended
as imperfect instances of the other because their
differences are attributable to the fact that each
possesses features that the other lacks, Descartes believes
that every perfection or reality found in creation must
exist in God. Creatures do not have anything “real and
positive” that God does not. “The idea of the infinite,”
says Descartes, “which includes all being, includes all
that there is of truth in things” (CSMK 377). Since we
cannot conceive of God’s being in terms of positive
features he lacks, we cannot measure him according to the
standard of creation.
Yet even if we cannot apprehend divine being as
imperfect in comparison to creaturely being, must we
conceive of creaturely being in light of a standard of
divine being? Just as we can grasp a given image as a
collection of “inky delineations” and “strokes and shadows”
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and hence without comparing it to (or having any idea of)
its model, or conceive of a figure that is an imperfect
triangle without comparing it to the standard of a true
triangle, can’t we conceive of that which is finite being
without conceiving it as finite being, i.e., without
comparing it to God?

In his own attempt to explain the

“paradoxical” notion of priority in CPP, John Carriero
suggests that the passages arguing for the priority of the
perfect “are best read as claims about how we, beings
endowed with an idea of God, conceive things that are
finite.”40 Other beings that happen to lack an idea of God,
he explains, would still be able to conceive of finite
things, but they would not be aware that they are limited
(qua beings).
Like Carriero, I am inclined to believe that Descartes
thinks we could conceive of creatures even if we lacked an
idea of God.41 Again, when Descartes asserts in the above
passage that “the negation of a thing has to be perceived
on the basis of knowledge of the thing itself,” he should
be interpreted as making the relatively uncontroversial
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claim, consistent with the triangle example, that
apprehending A as a negation of B presupposes a notion of
B. Just as I could conceive of a figure that happens to be
an imperfect triangle without comparing it to a true or
perfect triangle, so I could conceive of creatures (that
happen to be finite beings) without comparing them to
infinite being (God). Here it is important to see how the
kind of partial negation involved in the case of finite and
infinite being (or imperfect and perfect triangularity)
differs from the complete sort of negation involved in
examples such as darkness and light or being and
nothingness. Since darkness is not imperfect light, but its
complete absence, we cannot conceive of it except in terms
of the absence of the positive reality in question (light).
Yet creatures are not nothing—they have some reality of
their own. Just as the idea of an imperfect triangle is
more than the apprehension of the mere absence of
triangularity, but the idea of something that is like a
triangle though falling short of it, so the idea of
creaturely being is more than the apprehension of the
absence of being:

it is the idea of that which is not

being but like it, i.e., finite or imperfect being.
Yet the painting and triangle examples are, in a
significant respect, dissimilar to the case of creatures
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and God. If we lacked the idea of a (perfect) triangle we
could still conceive of things that happen to be imperfect
triangles by bringing them under some other concept of a
positive property they satisfy fully (e.g. closed figure).
Similarly, a painting of a man falls short of being a man,
yet we would nevertheless say that it is a perfect—that is
real or true—arrangement of shapes, piece of canvas etc.
There are countless ways in which we might say that the
painting fully satisfies the criteria definitive of a given
positive property. Indeed, it is only because the model
lacks positive features possessed by the painting that we
can (somewhat perversely) use the painting as the standard
and consequently apprehend the model as an imperfect
instance of the painting. Even if we lack knowledge of the
painting’s model and so cannot apprehend it with respect to
this standard, we can nevertheless grasp other real and
true aspects of it. But Descartes believes that every
creaturely property is either an imitation of a property
that exists formally (i.e., literally) in God or an even
more remote version of one that exists eminently (in some
higher way) in him.42 So while it seems that we could still
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conceive of creatures without a concept of God, we would be
unaware of the fact that these properties are, at best,
only imitations of the real thing.

IV. Cartesian CPP and Platonism
Adams has argued that the priority of the perfect is
“a main theme of the Platonic tradition.”43 Menn agrees,
asserting that the Cartesian doctrine is actually “the
crucial presupposition of Plotinus’ and Augustine’s
arguments for God, and is originally the teaching of the
Phaedo, arguing that the perfection of the approximately
equal depends on a recollection of the equal-itself.”44 Our
analysis of CPP provides further support for these claims,
for both (A) the identification of “perfect” with “real”
and (B) the claim that an explicit awareness of
imperfection is necessary for distinguishing thought of the
imperfect from that of the standard, are features that
interpreters have found within Plato’s metaphysics and
theory of recollection as well.

it can fill the role of that which does so correspond” (CSMII 114).
With respect to God, he says, we recognize that some of [the indefinite
attributes of which we have some idea] (such as knowledge and power)
are contained formally in the idea of God, whereas others (such as
number and length) are contained in the idea merely eminently” (Ibid.)
43
2008, 91.
44
1998, 283.
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A recurring theme within the Platonic tradition is an
identification of perfection and reality. In his own
analysis of the relationship between particulars and Forms
in Platonic metaphysics, Richard Patterson has drawn out
the consequences of such an identification. Patterson
argues that the resemblance relation between Forms and
particulars ought to be understood as analogous to that
obtaining between models and their images. According to
this reading, the imperfection of particulars in comparison
with Forms is like the imperfection of images with respect
to their models. Though using an image-model analogy to
understand Plato’s theory of Forms is not novel,
Patterson’s interpretation is especially relevant insofar
as he emphasizes that this analogy underscores a negative
relation between the perfect and the imperfect: the
imperfect, insofar as it is imperfect, is not of the same
nature as the perfect. As Patterson argues,

Plato’s stock examples of images—paintings, statues,
drawings, reflections in mirrors or water, dream
images, songs, images in poetry or prose—are in no
case related to their models as copies to standards or
as qualified to unqualified exemplars. In these cases
the image F is not ‘another real F such as its model’,
nor does it resemble its model with respect to being
F: the reflection of Cratylus in the mirror or on
water is not another Cratylus; the black-figure
warrior on a vase is not another, only qualified or

44

imperfect, warrior; the marble Hermes is not itself a
god.45
Just as an image of a horse is not a horse, so Patterson
argues that a particular horse is not really a horse in the
sense that the abstract nature of horse (the Form) is. A
given form F is perfectly F in the sense that it is really
F.46
Descartes uses a similar image-model analogy to
describe the relationship between the perfect and the
imperfect in CPP.47 The imperfect triangle resembles a
‘true’ one in the sense a shape carved within “a rough
block of wood” resembles the statue of Mercury, or the way
a portrait of a face resembles that of a “real” man.48 The
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1985, 20.
Patterson also uses Austin’s account of ‘real’ to illustrate his
interpretation: “The use of ‘real F’ as applied to a model or
paradeigma of this sort is what J.L. Austin called the ‘ellipsis
excluding’ use of ‘real,’ while ‘image’ or ‘imitation’, as contrasted
with ‘model’ or ‘original’ is akin to our usage in ‘imitation diamond’
or ‘imitation leather.’ To call the former ‘ellipsis excluding’ is to
observe only that the statement ‘this is a diamond’ will in certain
contexts be elliptical for ‘this is an imitation, but not a real,
diamond.’ A portrait labeled ‘Napoleon’ is not a real Napoleon, but
only –if we fill in the ellipsis –a portrait of Napoleon. On the other
hand when we say this is a real (true, genuine) diamond we mean to
exclude any such addition: This is no mere imitation, no piece of cut
glass that only sparkles like a diamond, but the genuine article[…]”
(1985, 21).
47
Adams observes that “Of the relations suggested by Plato as obtaining
between ordinary particulars and the Forms, the one most used in
structuring philosophical theologies has been that of an imitation or
imperfect copy to an archetype or exemplar; and something like that is
envisaged in Descartes’ top-down approach” 2007, 99.
48
Why does Descartes here use the analogy of an image of an image—a
wooden representation of a statue of Mercury? Perhaps he is here
observing a distinction between a perfect instantiation of a triangle
and the abstract geometrical nature of the triangle itself—which,
depending on your interpretation of Cartesian essences, may itself be
46
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same analogy is explicitly applied to the relationship
between creatures and God.

At the end of the Third

Meditation, for example, the narrator claims that “the mere
fact God created me is a very strong basis for believing
that I am somehow made in his image and likeness […].”
Later, the narrator notes that it is primarily in virtue of
his will that he appears to “bear in some way the image and
likeness of God” (CSMII 35). In fact, Descartes even uses
the image-model analogy to highlight the sense in which
creatures fall short of God. In the Fifth Objection,
Gassendi argues that while the notion that we “are made in
the image and likeness of God” is a principle of Christian
faith, he wonders “how may it be understood by natural
reason, unless you are putting forward an anthropomorphic
picture of God?” (CSMII 213). In response, Descartes argues
that it would be absurd to “deny that we are made in the
image of God” merely out of fear that this would “make God
like a man.” This objection, he says, is like

identical with the innate idea of a triangle. Descartes indicates that
the imperfection of the drawn triangle is its lacking features
definitive of triangularity (straightness of lines) not its being a
material instantiation of what is really an abstract object. Thus a
perfect instance of a triangle captures the essence of the abstract
entity in the way that a perfect statue of Mercury captures the nature
of the mythical being. Notice that this same ambiguity attends Plato’s
account of the imperfection of particulars: are they imperfect simply
because they are material instantiations rather than abstract objects,
or are they imperfect because, as material instantiations, they fail
(and necessarily so?) to exhibit qualitatively identical features?
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trying to deny that one of Apelles’ pictures was made
in the likeness of Alexander on the grounds that this
would mean that Alexander was like a picture, and yet
pictures are made of wood and paint, and not of flesh
and bone like Alexander […] It is not in the nature of
an image to be identical in all respects with the
thing of which it is an image, but merely to imitate
it in some respects. (CSMII 256-7)
Notice that in denying that images must be “identical in
all respects” with their models, Descartes is not
committing himself to the view that images must then be
qualitatively identical in some respects with their models.
Rather, an image must merely “imitate [imitetur] it in some
respects.” This passage is best read as supplying a
sufficient rather than a necessary condition for a thing’s
being an image—namely, if something is qualitatively
distinct in every way from something else, it could
nevertheless be an image of that thing so long as it
imitates it in some respect.49 Since a thing can be an image
of another thing without being qualitatively identical with
the latter in any respect whatsoever, treating creatures as
images of God does not presuppose any form of qualitative
49

So this still allows us to say that one thing could be an image of
another by virtue of being qualitatively identical in some respects.
Does this mean that the imitation relation is not a necessary condition
for being an image? I don’t think so, for it seems that we would want
to say that the former, considered as a whole and not with respect to
its individual qualities, still imitates the latter. The thing taken as
a whole is an imitation, though some of its attributes are copies
rather than imitations of some of the model’s attributes. Of course,
creatures cannot imitate God by being qualitatively identical with him
in any respect, and consequently they can be considered images only
insofar as they imitate (some of) God’s attributes.
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identity and hence does not lead to anthropomorphism. The
negative aspect, i.e., the feature that makes something
merely an image rather than a reproduction of a model, can
be secured by the imitation relation alone; an image could
imitate its model in every respect and still be merely an
image, so long as the relation is only one of imitation.
As we shall see in the next chapter, Descartes holds
that creatures are like God in only some respects, for God
has many (perhaps infinitely many) attributes that
creatures fail to imitate in any way. The above passage
indicates, however, that Descartes considered creatures to
be images of God not because they share qualities with him
in a limited number of ways, but because they, in a limited
number of ways, imitate him.50 Descartes’ use of the imagemodel analogy thus underscores the negative relation
implied in CPP—i.e., the claim that an imperfect thing is
imperfect insofar as it fails to be the same kind as the
perfect. As an imitation apple is not an apple, nor
imitation wood real wood, so the respects in which a given
image “imitates” its model are respects in which an image
is qualitatively distinct from its model. In this sense,

50

Perhaps, however, Descartes would hold that if creatures imitated God
in every way then they actually would possess a secondary-property in
common with God –that of the extensive infinitude of attributes.
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the image-model analogy has for Descartes the negative
significance of the image-model analogy used by Plato.
The image analogy is put under some strain within the
tradition of Theistic Platonism, however, as philosophers
and theologians sought to explain how the goodness or
reality of creation could be conceived as not representing
an addition to, or improvement upon, the goodness and
reality of God. Particularly, the image-model analogy could
lead one to the mistaken view that creatures differ from
God in terms of their possessing something God lacks. In
the example above, Descartes had suggested that the
imperfection of a painting consisted, in part, of its
having features (e.g. paint and wood) that are absent in
its model. Yet creatures cannot be said to differ from God
by virtue of having something God lacks, for Descartes is
committed to the view that whatever reality exists in
creatures exists formally or eminently (i.e. in some higher
way) in God. Indeed, David Schindler has argued that since
Plato normally invokes participation to explain the
positive relation between participants and Forms, there has
been some pressure within Theistic Platonism to find a
principle explaining the difference between creatures and
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God.51 Yet he argues that positing such a principle leads to
a dilemma of assuming either “a Gnostic ultimacy of two
principles, which is ultimately irrational, or to affirm
difference as an ‘unjustifiable’ fall from unity.”52 In the
Fourth Meditation, the narrator appears to grasp the second
horn of Schindler’s dilemma, ascribing his imperfection to
“participation in nothingness,” which he says is equivalent
to his simply lacking features of God:

I realize that I am, as it were, something
intermediate between God and nothingness, or between
supreme being and non-being: my nature is such that in
so far as I was created by the supreme being, there is
nothing in me to enable me to go wrong or lead my
astray; but in so far as I participate in nothingness
or non-being, that is, in so far as I am not myself
the supreme being and am lacking in countless
respects, it is no wonder that I make mistakes. (CSMII
38)
This passage suggests that the failure of creatures to be
qualitatively identical in any respect with God is to be
explained entirely in terms of their lacking features of
the “supreme being.” They differ from God either in terms
of failing to possess correlates of divine perfections, by
possessing qualitatively distinct imitations of divine

51

“Aquinas, following the classical philosophical tradition, affirms
that ‘that which is the principle of unity cannot be the principle of
difference.’ If this axiom is simply true, we can find a principle for
the difference of the image from the form—and ultimately of the world
from God—only by positing a second principle for difference” (2005, 4).
52
4.
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perfections, or in terms of possessing properties (such as
extension) that exist in God in some higher way
(eminently).
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Alexander Nehamas confessed that he had always been
puzzled as to why Plato would hold that a necessary
condition of the recollection of likes is an explicit
awareness that the object that reminds us “lacks something
in respect of being similar to that which is remembered.”54
Referring to Plato’s example of the portrait of Simmias,
Nehamas asks “Is it really necessary for me to realize that
Simmias' portrait, which reminds me of Simmias, does not
match the color of his hair? Must I, in one breath, realize
that I am looking at Simmias' portrait and that the
portrait is inaccurate?” He concludes, however, that the
awareness of imperfection is here necessary because it is
the only thing distinguishing the apprehension of the
imperfect from that of the perfect: “the fact that the
portrait does not duplicate all the features of its model
53

As we shall see in later chapters, understanding the resemblance
relation between creatures and God in terms of analogy might allow us
to understand why creation does not represent an addition to God’s
goodness or reality. Since the creaturely analogates of goodness and
reality are qualitatively distinct from God’s goodness and reality,
they are incommensurable. In his analysis of Aquinas, Gilson similarly
sees analogy as providing a solution to this problem (as well as to the
problem of pantheism): “A mere analogue of the divine being, the
created being can neither constitute an integral part of the divine
being, nor be added to it nor subtracted from it. Between two
magnitudes of different orders there is no common measure” (2002, 1334).
54
1975, 112.
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must be clear to the spectator if he is to be aware that he
is looking not at the model itself, but at a different
thing, its portrait or copy, which resembles the model in
certain relevant respects!”55
As we have seen, an awareness of imperfection plays a
similar role in Descartes’ account. Since our ideas of the
divine perfections are innate and supremely intelligible,
we are initially inclined to apprehend creaturely
imitations of these properties as instances of the real
thing. That the creaturely properties are merely imitations
can be evident to us only if we grasp their dissimilarity
to the divine properties. As Descartes puts it in the
Principles, “We pass from knowledge of God to knowledge of
his creatures by remembering that he is infinite and we are
finite” (CSMI 201). If we are to apprehend a drawing of a
face as an image of a face rather than a mere collection of
lines, we must grasp its likeness to a real face; but if we
apprehend this similarity without recognizing its
dissimilarity, then this image will be indistinguishable to
us from the real thing.

Likewise, if we are to apprehend

creaturely being and goodness as imitations of true being
and goodness, we must grasp their similarity to these
properties; but if we do not recognize that the creaturely
55

1975, 113.
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properties are imperfect, their likeness to the divine
properties will lead us to mistakenly treat them as
instances of genuine being and goodness.

V. Why Must the Narrator Compare himself to God?
Appreciating that “perfect” or “infinite” has the
significance of “true” or “real”

in CPP also allows us at

this point to address a common criticism of the Third
Meditation version of the argument. There, as you may
recall, the narrator had argued that his idea of the
infinite must be prior to the finite, for otherwise “how
could I understand that I doubted or desired—that is,
lacked something—and that I was not wholly perfect, unless
there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which
enabled me to recognize my own defects by comparison?”
(CSMII 31). Granting the narrator the uncontroversial point
that he can’t judge himself to be imperfect without
possessing some corresponding notion of perfection, critics
have nevertheless questioned his implicit assumption here
that the perfection in question must be absolute perfection
(i.e. God’s). Broughton, for example, asks “Why must he be
thinking, even implicitly, that he is not God-like?”56 All
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2002, 149.
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he needs in order to think of himself as imperfect, so the
argument goes, is an idea of something a little more
perfect than he is—an idea of a person who knows a bit more
that he does, for example. He can remain uncertain as to
whether this thing itself is “wholly perfect,” for all that
he needs in order to understand that he is not “wholly
perfect” is the awareness that something is “more perfect”
than he is.57
Yet this criticism fails to recognize that the
argument from doubt expresses the narrator’s sense that he
is imperfect as a thing. Indeed, at this point in the
Meditation, the narrator knows only that he is a thinking
thing and it is qua thing that he judges himself to fall
short. After all, the line immediately preceding the
argument from doubt asserts that it is the narrator’s idea
of God understood as an infinite substance (or “thing”)
that is prior to the idea he has of himself understood as a
finite substance (“thing”).58 That it is as a thing that the
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This is not, in fact, a new criticism—Gassendi raises this very
critique in the Fifth Set of Objections: “you might have known a man
who was healthier, stronger, better looking, more learned, more
restrained and hence more perfect than you; if so, it would not have
been difficult for you to conceive an idea of this man and, by
comparing yourself with it, to come to understand that you did not have
the same degree of health, strength and the other perfections that were
to be found in him.” (CSMII 208)
58
And as Bernard Williams observes, if Descartes is here claiming to be
himself imperfect as a man rather than as a being, then “he has no
proof that he is imperfect—for perhaps a perfect man is one whose
experiences include doubt and sorrow” (1978, 147).
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narrator judges himself to be imperfect is crucial for
understanding the sense of perfection that is here being
employed, for throughout his works Descartes often uses
“perfection” as a synonym for “reality.”59 Derived from the
Latin term res or “thing,” realitas or “reality” can be
glossed as “thinghood” or “thingness.”60 When Descartes
compares items according to their perfection understood as
thinghood or reality, he usually does so in terms of a
three-tiered ontological hierarchy: “There are various
degrees of reality or being: a substance has more reality
than an accident or a mode; an infinite substance has more
reality than a finite substance” (CSMII 117). Kenny thus
concludes that, taken in this way, Descartes’ ontological
hierarchy “does not admit of degrees.”61 When Descartes
talks about one thing being more perfect qua thing than
another, he is making a comparison across these ontological
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In his argument for the causal principle in the Third Meditation, for
example, he equates “more perfect” with “contains in itself more
reality” (CSMII 28). Carol Rovane observes that, in addition to “the
‘degrees of reality’ conception associated with the Principle: what is
more perfect is literally more real” there are at least three other
senses of perfection at work in Descartes. 1) A thing can have
“perfections in the plural” in the sense that “one thing can possess
various perfections.” Here “perfection” is more or less synonymous with
attribute or property; 2) there is also “the more familiar notion of
attributive perfection: with respect to a given property, one thing may
be perfect or imperfect”; finally, 3) “the notion of absolute
perfection associated with the idea of God” (1994, 95). See also Kenny
1968, 134-5 and Wee 2006, 98-9.
60
Adams 103
61
1968, 134.
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categories, not within them.62 Thus the idea of another
finite thinking thing, even one vastly more intelligent and
powerful than he, could therefore never explain the
narrator’s awareness of his imperfection qua thing, for the
narrator is no less a thing than any other finite thinking
thing to which he can compare himself. Similarly, the idea
of a sweet and crisp apple could never enable me to
apprehend a bland and mushy apple as imperfect in the sense
of failing to be an apple, for one is neither more nor less
an apple than the other. Since no finite substance is more
of a thing than he is, the narrator’s apprehension of his
own imperfection qua thing can be explained only by his
possessing an idea of that which has “more reality” than
finite substance, and the only thing that has “more
reality” than finite substance is infinite substance (i.e.,
God).
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The story is more complicated than this, however. Though the threepart ontological hierarchy suggests that all finite substances have an
equivalent amount of formal reality, Descartes suggests in the Sixth
Meditation that finite thinking substances are more “noble” than finite
extended substance insofar as minds, unlike bodies, are indivisible—a
claim that some have linked to the narrator’s suggestion in the Third
Meditation that his mind might contain modes of extended substance
eminently. That finite extended things might fall below finite thinking
things in the hierarchy is, however, irrelevant with respect to the
argument from doubt in the Third Meditation since the same conditions
for the narrator’s grasping his imperfection (his possessing an idea of
that which is more perfect qua thing than he is) would hold. For a
detailed description of this complication of the three-part hierarchy,
see Schmaltz 2008, 52-56, 67-71). My position is also consistent with
the suggestion that when Descartes talks about necessary features of
the (formal) causes of objective reality (of ideas), he may be invoking
a more detailed ontological hierarchy.
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One might object, however, that it makes no difference
whether the argument from doubt assumes that all finite
substances are equally perfect (or equally imperfect) qua
things, for the notion of degrees of “reality or being”
(“thinghood”) itself makes no sense. Edwin Curley remarks
that “we do not naturally think of either being or
perfection as admitting of degrees.”63 Indeed, the notion of
degrees of reality struck Hobbes as nonsensical as well:
“Does reality admit of or more and less? Or does he think
one thing can be more of a thing than another?” (CSMII
130).64 If one thing is no more a thing than any other, then
it is hard to see how the idea of anything, even a divine
thing, could give Descartes a sense of his own imperfection
qua thing.
In fact, his account is consistent with the
commonsense intuition Curley and Hobbes express. That
Descartes describes being or reality as something that
63

1978, 129.
Descartes’ response to Hobbes provides further evidence for Kenny’s
claim that, for Descartes, “reality does not admit of degrees.” Instead
of explaining degrees of reality by citing gradations of perfection
within the categories of creatures (finite being), which would be to
understand “perfection” in its most common sense, Descartes once again
explains the distinction of degree in terms of a distinction in kind:
“I have […] made it quite clear how reality admits of more and less. A
substance is more of a thing than a mode; if there are real qualities
or incomplete substances, they are things to a greater extent than
modes, but to a lesser extent than complete substances; and finally, if
there is an infinite and independent substance, it is more of a thing
than a finite and dependent substance” (CSMII 130). His account here is
somewhat more complex since includes a distinction between complete and
incomplete substances.
64
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comes in “degrees” or increments of “more and less” is
misleading, for it suggests that “being” “real” or “thing”
is here used univocally.65 So as we might say that two
apples are both sweet even though one is sweeter,
Descartes’ language seems to allow us to say that even
though God’s being is greater than our own, we are
nevertheless both beings in the fullest sense of the term.
Yet as we have noted earlier, the term “being” cannot be
univocal since God alone is true being. Descartes’ explicit
assertion in the Principles that “substance” is not a
univocal term is indeed a consequence of his position that
“infinity” signifies “the very essence of substance.” There
he states that “the term ‘substance’ does not apply
univocally, as they say in the Schools, to God and to other
things; that is, there is no distinctly intelligible
meaning of the term which is common to God and his
creatures” (CSMI 51).
That “substance” or “being” as applied to creatures
and God are not used univocally is indeed required by CPP.
A “perfect” thing is perfect, according to CPP, in the
sense that it is a “true” or “real” thing, and an
65

As I will describe in Ch. 3, Aquinas sometimes uses comparisons of
“more” and “less” in cases where univocal predication is not possible.
We can reconcile Descartes’ denial of univocity with his use of “more”
and “less” by interpreting these comparisons as analogical in the sense
indicated by Aquinas. God is “more” of a thing than any creature in the
sense that he alone is a genuine thing (substance).
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“imperfect” thing is apprehended as imperfect qua thing
insofar as it is seen as falling short of this standard.
Understood according to this sense of perfection, a finite
substance is apprehended as finite or imperfect insofar as
it fails to be a true substance or thing, just as a wax
apple is apprehended as an imitation apple because it fails
to be a genuine apple. And as we wouldn’t say that an
imitation apple falls short of the genuine article by
virtue of having a very low degree of appleness, so we
ought not be misled into concluding that finite being or
substance falls short by virtue of having only a very low
degree of being or thinghood.

VI. The Criteria of True Substance
That substancehood, like triangularity, is something
that does not admit of degrees, can be seen more clearly if
we describe the criteria of true substance (or ‘thinghood’)
according to which the narrator in the Meditations judges
himself as falling short. In the passage from the
Principles where Descartes denies the univocity of
“substance,” the explanation for this denial is a
distinction in terms of ontological dependence: “there is
only one substance which can be understood to depend on no
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other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all
other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with
the help of God’s concurrence” (CSMI 51). In his own effort
to understand Descartes’ talk of “degrees” of being, Curley
isolates the dependence criterion as providing evidence for
the claim that the scale of being has only three levels
(and that, consequently, any two finite substances have the
same degree of being). According to this reading,
“differences in degree of formal reality are a function of
differences in degree of one property, the capacity for
independent existence.”66 Yet Curley’s suggestion that the
distinction ought to be understood in terms of variations
within a shared property—“the capacity for independent
existence”—is misleading. There are degrees of dependence,
and thus we might say that modes are more dependent than
finite substances since the latter require only God for
their continued existence whereas modes depend on finite
substances too. Yet the narrator does not grasp God as
possessing a very minimal degree of dependence—God is not
merely the least dependent being conceivable. God is
apprehended as “independent,” as not exhibiting any
dependence whatsoever.
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1978, 129.
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Though Bernard Williams notices that Descartes’
dependence criterion leads him to deploy the term
“substance” in a somewhat equivocal way, he doesn’t think
much of significance follows from this. Indeed, he thinks
we can still speak of degrees of being within the category
of substance. Though Descartes uses the term “substance” in
two different ways, Williams claims that “since all he
means by this is that the first sort are created, and God
is not, it comes to very much the same thing.”67 Yet the
dependence criterion is not the only one cited in the
Meditations. In fact, at the time of the argument from
doubt in the Third Meditation, the narrator has not yet
grasped his imperfection as a dependent thing. Rather, here
he judges himself to be imperfect by virtue of his
incompleteness. The narrator tells us that his
understanding that he “doubts and desires” is significant
because it is an understanding that he “lacked something.”
The implication is that he is here comparing himself to
something that is lacking nothing, something that is
“wholly perfect.”68 The idea of substance as such is an idea
67

1978, 136.
The narrator’s awareness of his own incompleteness follows an
apprehension of his intellectual limitations. Stephen Menn observes
that God serves “not just as a standard of perfection in general, but
specifically as a standard of intellectual perfection to the soul”
(1998, 286). Since, at this point in the Meditations, the narrator’s
only item of knowledge is that he is a thinking thing, it is natural
that the standard of perfection according to which he will judge
68
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of something complete or “wholly perfect” in the sense that
“whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as being real
and true, and implying any perfection, is wholly contained
in [the idea of] it” (CSMII 32).

Because this completeness

is definitive of substance as such, anything that is seen
to lack all that is “real and true” will be apprehended as
imperfect in the sense that it falls short of completeness
and hence falls short of true substancehood.
That the narrator would view completeness as a
criterion of true substancehood is likely a reflection of
the fact that Descartes held there was only a conceptual
distinction between a substance and its attributes.
Attributes are not, in other words, properties that inhere
in substances. A body does not, properly speaking, have
extension—it is extension. More precisely, every substance
is identical with its principal attribute, its “essence,”
and it is through this principal attribute that other
invariable features, other attributes of the substance, are
conceived.69 As the earlier quoted passage from Descartes

himself will be an intellectual one. As he describes in his
Correspondence, the idea of God at this point is an idea of
“intellectual nature in general,” an idea “if considered without
limitation, represents God, and if limited, is the idea of an angel or
a human soul” (CSMK 55). Indeed, it was this notion of intellectual
nature in general that the narrator examined in the Second Meditation.
69
“A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but
each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature
and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus
extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of
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suggests, the essence or principal attribute of substance
is “actually infinite and immense, true and real
perfections” which “is not an accident added to the notion
of substance, but the very essence of substance taken
absolutely and bounded by no defects.” To conceive of real
or true (infinite) substance is to conceive of that which
is “actually infinite and immense, true and real
perfections.” As we will explore further in the next
chapter, Descartes held that “the essences of things are
indivisible” in the sense that “an idea represents the
essence of a thing, and if anything is added to or taken
away from the essence, then the idea automatically becomes
the idea of something else” (CSMII 256). Thus to conceive
of that which fails to be “actually infinite and immense,
true and real perfections” is to think of some other
essence, and is thus to conceive of something that falls
short of substance as such.
We should not therefore attribute Descartes’ denial of
univocity to the dependence criterion alone, for the
corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking
substance. Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes
extension, and is merely a mode of an extended thing; and similarly
whatever we find in the mind is simply one of the various modes of
thinking. For example, shape is unintelligible except in an extended
thing; and motion is unintelligible except as motion in an extended
space; while imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only in a
thinking thing. By contrast, it is possible to understand extension
without shape or movement, and thought without imagination or
sensation, and so on; and this is quite clear to anyone who gives the
matter his attention” (CSMI 210-11).
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narrator’s intuition in the Third Meditation is that he is
imperfect qua thing insofar as he is “incomplete and
dependent.” When Descartes says that “there is no
distinctly intelligible meaning of the term [substance]
which is common to God and his creatures,” we can take him
at his word and thus understand him to be including the
completeness criterion as well. Substance as such is
complete, and anything that fails to be complete cannot be
a true substance.

Indeed, when the narrator summarizes the

conclusion of the argument from doubt at the beginning of
the Fourth Meditation, both criteria are noted: “[W]hen I
consider the fact that I have doubts, or that I am a thing
that is incomplete and dependent, then there arises in me a
clear and distinct idea of a being who is independent and
complete, that is, an idea of God” (CSMII 37).70 Again, the
narrator’s apprehension of imperfection is not expressed in
terms of seeing that God possesses the highest degree of
something he possesses less of, but through noticing
70

Descartes seems to suggest that completeness might be ‘contained
within’ the concept of an independent thing, though it is not obvious
that the assertion “an independent being is complete” is analytically
true since, in the Meditations, he seems to portray completeness as
merely something an independent being would have the power to achieve.
But in his reply to Arnauld, Descartes suggests the relationship is one
closer to logical entailment: “a being whose essence is so immense that
he does not need an efficient cause in order to exist, equally does not
need an efficient cause in order to possess all the perfections of
which he is aware: his own essence is the eminent source which bestows
on him whatever we can think of as being capable of being bestowed on
anything by an efficient cause.[…] his essence is such that he
possesses from eternity everything which we can now suppose he would
bestow on himself if he did not yet possess it.” (CSMII 168).
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properties—completeness and independence—that he (and
indeed every creature) lacks absolutely. The narrator
grasps himself as imperfect insofar as he falls short of
genuine substancehood, and he fails to be a true substance
because he lacks the completeness and independence that are
definitive of true substance.
A critic might grant the claim that the narrator’s
reference to completeness and independence lends support to
the earlier assertion that his sense of imperfection in the
argument from doubt is an awareness of falling short of
substance as such. Yet completeness and independence are
second-order properties, i.e., properties that supervene on
more basic (first-order) ones.

If the first-order

properties prove to be shared, it could be argued that the
qualitative break suggested by the reference to binary
second-order qualities is only superficial. The narrator
judges himself to be incomplete with respect to knowledge
and dependent insofar as he lacks the power to preserve
himself in existence.71 So even if we accept the claim that
the narrator’s awareness of his own imperfection in the
argument from doubt is an awareness that he is not a true
71

In response to Arnauld, Descartes asserts that “the inexhaustible
power of God is the cause or reason for his not needing a cause” (CSM
165). The narrator’s awareness that he is incomplete arises through his
being aware that he lacks knowledge and power. Menn argues, however,
that at this stage of the meditation power reduces to knowledge since
the power of a thinking thing consists in the ability to know.
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substance, if the distinction between a “true” substance
and a “false” one is merely a matter of God possessing more
knowledge or power than we do, then the significance of the
argument from doubt is thrown into question. This is so
because the standard of substance according to which we see
ourselves falling short would appear to be something we
could generate by modifying ideas of our own properties.
For example, one might arbitrarily designate a “real” apple
as that which possesses a high degree of sweetness and
crispness. One might then view a less sweet or crisp one as
thus failing to be an apple in this strict sense.72 Yet
since the distinction between being an apple and failing to
be one is thus a difference of degree of shared properties
(sweetness, crispness), there is no reason to think that
the standard itself is something we could not have created
by modifying our ideas of the fruit that fell short.
Likewise, if the standard of true substance (God) diverges
from our own nature merely by degree, then it would appear
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We do something similar in everyday speech. However, rather than
using ‘perfect’ as a synonym for ‘real’ or ‘true’ we will use ‘real’ or
‘true’ as a synonym for ‘perfect,’ and hence without really implying
that the imperfect instance would thereby fail to really be a thing of
the same sort. So, for example, I may point to an exceptionally
impressive automobile and exclaim, “now that’s a real car,” but in
doing so I am not saying that less impressive instances fail to be
cars. In the above example, however, the claim that only really sweet
and crisp apples are truly apples does imply that less sweet and crisp
ones are not apples.
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to be something we could create by amplifying ideas of our
own attributes.
Yet Descartes will explicitly deny that any attribute
can be predicated univocally of creatures and God. When
comparing creaturely freedom to God’s freedom, for example,
he asserts that “no essence [attribute] can belong
univocally to both God and his creatures” (CSMII 292). In
fact, the existence of a qualitative distinction between
divine attributes and creaturely ones is a crucial premise
in his arguments against the claim that we can derive ideas
of divine attributes by amplifying our ideas of creaturely
ones. I cannot, for example, arrive at a concept of divine
power or knowledge by simply modifying my notion of my own
power and knowledge because God’s power and knowledge
(which are true power and knowledge) differs in kind from
my own. Given God’s simplicity, every one of his attributes
is a primary attribute and hence identical with his
essence. Descartes will concede that we normally become
aware of these qualitatively distinct attributes through a
process of amplifying ideas of creaturely attributes, yet
he will deny the claim that this process of amplification
generates these concepts. Rather, we are able to arrive at
concepts of divine attributes in this way only because an
implicit awareness of them was already guiding the process
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from the beginning.

Amplification merely helps us make

these latent notions explicit.
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Ch. II. CPP and the Amplification Argument
It should at this point be clear how CPP works as a
response to the claim that the notion of God is a mere
negation of our notion of creaturely imperfection. Since
the judgment that something is imperfect insofar as it
falls short of being presupposes a notion of being, the
argument from negation can’t even get off the ground.
Descartes’ critics, at least those found in the Objections
and Replies appended to the Meditations, give little
indication that they understood, much less accepted, this
argument.73 In their responses to Descartes, however, they
introduce a different argument against the claim that the
idea of God is innate: we generate our idea of God by
amplifying our notions of creaturely attributes. In the
Second Set of Objections compiled by Marin Mersenne, the
argument is presented that we can “find within ourselves a
sufficient basis” for constructing an idea of God: “for
surely I can see that, in so far as I think, I have some
degree of perfection, and hence that others besides myself
73

Gassendi, for example, takes Descartes’ argument from doubt to be
claiming that our awareness of imperfection is relative to the object,
rather than the fact, of desire. Using the example of bread, he
objects, “when you desire some bread, the bread is not in any sense
more perfect than you or your body; it is merely more perfect than the
emptiness of your stomach.” Descartes responds that “the fact that
someone desires some bread does not imply that the bread is more
perfect than he is, but merely that someone who needs bread is in a
more imperfect state than when he does not need it” (CSMII 254).
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have a similar degree of perfection. And this gives me the
basis for thinking of an indefinite number of degrees and
thus positing higher and higher degrees of perfection up to
infinity” (CSMII 88).

74

Gassendi provides a similar

argument in the Fifth Set of Objections: “Although every
supreme perfection is normally attributed to God, it seems
that such perfections are all taken from things which we
commonly admire in ourselves, such as longevity, power,
knowledge, goodness, blessedness and so on. By amplifying
these things as much as we can, we assert that God is
eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good, supremely
blessed and so on” (CSMII 200).
If the amplification argument assumes that we begin by
apprehending a creaturely attribute as imperfect in the
absolute sense of failing to be the same kind as the
perfect, then the argument has no more force than the
argument from negation. This is so because we obviously
need to have an idea of the kind the creaturely attribute
falls short of if we are to apprehend it as imperfect in
this sense. In their own analyses, Adams and Carriero
suggest that CPP is intended to address the argument from
amplification in precisely this way.75 Menn too argues that
74

It is suspected, however, that most of these objections were written
by Mersenne himself. See editor’s comments (CSMII 64).
75
Adams 1996, 96; Carriero 2009, 192-4.
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the argument against amplification is the same as the
argument against negation: “I cannot reach the idea of an
infinite being by negating the idea of limits or amplifying
the idea of a finite being, since I conceive of a finite
being by adding the idea of limits to the idea of being as
such, and being as such is infinite.”76
Yet one wonders why our idea of God couldn’t be
constructed by amplifying concepts of creaturely attributes
that are not judged to be imperfect in the sense of failing
to be the same kinds as the perfect.77 To use Descartes’
triangle example, we might grant that in order to judge
that something is an imperfect triangle I must possess the
idea of a (perfect) triangle, but why couldn’t I conceive
of the drawing as the figure it is and then modify this
idea so as to reach the idea of a triangle? That perceiving
the drawing happened to be the occasion for my conceiving a
perfect triangle suggests that it in some sense resembles a
triangle; and if it resembles a triangle close enough to
reliably trigger the idea of one, rather than the idea of a
square or a circle, why couldn’t modifying this idea of it,
76

1998, 284.
Broughton argues that it is not enough for Descartes to show “that
his idea of God is implicit in his explicit recognition of his
imperfections” (2002, 151). Granted that we can’t conceive of ourselves
as imperfect in the sense of falling short of God without an idea of
God, it may nevertheless be the case that this presupposed idea of God
was itself constructed from our ideas of creatures in a way that did
not involve any such awareness of imperfection.
77
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or viewing this idea in comparison to other similar ideas,
enable me to produce the idea of a triangle? Similarly,
even though apprehending a particular instance of
creaturely goodness as failing to constitute true goodness
presupposes a notion of goodness as such, what if we
apprehend creaturely goodness without reference to goodness
as such? Why couldn’t we form the concept of (perfect)
goodness by manipulating this notion?78
The amplification argument does appear to assume that
we apprehend a creaturely property as imperfect in some
sense, for otherwise there is no rationale guiding the
process of amplification itself. Boyle, for example, may
indeed be right when she argues that “unless we had noticed
that our own qualities are limited, we would not see that
they can be extended and amplified.”79 Yet it does not
follow that an awareness of limitation would presuppose a
notion of God, for we need only be aware of a more perfect
creature to see that we are limited in some respect. In the
version of the argument provided by Mersenne, it is implied
that we apprehend a given property as imperfect relative to
others that differ by “degree.” Thus one could argue that

78

The same sort of argument would not work for the argument from
negation. Negating features of properties that are finite, but not
apprehended as finite, could yield concepts of only diminished
creaturely properties.
79
2009, 74.
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we can generate an idea of God by amplifying our ideas of
creaturely perfections that are judged to be imperfect
relative to other creaturely attributes of the same kind.
For example, we may notice that one creature is less
powerful than another creature, and then hypothesize that
this latter creature’s power may be similarly imperfect
relative to some other creature, and so on. Or from the
idea of my own power I could derive the idea of a being
with less power, and from a comparison between these I
could derive the idea of “twice as powerful” (or whatever
the given ratio may be).

It seems I could then generate an

idea of a being twice as powerful as myself, and so on. The
idea of divine power would then be what is yielded by our
amplifying our idea of creaturely power as far as we can.
This sort of amplification argument has also been put
forward by modern critics such as Broughton and Rovane.80
The amplification arguments provided by Mersenne and
Gassendi are more complicated, however, than they first
appear. This is because both the anonymous author in
Mersenne’s objection as well as Gassendi deny that we
possess ideas truly representing the infinite in the first
80

Rovane asks, for example, whether “the idea of perfect knowledge, in
contrast with which Descartes’ idea of his own epistemic imperfection
can be made intelligible, be construed as the (negative) idea of
indefinitely perfected knowledge, and could this idea be derived from
Descartes’s ideas of his actual states of knowledge and their relative
perfection?” (1994, 97-8). See also Broughton 2002, 146-153.
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place. Their amplification arguments are not intended to
assume the explanatory burden of demonstrating how we
generate the notion of God Descartes claims we have (i.e.,
an idea representing God’s essence), but rather intended to
show how we create the comparatively impoverished idea of
God that, according to these critics, we actually have.81
Given God’s greatness in comparison to us as well as our
own intellectual limitations, Gassendi suggests that the
idea produced through amplification doesn’t really capture
God’s nature: “We have no basis for claiming that we have
any authentic idea which represents God; and it is more
than enough if, on the analogy of our human attributes, we
can derive and construct an idea of some sort for our own
use—an idea which does not transcend our human grasp and
which contains no reality except what we perceive in other
things” (CSMII 200). Hobbes asserts something similar in
his own series of objections. He mistakenly assumes that
Descartes equates having an idea of God with having a
81

The version of the amplification argument provided by Mersenne is
difficult to interpret on this score. It is only after the argument is
provided that the author claims that “you do not have the idea of God,
just as you do not have the idea of an infinite number or an infinite
line” (CSMII 89). It is therefore not clear whether the anonymous
author takes the argument to show that Descartes’ idea of God can be
constructed by such amplification, or if it is merely intended to show
how some lesser idea is or could be constructed. Redefining the content
of the idea in question is a standard empiricist response to purported
candidates for innate ideas. Showing how a supposedly innate idea could
be derived from sense experience becomes much easier if it assumed that
the idea does not have the unique or rich content the rationalist
thinks it has.
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mental image of God, and then goes on to explain how such
an image can be constructed by ideas (images) of things we
have sensed.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that
Descartes appears to agree that the idea of God is, in a
sense, reached through a process of amplification. In a
letter to Regius, for example, he responds to the claim
that “it is because we have in ourselves some degree of
quantity [of wisdom, power, goodness and the other
perfections which we attribute to God] that we form the
idea of an infinite quantity” with the surprising statement
that “I entirely agree, and am quite convinced that we have
no idea of God except the one formed in this manner” (CSMK
147). In response to Hobbes’ question as to where we obtain
the idea of God’s understanding, Descartes argues that,
since everyone is aware that there are things he
understands, “everyone has the form or idea of
understanding; and by indefinitely extending this he can
form the idea of God’s understanding. And a similar
procedure applies to the other attributes of God” (CSMII
132). Indeed, as we shall see in his replies to Mersenne
and Gassendi, Descartes will apparently concede that we
conceive of the divine attributes through a process of
amplification.
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At first glance, therefore, one could take Descartes
to be agreeing with his critics that our idea of God is
wholly constructed out of our ideas of creaturely
properties. Indeed, his primary concern often seems to be
showing that the amplification procedure is nevertheless
compatible with his Third Meditation “Trademark” argument
for the existence of God. In a letter to Hyperaspistes, for
example, he asserts that even though we have the ability to
reach notions of divine attributes by amplifying ideas of
our own, God himself must have given us this ability or
“power”: “I did not deny that there is a power in the mind
of amplifying the ideas of things; but I frequently
insisted that the ideas thus amplified, or the power of so
amplifying them, could not be in the mind unless the mind
itself came from God, in whom there really exist all the
perfections which can be reached by such amplification. I
proved this from the principle that there can be nothing in
an effect which was not previously present in the cause”
(CSMK 192). He makes similar claims about the necessary
causal origin of this “power” in most of his responses to
the various amplification arguments.82 If this sort of
response were taken to represent the whole of Descartes’
reaction to the amplification argument, it would seem that
82

He does this in response to Mersenne’s anonymous author (CSM II 100)
and in response to Gassendi (CSM II 255).

76

only a certain faculty, and not an idea of God, is
presupposed by our ability to amplify our way to ideas of
divine attributes.

I. Amplification and Innateness
Anyone familiar with Descartes’ critique of scholastic
pseudo-explanation in natural philosophy, however, would
notice that this conclusion presents us with an
incongruity. One of the reasons Descartes rejected the
scholastic theory of forms was his belief that appeal to
such forms lacked explanatory force.

His basic objection,

as Desmond Clarke puts it, is that “one cannot explain any
phenomenon merely by attributing a quality or form to it
which is named after the effect to be explained.”83 It would
be odd, however, if Descartes were to deny that a sleeping
pill’s effectiveness could be adequately explained by
citing its dormative power, while at the same time
accepting that our ability to modify ideas of creaturely
attributes so as to arrive at ideas of divine ones is
sufficiently explained by citing a “power” of
amplification.84

83

2003, 19.
Nicholas Jolley provides a clear statement of the dilemma as it
appeared to Malebranche: “[W]hen the defender of innate ideas resorts
to talk of faculties, his claim must be empty unless such faculties can
84
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In fact, Descartes does not always treat this faculty
as explanatorily sufficient, for in one place he explicitly
states that the “power” of amplification is to be explained
by the existence of an innate idea.85 In his response to
Gassendi’s claim that the idea of God does not have more
objective reality than the (amplified) ideas of finite
things taken together, Descartes asserts that

be grounded in non-dispositional properties of the mind. In the case of
physical objects it is possible to see how such a grounding requirement
for faculties or dispositions can be satisfied; the non-dispositional
properties will typically be persistent structural modifications of the
kind discovered by science. But no such solution seems readily
available to the de-fender of innate ideas, for it is not clear how one
can speak of persistent structural modifications in the case of
immaterial minds. Thus the hypothesis of innate ideas is in danger of
being explanatorily empty” (78, 1988). As I will argue below, the
innate idea of God could be such a “persistent structural modification”
of the mind. David Rosenthal has addressed the incongruity of
Descartes’ appeal to faculties in his account of mind, yet he argues
that appeal to the faculty of thought, the faculty of judgment, or the
faculty of will is not intended to be explanatory but are “reductive in
spirit” and hence a “handy way to talk about the abilities a thinking
thing must have” (Rorty 1986, 422). This may be true for the broader
faculties Rosenthal cites, but it seems to me that Descartes does
invoke the “power” of amplification as part of an explanation for our
ability to reach concepts of divine attributes by modifying creaturely
ones. That Descartes goes on to identify this power with possession of
an innate idea suggests that he indeed recognizes that such a power
needs to be explanatorily grounded by reference to, in this case, the
existence of an innate idea of God.
85
Menn 1998, 285; Adams 2007, 95-6; Boyle 2009, 73; Carriero 2009, 1934; and Beyssade 1996, 180, have all noted that Descartes’ considered
response to the amplification argument is the claim that we must
possess an idea of God (or at least the perfect attribute in question)
in order to reach an idea of a divine attribute by amplifying an idea
of a creaturely one. They do not, however, appeal to the qualitative
difference between creatures and God to explain why such an innate idea
is required. Rather, these thinkers usually just cite Descartes’ letter
to Cleselier in which he asserts that the idea of being is the idea of
infinite being. The problem with this response, as I have indicated, is
that it does not address the possibility that we might amplify ideas of
creaturely perfections that are not apprehended as finite/imperfect.
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you yourself admit that these perfections must be
amplified by our intellect if they are to be
attributed to God. So do you think that the
perfections which are amplified in this way are not,
as a result, greater than they would be if they were
not amplified? And how could we have a faculty for
amplifying all created perfections (i.e. conceiving of
something greater or more ample than they are) were it
not for the fact that there is in us an idea of
something greater, namely God? (Italics mine) (CSMII
252)
That our ability to conceive of something “greater or more
ample” than created attributes is to be explained by our
actually possessing an idea of this greater and more ample
thing is entirely consistent with Descartes’ account of
innate ideas. Notice, however, that the “faculty” or
“power” is not simply identified with the idea but is
explained by it. Descartes’ account of innateness is often
mistakenly read as claiming that an innate idea is nothing
more than a disposition (or “power”) for having an
occurrent idea. Yet such a reading fails to distinguish the
act of perception (the idea’s formal reality as a mode of
the mind) from the content of the perception (the idea
considered in terms of its objective or representational
reality).

A given thought with a given representational

content can be characterized as “innate” insofar as we
always had “within ourselves” the faculty for “summoning it
up.” Yet this faculty itself is explained by our possessing
innately the idea as an objective reality. We have within
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ourselves the power for having a given thought with a given
content because we quite literally already possess the
objective content featured within the occurrent thought.86

86

I agree with Boyle in her recent (2009) effort to provide a single,
coherent account of Descartes’ theory of innate ideas. She suggests
that ideas are innate insofar as we possess ideas understood as
objective content (ideaO), and it is these (ideasO) that enable us to
have certain occurrent thoughts (ideasM). Yet the problem with Boyle’s
account is that she never explains in what sense ideasO could be said
to ‘reside’ in the mind without being the object of an act of thought
(ideaM), for Descartes is usually interpreted as holding that every act
of thought (ideaM) takes an object (ideaO) and every objective content
(ideaO) is the object of an act of thought (ideaM). It is difficult to
understand how conceptual content (ideaO) could ‘exist’ without being
an object of thought. I would argue, however, that Boyle’s position can
be reconciled with this doctrine if we can show that the ideaO of God
is an implicit object in every act of thought (ideaM). Such an account
would draw on Descartes’ occasional portrayal of ideas as innate in the
sense of being logical entailed by, i.e., ‘contained’ within, occurent
ideas (see McRae 1972). Descartes states that there are “certain
primitive notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of
which we form all our other conceptions. There are very few such
notions. First, there are the most general—those of being, number,
duration, etc.—which apply to everything we can conceive” (CSMK 218).
So we might argue that everything is conceived, at least implicitly, in
light of a notion of infinite being. Thus the ideaO of infinite being
could be said to be implicitly contained in every act of thought
(ideaM). And not only would our possessing this ideaO explain the
capacity to have an occurent ideaM of God, but by virtue of containing
the reality of creatures, the ideaO of God could explain the faculty of
summing up any innate idea—with, perhaps, the exception of the idea of
extension since this is not a formal feature of God. If this is
Descartes’ actual position, it would be somewhat similar to Leibniz’s
account in which dispositions for ideas are explained in terms of, or
grounded by, an infinity of unconscious experiences, i.e., ‘petites
perceptions’–though in Descartes’ case, the ‘infinite’ content would be
the reality contained within the ideaO of God. For Leibniz, says Jolly,
“when we ascribe a dispositional property to an object, there must be
some non-dispositional property in virtue of which it is ascribed; this
non-dispositional property will typically be a persistent structural
modification. Thus, in what Mates calls the paradigmatic example, the
sugar is soluble in virtue of its crystalline structure; the structural
description of the sugar, together with an appropriate law of nature,
jointly entail that the sugar is soluble in certain conditions. In
Leibniz's view, just the same basic principles apply when we ascribe a
dispositional property to the mind; for example, when we say that an
infant's mind has an innate idea of a triangle. There is the same basic
need for a persistent structural modification, but in this case it must
be a purely mental one” (1988, 86 emphasis mine). For Descartes, the
innate ideaO of God, implicitly contained in every act of thought
(ideaM) would, to use Jolly’s phrase, be a “persistent structural
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Thus we have Descartes’ frequent reference to innate ideas
as present but somehow submerged, waiting within the
“treasurehouse” of the mind to be brought to
consciousness.87
Why would we need to appeal to an innate idea of God to
explain our ability to amplify a given creaturely
perfection? In the account provided above, Descartes seems
to be arguing that any process of amplification presupposes
an innate idea. Yet is he really arguing that I could not
even amplify the idea of my own intelligence to arrive at
the idea of a slightly more intelligent creature unless I
possessed a corresponding innate idea?88 It may seem that
such a conclusion is required by Descartes’ claim that an

modification” of the mind, playing the same role of Leibniz’s petites
perceptions. On Leibniz’s distinction between mental dispositions
(which are always grounded by the properties of substances) and bare,
i.e., ungrounded, faculties (which he deemed absurd) see Jolley 1988,
86.
87
Those who interpret his account as identifying innate ideas with
dispositions are thus at a loss to explain why Descartes then refers,
in passages such as the following, to ideas as present but somehow
submerged: “a mind newly united to an infant’s body is wholly occupied
in perceiving in a confused way or feeling the ideas of pain, pleasure,
heat, cold and other similar ideas which arise from its union and, as
it were, intermingling with the body. None the less, it has in itself
the ideas of God, of itself and of all such truths as are called selfevident, in the same way as adult human beings have these ideas when
they are not attending to them; for it does not acquire these ideas
later on, as it grows older” (CSMK 190). Moreover, as the earlier
quotation from Jolley indicates, identifying ideas with dispositions
threatens to make a theory of innate ideas practically
indistinguishable from empiricist accounts, for surely the empiricist
will allow that we all have dispositions to form certain ideas given
certain stimuli.
88
Presumably, the innate idea would here be either the idea of such
creaturely intelligence or the idea of something more intelligent
(another creature or God).
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idea of that which has more reality cannot be derived from
an idea of that which has less. Yet our earlier analysis of
this principle shows that it does not force him to accept
such an implausible conclusion, for the idea of a more
intelligent creature is not the idea of something
possessing more reality than the idea of a less intelligent
one; as finite beings, each possesses exactly the same
degree of formal reality (or thinghood) as the other.
Indeed, Descartes’ actual claim is far more restricted than
an outright rejection of amplification as a means of
producing ideas. In his reply to Gassendi, he suggests that
the power of amplification calls for an innate idea of God
because of the nature of the difference between the
creaturely attribute amplified and the divine attribute
reached:

You agree that I can gradually augment, in varying
degrees, all the perfections that I observe in people,
until I see that they have become the kind of
perfections that cannot possibly belong to human
nature; and this is quite sufficient to enable me to
demonstrate the existence of God. For it is the very
power of amplifying all human perfections up to the
point where they are recognized as more than human
which, I maintain and insist, would not have been in
us unless we had been created by God. (italics mine)
(CSMII 255)
The explanandum is not merely the power to reach through
amplification ideas of greater human perfections, but the
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ability to reach ideas of perfections that are “recognized
as more than human.” It is our ability to reach through
amplification only these sorts of perfections that calls
for an innate idea of God. The question, then, is what does
Descartes mean by “the kind of perfections that cannot
possibly belong to human nature”?

II. Divine Perfections as Indefinite
It may initially seem that it is only the
quantitatively indefinite nature of our ideas of God that
precludes their being constructed from concepts of
creatures and hence presupposes innate resources. After
all, Descartes had agreed with his critics that we arrive
at ideas truly representing the divine perfections by
“indefinitely extending” the ideas we have of our own.
Throughout his works, he defines the indefinite as that in
which we perceive no limits. He portrays it as an
inherently negative notion in the sense that it merely
involves the recognition that we are unable to grasp the
limits of a thing.89 For example, he argues that we conceive
of bodies as “indefinitely divisible […] because it is not
possible to divide any body into such parts, that we do not
89

In the Principles, Descartes asserts that we conceive of a thing as
indefinite when we “negatively admit that their limits, if they have
them, cannot be found by us” (CSMI 202).
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understand each of these parts still to be divisible” (CSMI
202). He thinks a similar analysis applies to the
“extension of the world” and “the number of stars” that God
could create (CSMI 201). Descartes’ critics, however, had
taken the indefinite nature of our ideas of the divine
perfections to constitute evidence that these ideas are
wholly constructed from our ideas of creaturely perfections
and hopelessly incapable of representing their actually
infinite natures. Mersenne tells Descartes that “you do not
have the idea of God, just as you do not have the idea of
an [actually] infinite number or an [actually] infinite
line” because these ideas are merely concepts of creaturely
perfections extended indefinitely (CSMII 89).90
Descartes claims that there is more to our idea of the
indefinite than his critics seem to realize. Such ideas are
not objects “pictured in the imagination” but “perceive[d]
with the intellect, when the intellect apprehends, or
judges, or reasons” (CSMII 99). In this way, the idea of
the indefinite involves an intellectual apprehension of
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“For surely I can see that, in so far as I think I have some degree of
perfection, and hence that others besides myself have a similar degree
of perfection. And this gives me the basis for thinking of an
indefinite number of degrees and thus positing higher and higher
degrees of perfection up to infinity. In the same way, I can surely
take a given degree of being, which I perceive within myself, and add
on a further degree, and thus construct the idea of a perfect being
from all the degrees which are capable of being added on” (CSM II 88).
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something that lies beyond our power of conception.91 Citing
the example of an “indefinitely large number,” he suggests
that this intellectual recognition presupposes innate
resources:

Now in my thought or intellect I can somehow come upon
a perfection that is above me; thus I notice that,
when I count, I cannot reach a largest number, and
hence I recognize that there is something in the
process of counting which exceeds my powers. And I
contend that from this alone it necessarily follows,
not that an infinite number exists, nor indeed that it
is a contradictory notion, as you say, but that I have
the power of conceiving that there is a thinkable
number which is larger than any number than I can ever
think of, and hence that this power is something which
I have received not from myself but from some other
being which is more perfect than I am. (CSMII 99-100)
In addition to the apprehension that “when I count, I
cannot reach a largest number” there is the intellectual
recognition of “a perfection that is above me,” viz., “that
there is a thinkable number which is larger than any number
than I can ever think of.” Descartes goes on to assert that
when we consider what “power” could be responsible not only
for this idea of an “indefinitely large number” but for
“other attributes which can exist in the being that is the
source of the idea […] we shall find that it can only be

91

As I will later describe, Descartes distinguishes conceiving from
understanding.
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God” (CSMII 100).92 Thus the crucial feature distinguishing
our ideas of the divine perfections from our ideas of
creaturely ones—the feature that precludes the construction
of the former from the resources of the latter and hence
calls for an innate idea of God—would appear to be their
indefinite nature.
Aside from the question of why an idea of the
indefinite would presuppose innate resources, the above
account raises two significant issues. First, if the
distinction between divine and creaturely perfections were
merely quantitative, it would seem that creatures and God
could nevertheless be said to possess different degrees of
the same property. Just as an indefinitely large number is
still a number and an indefinitely long line still a line,
so it would appear that infinite power or infinite
knowledge would still be power and knowledge in the same
sense of the term. Such a conclusion would clearly
contradict Descartes’ denials of univocity elsewhere (e.g,
92

In the Conversation with Burman, however, Descartes asserts that this
argument is not intended to demonstrate the existence of God: “This
argument could not have any force for an atheist, who would not allow
himself to be convinced by it. Indeed, it is not suitable for this
purpose, and the author does not wish it to be understood in this way.
It must rather be conjoined with other arguments concerning God, since
it presupposes such arguments, and takes God’s existence as already
proved by them” (CSMK 340). The more perfect being established by the
argument is simply that which possesses the formal reality necessary to
confer upon us the innate idea that provides us with the power of
indefinite amplification. This notion of such a being is to ‘thin’ to
count as an idea of God, which is why the argument could not be
compelling for the atheist.
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“no essence can belong univocally to both God and his
creatures”).

Though Descartes believes that some

properties (e.g. such as the attribute of extension) cannot
be literally predicated of God since they are contained in
Him only “eminently” (i.e., they are part of God’s nature
only in the sense that he has the power to produce them),
those properties that are literally predicable of him,
i.e., contained in God “formally” (the pure perfections and
transcendentals), must be qualitatively distinct from their
creaturely instances.93 Yet if God’s perfections are in
reality qualitatively distinct from creaturely ones, then
this would seem to entail that Descartes’ critics are right
and that we do not, in fact, possess ideas truly
representing the divine attributes.
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In scholastic thought, the transcendentals are those properties that
are coextensive with being and hence common to all beings (thereby
“transcending” the traditional Aristotelian categories). Though there
was debate concerning which properties constitute transcendentals, they
often included unity, truth and goodness. Scotus later modified the
doctrine somewhat by defining transcendentals as those properties that
are not limited to a finite being or category. Following Bonaventure,
he introduced the disjunctive transcendental finite/infinite being —a
transcendental that Descartes appears to incorporate into his own
system. A pure perfection is, to use Scotus’ definition, any property
that is better than anything incompatible with it. Thus wisdom is
preferable both to its opposite (foolishness) as well as to being a dog
or a rock. All transcendentals are pure perfections, but not all pure
perfections are transcendentals (since wisdom, for example, is not
common to every being). See Seifert 1991, 909-11. For Scotus’ account
of pure perfections and transcendentals, see Wolter 1946. Though
Descartes clearly endorses a theory of pure perfections in his account
of God, his stance on the transcendentals is less clear. For his
treatment of transcendentals, see Clayton 2000, 170-171; Carriero 2009,
230-231; and Chappell 1997, 114.
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It was a commonplace in scholastic thought to deny
univocal predication on the basis of divine simplicity. Yet
since most scholastics were Aristotelian empiricists, they
believed that our conceptual resources were limited to what
could be derived from experience. Like Descartes’ own
critics, they consequently denied that we possess
quidditative knowledge of God’s essence or his
qualitatively unique perfections.94 Descartes, however,
boldly asserts that our (innate) idea of God “contains the
essence of God” (CSMII 78) and furthermore that God’s
“perfections are known to us more clearly than any other
thing” (CSMI 199).95 While he does not think that our
cognitive access to God’s nature is anything like the
complete or comprehensive understanding found in the
beatific vision, his philosophical theology, particularly
94

For Aquinas, possessing quidditative knowledge of something is to
have a definition of its essence. See Rocca 1993, 646.
95
Descartes does, however, qualify the first claim: “[T]his idea
contains the essence of God, at least in so far as I am capable of
understanding it.” As I shall argue later in this chapter, this
qualification is less significant than it may seem, for he believes
that such ideas really contain everything entailed by those features
necessary and sufficient for possessing the idea in the first place. In
itself, our idea of God is comprehensive insofar as it ‘contains’ the
entirety of the divine essence. Yet given our cognitive limitations, we
cannot achieve an explicit understanding of everything it entails. One
could interpret the second assertion—that God’s “perfections are known
to us more clearly than any other thing” —as the relatively
uncontroversial claim that what is known “more clearly than any other
thing” is merely that God has certain perfections, even though we don’t
really understand how they differ from our own. As I hope to make
clear, however, Descartes does believe that our innate ideas of these
perfections provide us with some insight into how God’s perfections are
qualitatively distinct from our own, and hence enable us to apprehend
our own perfections as imperfect in the absolute sense.
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his arguments for God’s existence, presuppose that we have
some understanding of the divine essence. Regarding the
ontological argument, for example, he asserts that

even if we conceive of God only in an inadequate or,
if you like, ‘utterly inadequate’ way, this does not
prevent its being certain that his nature is possible,
or not self-contradictory. Nor does it prevent our
being able truly to assert that we have examined his
nature with sufficient clarity (that is, with as much
clarity as is necessary to know that his nature is
possible and also to know that necessary existence
belongs to this same divine nature). […] In the case
of the few attributes of God which we do perceive, it
is enough that we understand them clearly and
distinctly, even though our understanding is in no way
adequate. (CSMII 108)
Moreover, as we will describe in detail in chapter VI,
Descartes holds that we can achieve insight into many
features that render God’s perfections qualitatively
distinct from their creaturely correlates. For example, he
thinks that we can understand that divine power would not
require pre-existing material on which to work and that
divine existence would exhibit not merely a very low degree
of contingency but absolutely no contingency at all. Though
he will argue that we can think of divine existence in
terms of God acting as his own efficient cause, he will
maintain that we can understand how the divine property of
deriving existence from oneself is only analogous to, and
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hence qualitatively distinct from, the property of deriving
existence from another.96
A second problem with viewing the indefinite nature of
the divine perfections as the sole feature precluding
construction of ideas of these perfections from ideas of
creaturely ones is the fact that, in numerous places
throughout his works, Descartes distinguishes our
apprehension of God’s essence and individual perfections
from our ideas of the merely indefinite. God’s essence and
attributes alone merit the designation “infinite,” for in
these cases, he says, “not only do we recognize no limits,
but also we understand positively that there are none”
(CSMI 202, italics mine).97 In the Third Meditation, the
narrator explicitly asserts that it is his apprehension of
God’s perfections (in this case, knowledge) as actually
96

Carriero provides a good general discussion of how Descartes’
approach to philosophical theology differs from Aquinas’ insofar as
Descartes assumes that we “start out with some cognitive purchase on
God’s essence or nature, that is, some positive knowledge of what God
is, as opposed to a merely negative and relative knowledge (e.g., as
the first mover unmoved of the motion we see in the world)” (2009, 8).
See especially 168-222.
97
Descartes provides two criteria distinguishing his use of “infinite”
from “indefinite,” only one of which is mentioned here. In addition to
our understanding that God cannot be limited, we also recognize that
God lacks limits in every respect, whereas, in the case of an
indefinite quantity, we are unable to recognize a limit in only some
respect. This latter criterion, which Margaret Wilson has dubbed the
“metaphysical criterion” (Rorty 1986, 340) appears to apply only to
Descartes’ use of “infinite” to describe God’s substance, which is
unlimitied in every respect in the sense that it includes every
perfection. It does not appear to apply to those cases where Descartes
describes God’s individual perfections as “infinite.” Since it is this
latter usage that is of primary interest in this chapter, I do not
address the metaphysical criterion in what follows.
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infinite, rather than indefinite ( “potentially” infinite),
that precludes the possibility that, by virtue of being
aware of a “gradual increase in my knowledge,” he might be
able to construct the idea of divine knowledge by
amplifying the idea of his own: “[E]ven if my knowledge
always increases more and more, I recognize that it will
never actually be infinite, since it will never reach the
point where it is not capable of a further increase; God,
on the other hand, I take to be actually infinite, so that
nothing can be added to his perfection” (CSMII 32).
It is not immediately clear what Descartes means by
this “positive” understanding distinguishing ideas of the
infinite from those of mere indefinite quantities.

98

In the

passage from the Principles where he distinguishes the two,
he argues that, in the case of indefinite things, “our
understanding does not in the same way positively tell us
that they lack limits in some respect; we merely
acknowledge in a negative way that any limits which they
may have cannot be discovered by us” (CSMI 202).99

The

numerical example suggests that it is in the nature of the
98

For an assessment of Descartes’ distinction between the actual
infinite and the indefinite in the context of the late scholastic
distinction between the categorematic and syncategorematic infinite,
see Ariew 1999, 166-71.
99
Henry More had suggested that Descartes was needlessly confusing
things: If a thing that appears infinite to us is not, in reality,
infinite, then it must be finite (Rorty 1986, 346). Some contemporary
scholars have likewise understood the category “indefinite” to be
merely an epistemological one.
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indefinite that we cannot conceive its limits, and it is
the recognition of this nature—the awareness of a
“perfection that is above me”—that ostensibly precludes our
constructing such ideas on our own. In the case of the
infinite, however, we also have what Cottingham calls a
“conclusive reason” to believe that the nature in question
cannot have any limits. Similarly, Margaret Wilson suggests
that our understanding of the divine essence and the divine
properties is positive insofar as we see it “includes or
entails unlimitedness.”100 We understand that it is in the
nature of God that we not only cannot conceive of him
having limits, but that he cannot, in fact, have any. But
why does an absence of limits follow from God’s nature?
What is this conclusive reason?
The answer can be found in Descartes’ response to
Mersenne’s amplification argument. There he begins with
what initially appears to be an admission that our idea of
God’s intellect differs from our own merely by degree,
insofar as it is amplified indefinitely: “the idea which we
have of the divine intellect, for example, does not differ
from that which we have of our own intellect, except in so
far as the idea of an infinite number differs from the idea
of a number raised to the second or fourth power. And the
100

1986, 353. Emphasis mine.
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same applies to the individual attributes of God of which
we recognize some trace in ourselves.” Since Descartes
consistently distinguishes our ideas of God’s perfections
from ideas of creaturely perfections extended indefinitely,
one would expect him to immediately qualify this assertion,
and he does so. Yet instead of saying that our ideas of
God’s perfections are distinct (and not constructible from
our own) by virtue of being “actually infinite,” he appeals
to the qualitative distinction that follows from divine
simplicity:

But in addition to this, our understanding tells us
that there is in God an absolute immensity, simplicity
and unity which embraces all other attributes and has
no copy in us, but is, as I have said before, ‘like
the mark of the craftsman stamped on his work.’ In
virtue of this we recognize that, of all the
individual attributes which, by a defect of our
intellect, we assign to God in a piecemeal fashion,
corresponding to the way in which we perceive them in
ourselves, none belong to God and to ourselves in the
same sense.” (italics mine) (CSMII 98)101
Descartes is here repeating the narrator’s insight, in the
Third Meditation, that “the unity, the simplicity, or the
inseparability of all the attributes of God is one of the
most important of the perfections which I understand him to

101

Though we will discuss this in further detail in a later chapter,
this puts him at odds with the Scotists who believed that divine
simplicity was, in fact, compatible with univocity.
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have” (CSMII 34).

102

Since God’s properties are identical

with his essence and so with each other, there must be a
qualitative distinction between, for example, the Goodness
that God is and the property of goodness that creatures
have. The distinction between our idea of an indefinite
magnitude (“the idea of an infinite number”) and our ideas
of God’s perfections is here the recognition that the
latter are qualitatively distinct from creaturely
perfections. One might initially view this qualitative
distinction as a second feature of divine perfections that,
in addition to their actual infinity, distinguishes ideas
of them from ideas of their creaturely correlates. Yet we
shall argue that our awareness of how God’s perfections
differ qualitatively from our own constitutes the
conclusive reason for apprehending God as unlimited. God’s
understanding, for example, is apprehended as infinite or
unlimited insofar as it is perceived to be true
understanding (a faculty of the understanding in the
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The narrator is responding to the imagined objection that even if his
possessing ideas of the perfections presupposes that they are “found
somewhere in the universe,” it does not follow that they must be
“joined together in a single being.” He responds: “[T]he unity, the
simplicity, or the inseparability of all the attributes of God is one
of the most important of the perfections which I understand him to
have. And surely the idea of the unity of all his perfections could not
have been placed in me by any cause which did not also provide me with
the ideas of the other perfections; for no cause could have made me
understand the interconnection and inseparability of the perfections
without at the same time making me recognize what they were” (CSMII
34).
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absolute or full sense, i.e., without qualification),
whereas creaturely understanding is apprehended as finite
or limited insofar as it is seen to fall short of this
kind.

III. The Infinite as the Absolute
The sense of “infinite” employed within CPP provides
us with a way of understanding Descartes’ distinction
between the indefinite and the infinite that captures a
qualitative difference between the two. We argued that when
Descartes uses “infinite” in the context of CPP, it has the
same significance “perfect” does when we say a circle is
“perfect” insofar as it is a true or real one. Just as we
can be said to conceive of a perfect circle by virtue of
conceiving of a circle, so Descartes asserts that “by the
mere fact that I conceive being, without thinking whether
it is finite or infinite, what I conceive is infinite
being” (CSMK 377). Here it is the idea of being as such,
not the notion of a greatest or most perfect being (in an
evaluative sense), that is equivalent to an idea of
infinite being. Like circularity, being is the sort of
perfection that cannot be had in greater or lesser degrees.
To possess it at all is to possess it in an unqualified
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fashion, i.e., fully, absolutely, or infinitely. A perfect
circle is in this sense “infinitely” circular insofar as it
cannot become “more perfect” qua circle and could thus be
said to possess the perfection of circularity absolutely or
without “limits.” Anything that possesses the perfection of
circularity in a limited or qualified fashion must, by
virtue of being a non-circle, fall short absolutely of the
perfection of circularity.103
That this sense of “infinite” is the “positive”
understanding to which Descartes alludes appears to be
confirmed by the distinction he draws between the
indefinite and the infinite in the very same letter to
Cleselier in which he equates the idea of being with that
of infinite being. He states that when “infinite” is used
to describe the divine substance (being), it signifies not
“the mere lack of limits” but a “real thing”:

By ‘infinite substance’ I mean a substance which has
actually infinite and immense, true and real
perfections. This is not an accident added to the
notion of substance, but the very essence of substance
taken absolutely and bounded by no defects; these
defects, in respect of substance, are accidents; but
infinity or infinitude is not. It should be observed
that I never use the word ‘infinite’ to signify the
103

This is, perhaps, the notion of infinity that Malebranche uses when
he characterizes such ideas as ‘infinite.’ That Descartes, however,
does not seem to use the term “infinite” (in the sense of actually
infinite) to describe anything other than God (with the exception of
the will) might be due to the fact that he prefers to use the term in
its traditional (theological) sense.
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mere lack of limits (which is something negative, for
which I have used the term ‘indefinite’) but to
signify a real thing, which is incomparably greater
than all those which are in some way limited. (CSMK
377) (emphasis mine)
When Descartes describes God’s essence as “infinite,” the
term signifies more than that we cannot conceive of God as
limited in number or degree of perfections. Rather, it also
signifies that we know that he cannot be limited in this
way because he is a “real thing,” i.e., a substance in the
full or absolute sense. As we indicated in the previous
chapter, the term “infinite” functions here as “the
negation of a negation” in the same way that terms “real”
or “true” do. To conceive of a substance is to conceive of
an infinite substance, in the same way that to conceive of
a thing is to conceive of a “real thing.” Substance as such
is therefore “incomparably greater” than finite substance
because finite substance is not true or genuine substance.
Since comparisons of degree or quantity can be made between
members of the same kind, no such comparison can be made
between something that is a substance in a true or
unqualified sense (i.e., infinitely) and something that
falls short of the kind.
A similar case can be made for the individual divine
perfections. They are infinite in essence insofar as they
are the “true and real” instances of the perfections in
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question.104 Though Descartes usually reserves this sense of
“infinite” (i.e., in the sense of “absolute”) for
descriptions of God’s perfections, he makes an exception
for the human will on account of its apparent resemblance
to the divine property. In a letter to Mersenne, he states
that “the desire that everyone has to possess every
perfection he can conceive of, and consequently all the
perfections which we believe to be in God, is due to the
fact that God has given us a will which has no limits. It
is principally because of this infinite will within us that
we can say we are created in his image” (CSMK 141-2). One
might initially assume that Descartes here describes the
will as “infinite” solely because the number of its
potential objects, i.e., its scope, appears unlimited. His
assertion that it is “principally because of the infinite
will within us that we can say we are created in his image”
should presumably be taken to say that it is the infinite
scope of our will that makes it like God’s. Naaman-Zauderer
initially suggests this in her own analysis, asserting that
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In the Conversation with Burman, Descartes uses the term “absolute”
instead of “infinite” to describe God’s perfections: “Since I know from
my idea of God that he is the most perfect being and that all absolute
perfections belong to him, I must attribute to him only what I know is
absolutely perfect. Now take any attribute that I can form an idea of
as meeting this requirement –anything I can think of as absolutely
perfect perfection: from the very fact that I can form an idea of it, I
know that it belongs to the nature of God” (Cottingham 1976, 20).
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we “experience our will as infinite in scope and, in this
respect, created in God’s image.”105
Yet, as Zauderer later acknowledges, Descartes does
not assert that the human will has the same scope as God’s,
for in the Meditations he asserts that one of the features
that distinguish the two is that God’s will “ranges over a
greater number of items.”106 In the above quotation from the
letter to Mersenne, our desire to possess “every perfection
[we] can conceive of” is not to be explained by the will’s
actually infinite scope, for in fact the number of
perfections that we can conceive of is proscribed by the
limits of the human intellect.107 The unlimited scope of the
will is more appropriately described as infinite in the
negative sense, i.e. as indefinite, insofar as we see that
it can apply itself to everything of which we can conceive.
That the will is “infinite” only in the sense of being
applicable to an indefinite range of objects appears to be
confirmed by Descartes’ admission, in the Principles, that
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2010, 138.
Zauderer: “Descartes does not endorse the view that our will extends
to every possible object, including all the objects of the divine will.
Rather, he argues that he cannot think of a faculty of choice greater
than the one he experiences within himself” (2010, 137).
107
Which is not to say that we cannot will things we do not understand
clearly and distinctly, for it is in this sense that the will’s reach
extends beyond the intellect. Yet, as Petrik argues, “when [Descartes]
says that the will extends beyond the intellect, he does not mean that
we have a contentless volition; rather he means that the content of the
volition is not clearly and distinctly perceived. It is a confused
perception, but a perception nonetheless” (1992, 126-7).
106
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the will’s scope entitles us to call it “infinite” only “in
a certain sense” (CSMI 204). In fact, Descartes explicitly
asserts that the principal feature that makes the human
will like God’s is not its scope but its nature or essence:

For although God’s will is incomparably greater than
mine, both in virtue of the knowledge and power that
accompany it and make it more firm and efficacious,
and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges
over a greater number of items, nevertheless it does
not seem any greater than mine when considered as will
in the essential and strict sense [in se formaliter &
praecise spectata]. This is because the will simply
consists in our ability to do or not do something
(that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid).
(CSMII 40) (emphasis mine)
In the same way that any apple, however mushy and bland,
possesses the perfection of being an apple in the full or
absolute sense, so the human will, though limited in terms
of the knowledge and power accompanying it, appears to
possess the perfection of being a faculty of the will in
the full or absolute sense. And just as a crisp and sweet
apple is not more of an apple than a mushy and bland one,
so the narrator says that God’s will “does not seem any
greater than mine when considered as will in the essential
and strict sense.” Zauderer, as well as other scholars,
therefore suggest that “infinite” has a dual significance
for Descartes when applied to the will. It refers not only
to the will’s unlimited scope (in which case the term
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“infinite” is being used loosely and is synonymous with
“indefinite”) but also to the fact that the human will is
infinite in essence.108 Gueroult agrees, characterizing this
sense of the term “infinite” as “absoluteness.” He argues
that “it is not through its capacity of indefinite
extension that will can be said to resemble God, but only
through its absolute faculty of deciding.”109Just as God is
“infinite” being or “infinite” substance because he has
that which is the “very essence of substance taken
absolutely and bounded by no defects”—viz., “infinite and
immense, true and real perfections”—so we appear to have an
infinite will because we have that which is the very
essence of the faculty taken absolutely and bounded by no
defects—viz., the ability “to affirm or deny, pursue or
avoid.” Like the circle, which is perfectly or infinitely
circular in the sense that it cannot be more perfect qua
circle, the human will, at least as it appears to our
finite minds, is “perfect and absolute,” a faculty of the
108

Zauderer: “Descartes alludes to another sense in which the human will
may be taken to be infinite and, as such, to bear a likeness to the
infinite will of God. He states that the divine will does not appear
any greater than the human will when considered as will ‘in the
essential and strict sense’” (80). Commenting on the above quotation
from Descartes, James Petrik asserts that “the will’s infinity does not
depend upon its having an infinite scope in actuality. […] No, the
will’s infinity or perfection consists in its simple essence, viz.,
choice” (1992, 128). See also Gueroult who, in addition to quantitative
infinity and infinity as absoluteness, identifies a third sense of the
term as “infinity in extension as infinite aspiration toward something
else that man does not have” (1984, 232).
109
Gueroult 1984, 232-3.
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will in the full or unqualified sense (CSMK 342).110

The

idea of a more perfect will, says the narrator, is “beyond
my grasp” (CSMII 40).
And just as something that possesses the perfection of
circularity in only a qualified or limited way cannot be a
true circle, the narrator asserts that a faculty cannot
really be a faculty of the will absent the perfection in
question, “for since the will consists simply of one thing
which is, as it were, indivisible, it seems that its nature
rules out the possibility of anything being taken away from
it” (CSMII 42). Thus the idea of the will is indivisible in
the very same sense that Descartes believes the idea of God
is, for “if anything is added to or taken away from the
essence, then the idea [of God] automatically becomes the
idea of something else.”111 In order to form a correct
110

The sense of “infinite” as absolute was also employed by Descartes’
rationalist successors. Leibniz, consistently distinguishes the idea of
infinite quantities from the idea of the “absolute” which expresses a
positive quality existing without qualification or limitation: “The
true infinite, strictly speaking, is only in the absolute, which
precedes all composition and is not formed by that addition of parts”
1981, 157-60. See Adams 1994, 115-19. Similarly, Spinoza
differentiates the idea of that which is infinite “as a consequence of
its own nature, or by the force of its definition” and consequently
“cannot be conceived to be finite” from both the infinite that “can be
divided into parts and regarded as finite” as well as the indefinite
(“that which is called infinite because it has no limits and that whose
parts we cannot explain or equate with any number, though we know its
maximum and minimum”) (1985, 200-2). Malebranche too appears to invoke
the infinite as absolute in his description of God as “the being
without individual restriction, the infinite being, being in general”
(1997, 240).
111
This is part of Descartes’ response to Gassendi’s objection to his
principle that “nothing can be added to or taken away from the idea of
God.” The full quotation: “it seems you have paid no attention to the
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conception of a will, I have to conceive of the power “to
affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid,” and if I do not
include this within my conception, then I cannot be said to
conceive of a faculty of the will. The priority relation
described by CPP would therefore apply to the idea of the
will just as it does to the idea of being or the idea of a
circle. I conceive of an infinite or perfect will merely by
conceiving of a will because every genuine will is and must
be a perfect instance of the faculty, just as every genuine
circle is and must be a perfect instance of circularity.
But in order to conceive of something as imperfect in the
sense of falling short of the faculty, I must possess an
idea of the faculty in question.
It is nevertheless true that God’s will must be
qualitatively distinct from our own insofar as it is, in
reality, identical with every other divine perfection and
the divine essence. Descartes argues that “there is always
a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of
which [God] simultaneously understands, wills, and
accomplishes everything” (CSMI 201).112 Yet even though we
common philosophical maxim that the essences of things are indivisible.
An idea represents the essence of a thing, and if anything is added to
or taken away from the essence, then the idea automatically becomes the
idea of something else. This is how the ideas of Pandora and of all
false Gods are formed by those who do not have a correct conception of
the true God” (CSMII 255-6)
112
See his May 27th 1630 correspondence with Mersenne: “[i]n God,
willing, understanding and creating are all the same thing without one
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understand that God’s will must differ qualitatively from
our own for this reason, the divine faculty does not appear
qualitatively distinct from our own when we consider it in
isolation from the other divine perfections.
However, when we conceive of the other divine
perfections as distinct properties, we do apprehend them as
differing qualitatively from our own. It is this implicit
awareness of qualitative difference that enables the
narrator to apprehend his own understanding as imperfect
qua faculty of the understanding [i.e., “considered […] in
the essential and strict sense”]. In the Fourth Meditation,
the narrator observes that, other than the will,

there is nothing else in me which is so perfect and so
great that the possibility of a further increase in
its perfection or greatness is beyond my
understanding. If, for example, I consider the faculty
of understanding, I immediately recognize that in my
case it is extremely slight and very finite, and I at
once form the idea of an understanding which is much
greater—indeed supremely great and infinite; and form
the very fact that I can form an idea of it, I
perceive that it belongs to the nature of God.
Similarly, if I examine the faculties of memory or
imagination, or any others, I discover that in my case
each one of these faculties is weak and limited, while
in the case of God it is immeasurable. It is only the
will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within

being prior to the other even conceptually” (CSMK 25-6); see also his
May 2nd 1644 letter to Mesland: “[N]or should we conceive any precedence
or priority between his intellect and his will; for the idea which we
have of God teaches us that there is in him only a single activity,
entirely simple and entirely pure” (CSMK 235).
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me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty
is beyond my grasp. (CSMII 40)113
In the above passage, the human faculty of understanding is
apprehended as “extremely slight and very finite” because
it is seen to fall short of true understanding.

Burman had

objected that “considered in this abstract way [i.e., in
the essential and strict sense], understanding is
understanding, and so our understanding too is not going to
differ from that of God, even though God’s understanding
ranges over a greater number of objects.” Yet Descartes
responds that we apprehend how human understanding falls
short absolutely, i.e., qualitatively, of the divine sort:
“But understanding depends on its object and cannot be
separated from it; so it is not the case that
‘understanding is understanding.’ Moreover, it is not just
that our understanding ranges over fewer objects than that
of God: rather, it is extremely imperfect in itself, being

113

Notice that the order of apprehension regarding the faculty of
understanding is precisely that which Descartes had described in his
statement of the priority of the perfect in this discussion with
Burman. There he had argued that, while our explicit awareness of
imperfection precedes the explicit apprehension of divine perfection,
the former insight presupposes an (implicit) awareness of the standard
in question (CSMK 338). Even though, in the order of explicit
awareness, we apprehend our faculty of understanding as imperfect
before we “form an idea of understanding which is […] supremely great
and infinite,” CPP indicates that we can apprehend our own faculty as
imperfect (in the essential and strict sense) because we already
possess a concept of true (infinite) understanding.
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obscure, mingled with ignorance, and so on” (CSMK 341).114
It is because divine understanding appears greater than our
own when “considered […] in the essential and strict sense”
that we are able to apprehend human understanding as
absolutely imperfect.115

Though we may ‘approach’ an idea

of such understanding by amplifying elements of our own, we
cannot thereby construct an idea of the divine property in
this way.
For Descartes, therefore, the faculty of the will is
the one respect in which we find ourselves incapable of
apprehending ourselves as absolutely imperfect with respect
to God. Our apprehension of our will’s absolute perfection
(or infinity) is thus a good model for how we understand

114

In what sense does understanding depend on its object? Petrik
suggests the following: “Descartes seems to be drawing upon the view
that there is no faculty of the understanding and that the
understanding is simply the sum total of all our perceptions. Thus, to
say that our understanding is finite [in this respect] is to say that
the number of our possible perceptions is finite. To say that our
understanding is limited is to say that our perceptions are limited
(1992, 130).
115
It is true that the narrator believes that each of his faculties,
including understanding, is “perfect of its kind” (CSMII 38). But this
does not mean that these faculties, when considered in the essential
and strict sense, do not fall short of God’s. Rather, they are perfect
of their kind insofar they don’t lack anything which they “ought to
have” (ibid.) given their function and place within “the whole
universe” (Ibid, 39). The faculty of the understanding, for example, is
perfect of its kind insofar as it, if used properly, does not lead to
error. Thus the narrator states that, even though God could have given
him a greater faculty of the understanding “I have no cause for
complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding or the natural
light which God gave me is no greater than it is; for it is the nature
of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things, and is the
nature of a created intellect to be finite” (CSMII 42).
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the divine perfections generally.116 To apprehend a
perfection as actually infinite is to see that it is a
complete or absolute (i.e. true) instance of this
perfection considered “in the essential and strict sense.”
Thus we apprehend God as actually infinite goodness,
wisdom, love, etc. because he alone has (or more properly,
is) the genuine or true instance(s) of these perfections.
We “understand positively” that these perfections are
unlimited in the same way that we see that a perfect circle
is unlimited with respect to the perfection of circularity.
With the exception of the will, the human analogues of
divine perfections are apprehended as “finite” or
“imperfect” insofar as they are seen as failing to be
instances of these perfections considered “in the essential
and strict sense.” We do not have lesser degrees of these
perfections—we do not have them at all.117

116

But as I will argue in the following section, though Descartes thinks
we understand God’s perfections, we cannot conceive of them (or
represent them to ourselves) except by using our own (amplified
indefinitely) as approximations. No such amplification is possible in
the case of the will, however, since the human will already appears
perfect in the absolute sense.
117
My interpretation of the term “infinite” is similar to a popular,
though not uncontroversial, interpretation of Spinoza’s use of the term
when he describes God as possessing “infinite attributes.” According to
thinkers such as Abraham Wolf (1972, 24-7) and Jonathan Bennett (1984,
75-8), this claim does not merely entail but is synonymous with the
claim that God possesses all attributes, i.e. every attribute that can
be instantiated. The claim is therefore compatible with God's
possessing a finite number of attributes (thought and extension),
assuming these are all the attributes that can be instantiated. Wolf
argues that “it is a sheer blunder to translate Spinoza’s infinite by
innumerable. And it is this mistranslation that is at the root of the
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IV. Amplification and Qualitative Difference
If Descartes believes that there is an absolute or
qualitative distinction between divine properties and
creaturely ones, why would he endorse amplification? If
human understanding is qualitatively distinct from divine
understanding, in what sense could the indefinite extension
of the former enable us to ‘reach’ an apprehension of the
latter? In the Conversation with Burman, Descartes
distinguishes the way in which we conceive of God’s
perfections—as indefinite—from the intellectual
apprehension of these perfections that we do indeed
trouble. By infinite Spinoza means complete or all. Again and again
Spinoza insists on his positive use of the term infinite; and again and
again he uses perfect (i.e., complete) or all as the equivalent of
infinite” (26). Similarly, Bennett argues that “It is on that reading
of ‘infinite attributes’ that Spinoza’s definition of ‘God’ is least
arbitrary, because best supported by the theological doctrine which he
was trying to capture. There was a strong tradition making God the ens
realissimum, the entity with the most possible reality, and Spinoza
hints that he has that in mind when he pauses to say in 1p9—which is
not mentioned anywhere else in the Ethics—that the more real a thing is
the more attributes it has […]. The concept of the ens realissimum
involves totality or supremacy , but not cardinality” (1984, 76-7)
Since Descartes sometimes uses the term “infinite” in a quantitative
sense, I am undecided as to whether he believes that God’s perfections
are infinite in number or merely in the way Bennett suggests. When it
comes to the infinity of the perfections themselves, however, I believe
that the significance of the term is that of absoluteness or totality.
Divine understanding is infinite in the sense that it is a perfection
of understanding in the fullest or most complete way, in the same way
that a circle is infinite insofar as it possesses the perfection of
circularity absolutely or without qualification, i.e., perfectly.
Though God may indeed know a quantitatively infinite number of things,
characterizing divine understanding as “infinite” in this sense does
not entail a quantitative infinity, but rather that God has the
perfection of understanding fully and hence that he knows everything
there is to know (which may or may not be an infinite number of
things). For a detailed analysis of the various senses of “infinite” in
Spinoza’s work, an analysis consistent with Wolf and Bennett’s
interpretation, see Kline (1977, 333-52).
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possess. The only way we can “represent [God’s perfections]
to ourselves” is by indefinitely extending their creaturely
correlates:

Take for example the perfections of God. We do not
imagine these, or conceive of them, but we understand
them: the way in which God understands all things in a
single mental act, or the way in which his decrees are
identical with himself, are things which we
understand, but we do not conceive of, since we
cannot, so to speak, represent them to ourselves.
Thus, we understand the perfections and attributes of
God, but we do not conceive of them—or, rather, in
order to conceive of them, we conceive of them as
indefinite. (CSMK 339)
Taken as a pure object of the understanding, Descartes
believes that an idea can be said to actually contain all
the content that is logically entailed by those features
that are necessary for that idea to be the object of one’s
thought in the first place, even if the person possessing
the idea does not or cannot distinctly perceive everything
it contains. Using the example of a triangle, Descartes
asserts that we would not deny that a “novice at geometry
has an idea of a whole triangle when he understands that it
is a figure bounded by three lines” merely because the
novice is unaware of further features entailed by the ones
of which he is aware. Likewise, “just as it suffices for
the possession of an idea of the whole triangle to
understand that it is a figure contained within three
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lines, so it suffices for the possession of a true and
complete idea of the infinite in its entirety if we
understand that it is a thing which is bounded by no
limits” (CSMII 254).

118

From the fact that we may

nevertheless be unaware of many of the attributes such a
being must accordingly possess, it does not follow that
these features are not contained within our idea, so long
as this idea truly represents God’s nature.119 In this way,
says Carriero, “my idea of God makes available to me God’s
essence in more or less the same way that my idea of a
triangle makes available to me its essence.”120
In his commentary on the above passage, Cottingham
argues that Descartes’ distinction between
118

The same claim in response to Mersenne: “No one can possibly go wrong
when he tries to form a correct conception of the idea of God, provided
he is willing to attend to the nature of a supremely perfect being.”
(CSMII 99) And in the Principles: “We can also have a clear and
distinct idea of uncreated and independent thinking substance, that is
of God. Here we must simply avoid supposing that the idea adequately
represents everything which is to be found in God; and we must not
invent any additional features, but concentrate only on what is really
contained in the idea and on what we clearly perceive to belong to the
nature of a supremely perfect being. And certainly no one can deny that
we possess such an idea of God, unless he reckons that there is
absolutely no knowledge of God to be found in the minds of men” (CSM
211). Descartes recognizes that there is, at least among non-experts, a
diversity of opinion about the nature of God. Yet he believes that this
can be explained as simply a failure to understand what is contained in
the idea. Using the triangle example, he notes that “although everyone
is aware of the idea of a triangle not everyone notices equally many
properties in it and some people may draw false conclusions about it”
(CSMII 257).
119
Nor is the idea of God or the idea of a triangle “augmented” or
changed as we discover further features entailed by their essences.
Rather, we are thereby only making our idea “more distinct and
explicit, since, so long as we suppose that our original idea was a
true one, it must have contained all these perfections” (CSMII 256).
120
2009, 172.
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“understand[ing]” and “conceiv[ing]” is the distinction
between having a concept and grasping or comprehending
(through a “kind of internal representation”) everything it
involves or contains.

121

As an illustration, he cites the

idea of a million pigs: “This is a notion which I can
clearly understand—I am perfectly aware of what is meant.
On the other hand, I cannot imagine or picture such a vast
number of pigs except in a very vague and confused way;
such are the limitations of the human brain.” In support of
this reading, he cites Descartes’ 1630 letter to Mersenne
in which he defends his claim that we understand God to be
the creator of the eternal truths: “I say that I know this,
not that I conceive it or grasp it; because it is possible
to know that God is infinite and all powerful although our
soul, being finite, cannot grasp or conceive him […] To
grasp something is to embrace it in one’s thought; to know
something, it is sufficient to touch it with one’s thought”
(CSMK 25).
Yet Cottingham’s example suggests that the reason why
we can’t conceive of God’s perfections—as well as the
reason why conceiving of the indefinite amplification of
our own could constitute an imperfect substitute for these
conceptions—is the quantitatively infinite nature of divine
121

1976, 75. In this sense, conceiving would fall somewhere between pure
understanding and imagination.
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perfections. Though we cannot conceive of a million pigs,
Cottingham argues that

[w]hat I can do, however, is to try to grasp, or ‘get
my mind round’ the bafflingly large number, so that my
conception of what is involved is rather more vivid
than the pure and simple understanding of what is
meant. One way of going about this might be to think
of ten groups of one hundred pigs; then think of this
number put together in a field; then think of a
thousand such fields. This seems to be the sort of
process which Descartes has in mind [in the passage
above] apropos of conceiving of the infinite
perfections of God: e.g. to grasp what is involved in
the concept of infinite knowledge, one has to think of
possessing a little more knowledge than one has at
present, and then a little more again than this new
amount, and so on.122
However, in the passage (above) from the Conversation with
Burman, the perfection at issue is not merely the uniquely
large scope of divine knowledge (which perhaps includes a
quantitatively infinite number of things), but “the way”
God knows these things “in a single mental act.” Menn
suggests that the single act by which God knows all things
is the apprehension of his own will. In this, he explains,
Descartes would be following scholastic tradition: “God
knows things outside himself because he knows his own will,
and because he knows the necessary truth (entailed by God’s
essence) that whatever God wills is as he wills it to be.
So God does not have to ‘look at’ or ‘make contact with’
122

1976, 76.
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things outside him, and his success in knowing does not
depend on anything outside his own essence: he ‘looks’ only
at himself (and from eternity, before there is anything but
God to look at), and his ability to know his creatures
depends only on his power to produce them as he wills.”

123

How could amplification, which is a purely quantitative
modification, give us cognitive purchase on such a
qualitatively distinct perfection?
Descartes’ explicit use of analogy in his account of
divine necessary existence will here prove to be especially
illuminating, for he uses a geometrical example to
illustrate the heuristic utility of conceptual
amplification in the context of qualitative distinction.
This example suggests that our cognitive access to the
divine perfections by way of creaturely ones is similar to
the cognitive access we have of certain geometrical figures
by virtue of the indefinite amplification of others. In his
reply to Caterus’ objection to characterizing God as selfcaused, Descartes argues that even though God is his own
cause only in the sense that his “inexhaustible power […]
is the cause or reason for his not needing an [efficient]
cause” we are nevertheless “entitled to think that in a
sense he stands in the same relation to himself as an
123

1998, 339.
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efficient cause does to its effect” (CSMII 80). In his
effort to justify the use of efficient causality as a model
for divine self-causation, he appeals to the “way in
geometry the concept of the arc of an indefinitely large
circle is customarily extended to the concept of a straight
line; or the concept of a rectilinear polygon with an
indefinite number of sides is extended to that of a circle”
(emphasis mine). Similarly, we conceive of divine selfcausation by amplifying our concept of efficient causal
power up to the point at which it includes the power to
preserve oneself in existence. This procedure, says
Descartes, is

necessary for guiding the natural light in such a way
as to enable us to have a clear awareness of these
matters. It is exactly the same sort of comparison
between a sphere (or other curvilinear figure) and a
rectilinear figure that enables Archimedes to
demonstrate various properties of the sphere which
could scarcely be understood otherwise. And just as no
one criticizes these proofs, although they involve
regarding a sphere as similar to a polyhedron, so it
seems to me that I am not open to criticism in this
context for using the analogy of an efficient cause to
explain features which in fact belong to a formal
cause, that is, to the very essence of God. (CSMII
168)
Though the details of the analogy Descartes proposes
between efficient and formal causes of existence will have
to be left to a later chapter, the geometrical example
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illustrates important features of Descartes’ understanding
of amplification as a tool for philosophical theology. In
the same way that an idea of a true circle cannot be
gradually formed by amplifying features of a polygon but is
attained when we ‘reach’ in thought the idea of a figure
that has the approximated perfection in the fullest way
possible (i.e., infinitely), so “the idea of God is not
gradually formed by us when we amplify the perfections of
his creatures; it is formed all at once and in its entirety
as soon as our mind reaches an infinite being which is
incapable of any amplification” (CSMII 256). Just as the
indefinite amplification of the number of sides of a
polyhedron does not enable us to construct an idea of a
sphere, so we cannot construct ideas of divine perfections,
or the divine essence, by amplifying ideas of ourselves
because amplification could never overcome the qualitative
gulf that separates the natures.124Nevertheless, as in the
geometrical example, we recognize that we can approach
(asymptotically) the notion of God by amplifying features
of ourselves. This procedure enables us to represent to

124

Leibniz (1981, 157) makes a similar claim in his response to Lockean
amplification arguments intended to show that our ideas of God are
nothing more than our ideas of creaturely attributes amplified
indefinitely, He argues that “The true infinite, strictly speaking, is
only in the absolute, which precedes all composition and is not formed
by that addition of parts.”
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ourselves certain aspects of the approximated figure that,
he says, “could scarcely be understood otherwise.”
We can use this geometrical analogy to understand
Descartes’ somewhat perplexing statements regarding the use
and value of amplification. Consider the perfection of
understanding. Descartes had agreed with his critics that
“everyone has the form or idea of understanding; and by
indefinitely extending this he can form the idea of God’s
understanding. And a similar procedure applies to the other
attributes of God.” This sort of statement seemed
incompatible with other remarks disparaging the value of
amplification for cognizing this perfection. In the Third
Meditation, for example, the narrator had argued that I
cannot generate an idea of God’s knowledge merely by
noticing a “gradual increase in my knowledge” since “this
is all quite irrelevant to the idea of God, which contains
absolutely nothing that is potential {but only what is
actual and real}” (CSMII 32) (emphasis mine).125 Yet if
God’s understanding alone is actual understanding, how can
the amplification of the false (human) perfection give us
any cognitive access to the genuine (divine) one?
If we take the geometrical example seriously, however,
the first thing we notice is that the indefinite
125

The parenthetical insertion “but only what is actual and real” was
added by Descartes to the French version of the Meditations.
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amplification of our idea of human understanding would be
the indefinite approximation of the perfection of God’s
understanding in the same way that the indefinite
amplification of our idea of a rectilinear polygon is the
indefinite approximation of the perfection of circularity.
Just as a rectilinear polygon is not a circle, and cannot
become one through the indefinite amplification of the
number of its sides, so human understanding is not true
(infinite) understanding, and cannot become such
understanding merely by indefinitely increasing its scope
or degree of certitude. Thus if Descartes’ critics were
right that our idea of God’s understanding is nothing more
than the idea of human understanding amplified
indefinitely, then we could no more be said to thereby
possess an idea of God’s understanding than we could be
said to possess the idea of a circle by virtue of
conceiving of a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite
number of sides.
Yet in the geometrical example, the process of
amplification is guided by an imperfect though real
understanding of the qualitatively distinct nature
approximated. Descartes argues that the reason we accept
the Archimedean analogy is because we already recognize
that a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of

117

sides resembles, but is not the same as, a circle.

126

Though

we recognize that only the circle possesses the perfection
of circularity in an infinite or unlimited fashion (i.e.,
truly) we understand that we can approximate infinite
(true) circularity by amplifying a rectilinear polygon. The
goal of the proof is not to ‘give’ us an idea of a circle,
for we already possess an understanding (albeit an
imperfect one) of this nature. Rather, the aim is to unpack
(or render explicit) elements of our idea of a circle that
we cannot represent to ourselves. Presumably, part of the
understanding amplification can confer in the proof we are
considering is an understanding of the approximate area of
a circle.

If we possess the concept of a circle with a

given set of dimensions, Descartes would hold that this
feature—the circle’s area—would already be contained within
our idea. Yet if we do not understand how to ‘unpack’ our
idea so as to represent to ourselves this feature—the exact
area of the figure—we can use analogous figures whose areas
126

As I will argue in the chapter on top-down derivation, Descartes
explicitly argues that the analogy at play here is one in which we
derive an analogous ‘common’ concept from concepts of analogous
entities. The analogy is not one of using the concept of one figure to
indeterminately represent another of which we have no positive
knowledge. Archimedes’ proofs presuppose a prior apprehension of the
similarity between the figures and thus a prior possession of both the
concepts of a polygon and a circle. Descartes imagines Archimedes
making this very point: “If I thought that a sphere could not be taken
to be a rectilinear or quasi-recitlinear figure with an infinite number
of sides, I should attach no force to my proof, since the proof does
not strictly apply to a sphere as a curvilinear figure but applies to
it only as a rectilinear figure with infinitely many sides.”
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we do know to represent to ourselves (conceive or grasp) an
approximation of this feature. Specifically, if we already
understand how to conceive (or represent to ourselves) the
area of a rectilinear polygon, inscribing a circle within
two such polygons whose sides are indefinitely extended
could give us an approximation of this circle’s area. This
procedure, however, already assumes that we recognize that
there is a fundamental resemblance between the figures.
Similarly, Descartes has argued that we already see
how divine understanding differs qualitatively from our
own. Even though we cannot conceive (represent to
ourselves) everything such a perfection entails—e.g., “the
way in which God understands all things in a single mental
act”—these features are really contained within our concept
of infinite (true) understanding. Yet because we can
represent to ourselves the (discrete) way in which humans
understand things, and we further recognize that this
faculty resembles the divine one, we can use ideas of this
kind of understanding to represent to ourselves
approximations of the divine perfection. We can, for
example, amplify indefinitely the scope and degree of
certainty of human knowledge, and then use this idea to
approximate the perfection of divine understanding, a
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reality that we can otherwise only ‘touch’ with our
minds.127
According to Descartes, the fundamental mistake that
his critics make regarding our cognition of God is not the
assumption that we conceive of the divine perfections by
conceiving of amplified versions of creaturely ones. He had
agreed, in his letter to Regius, that our idea of God is
“formed in this manner.” Rather, what his critics fail to
realize is that such amplification presupposes, and is
guided by, an innate understanding of the approximated

127

Or consider the example of eternity. The traditional view of divine
eternity is that God exists ‘outside’ of or ‘apart’ from time (see Helm
2014). We may conceive of eternity by extending the duration of a
thing’s existence indefinitely into the future, but this sort of
amplification does not provide one with a concept of eternity, but
merely sempiternity. Though Descartes doesn’t use this example, Leibniz
does in his New Essays on Human Understanding (1998). In response to
Philalethes’ objection that “we have no positive idea of an infinite
duration, i.e. of eternity,” Theophilus (the character espousing the
Leibnizian position) argues that we do have such a positive idea,
“provided that it is conceived not as an infinite whole but rather as
an absolute, i.e. as an attribute with no limits. In the case of
eternity, it lies in the necessity of God’s existence: there is no
dependence on parts, nor is the notion of it formed by adding times”
159. Philalethes retorts: ““Again we are apt to think we have a
positive comprehensive idea of eternity, which is as much as to say
that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly known in
our idea. But however great a duration someone represents to himself,
since what is in question is a boundless extent there must always
remain a part of his idea which his still beyond what he represents to
himself and which is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is,
that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity, or any other
infinite, we are very apt to tangle our selves in manifest
absurdities.” Theophilus responds by emphasizing, as Descartes does,
that the idea of the infinite is an object of understanding, not
something we can imagine: “[W]e have a ‘comprehensive’, i.e. accurate,
idea of eternity, since we have the definition of it, although we have
no image of it at all. But ideas of infinites are not formed by the
assembling of ‘parts’; and the mistakes people make when reasoning
about the infinite do not arise from their having no image of it”
(158).
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(qualitatively distinct) perfections in question.

We

recognize that we can ‘approach’ the nature of the divine
intellect by amplifying features of our own only because we
already grasp an underlying similarity between the two
faculties. In this way, amplification presupposes an innate
intellectual idea of the approximated nature. We do not
need to possess an idea of a circle in order to amplify the
number of sides of a rectilinear polygon; we do need such
an idea if the amplification includes the recognition or
insight that we can thereby approximate, but never reach,
the nature approximated. Similarly, we do not need to
possess an idea of divine power or knowledge in order to
use amplification to produce the idea of a more powerful or
knowledgeable creature; yet we do need to possess such
ideas if we are to amplify these human perfections “up to
the point where they are recognized as more than human,”
for this is to use and regard the amplified perfection as
an approximate representation of the qualitatively distinct
divine perfections.128

128

Emphasis mine. Though Jacques Maritain (1944) also takes these
mathematical examples to illustrate how Descartes viewed the role of
amplification for understanding God, he misunderstands their
significance. According to Maritain, the examples show “how Cartesian
thought is riveted to univocity [and hence to anthropormophism] and
confuses the metaphysical analogy of the creature to the creator with
an entirely different type of analogy—that of the passage to the
geometrical limit, which causes mathematically to pass from one
specific type to the other simply by increasing to infinity in the same
line” (125). On the contrary, the mathematical examples are used to
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Understanding “infinite” as expressing a qualitative
difference also explains why Descartes would hold that we
are always and necessarily in the position of novices when
it comes to representing to ourselves what is contained in
our ideas of God’s essence and perfections. In the Third
Meditation, the narrator asserts that we could never grasp
the nature of those perfections that we know are contained
formally in God, nor could we hope to understand, much less
grasp, the “countless” others that are undoubtedly in him
that have no creaturely correlates (CSMII 32). To this,
Gassendi objects that the narrator would forever lack a
“true” (complete) idea of the infinite. Yet Descartes
argues that the very fact that we can never represent to
ourselves everything contained within the idea is one of
the features contained within the notion of an infinite
being:

For the idea of the infinite, if it is to be a true
idea, cannot be grasped at all, since the
impossibility of being grasped is contained in the
illustrate the value of amplification in light of the recognition of
qualitative difference. Descartes never suggests that the indefinite
amplification of the number of sides of a polyhedron could enable us to
“pass” from the idea of this figure to the idea of a sphere. In these
examples, we already possess concepts of both, and amplification is
merely a heuristic tool for representing to ourselves features of one
by likening it to the other. The examples should not therefore be taken
to show that Descartes thought that our ideas of the divine perfections
are nothing more than ideas of creaturely perfections extended
indefinitely (which is a form of natural theology that critics such as
Gassendi had endorsed, and that Descartes, as I have shown, has
denied).
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formal definition of the infinite. Nonetheless, it is
evident that the idea which we have of the infinite
does not merely represent one part of it, but really
does represent the infinite in its entirety. The
manner of representation, however, is the manner
appropriate to a human idea.” (CSMII 253)129
Finite minds can grasp only finite natures. In other words,
since our faculty of understanding is radically imperfect,
we can represent to ourselves (conceive) only creaturely
being and creaturely perfections. As the narrator asserts
in the Fourth Meditation, “it is the nature of a created
intellect to be finite” and “it is in the nature of a
finite intellect to lack understanding of many things”
(CSMII 42). Even though God really is an object of our
understanding, his qualitatively distinct nature entails
that we cannot represent him to ourselves except in “the
manner appropriate to a human idea,” i.e., in terms of what
are qualitatively distinct creaturely perfections. The best
we can do is approach, or approximate, the divine
properties by indefinitely amplifying our own.
Adams and others are therefore right, in a sense, that
Descartes’ argument against amplification is the same as
the argument against negation. Yet this is not, as these
129

The fact of its incomprehensibility is, in this sense, a necessary
component of its intelligibility. Descartes uses the metaphor of a king
who discloses his majesty to his subjects by keeping his distance from
them. As Beysssade explains, “distance is a mark of majesty, and to
decrease familiarity is not to decrease knowledge, but to disclose to a
subject the true knowledge of his unequal relation to his king” (1992,
88).
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interpreters suggest, because we can’t conceive of
creaturely perfections without comparing them to standards
of divine perfection. Rather, it is due to amplification’s
inability to overcome the qualitative divide separating
infinite (true) perfections from finite (false) ones. A
polygon with an indefinite number of sides is still just a
polygon, and unless such a figure is apprehended as an
approximation of a circle, it could never represent the
nature in question (circularity). In other words, we must
conceive of the polygon as, or judge it to be, an imperfect
circle. And in order to do this, we must already possess,
however obliquely, a concept of a perfect (true) one.
Likewise, to apprehend indefinitely amplified creaturely
perfections as approximations of divine ones is to conceive
of them as, or judge them to be, absolutely imperfect
instances of divine perfections. As CPP indicates, we can
do this only if we already possess concepts of the perfect
attributes in question.

V. The Nature of the Qualitative Difference
The absolute or qualitative distinction between divine
and creaturely properties presupposed by CPP shows why we
cannot construct ideas of the former by amplifying those of
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the latter even in cases where we do not judge creatures to
be imperfect in the absolute sense. An idea of that which
has ‘more reality’ cannot be derived from an idea of that
which ‘has less’ for this apparent distinction in degree is
actually a distinction in kind.130 Descartes cannot,
however, be committed to the general view that, if two
properties are qualitatively distinct, an idea of one can
never be used to construct an idea of the other. That this
must be so is clear from the fact that he obviously thinks
that ideas of some creaturely perfections are derived (by
partial negation) from ideas of qualitatively distinct
divine ones.131 As we have mentioned in the first chapter,
the qualitative distinction at issue is a unique one:
130

David Cunning has also observed that “most commentators argue that
Descartes’ argument for the view that we do not compose an idea of
infinitude is that we would not have an idea of finitude unless we
first had an idea of infinitude” (2010, 116f). He argues, as I have,
that “Descartes is also offering the argument that we notice that our
idea of an infinite substance is an idea of more reality than is
represented by a composite of finite ideas.” Cunning does not, however,
explain what it means for infinite substance to have “more reality” in
this way and does not suggest, as I do, that it signals an absolute or
qualitative divide.
131
Does Descartes believe we can derive the idea of a creaturely
property from the idea of another qualitatively distinct creaturely
one? He does not seem to think that we can derive the idea of the
attribute of extension from the idea of the attribute of thought. In
fact, when he wants to emphasize the distinction between his ideas of
mental and extended created substance—which is clearly a qualitative
one—he notes that the difference between the two ideas is surpassed
only by that obtaining between our idea of God and creatures. If I
cannot generate an idea of mind by modifying an idea of body (or vice
versa), surely the idea of my own mind cannot enable me to construct a
concept of God’s. The supreme difficulty, however, will be in
explaining how I can nevertheless derive an idea of a finite mind from
that of God’s. Malebranche accepts a similar distinction between God’s
mind and our own, arguing that the term “mind” cannot be used
univocally of the two since “God is higher above created minds than
created minds are above bodies.” (1997, 250)
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creaturely attributes are qualitatively distinct by virtue
of being imitations of divine attributes. Descartes accepts
what may appear to be contradictory theses: 1) God
possesses all the reality or perfection found in creatures
and 2) nothing can be predicated univocally of God and
creatures since none of the pure perfections and
transcendentals exist in them with the same nature. This is
a paradox that we will address at length in the next few
chapters. For the moment, however, it is enough to note
that Descartes’ considered view must be that an idea of a
property can be derived from an idea of a qualitatively
distinct one only if the latter is a divine property.
Indeed, ideas of creaturely attributes, not divine
ones, are actually created through the process of
amplification. We do not need to possess an idea of a
divine attribute to apprehend a given creaturely attribute
as imperfect relative to another creature’s.132 Yet insofar
as the process of amplification requires us to view
creaturely attribute as absolutely imperfect, i.e.,
imperfect in the sense of failing to be the same kind as
the perfect, we thereby come to possess, for the first
time, the notion of this creaturely attribute as a thing
132

Which is not to say that we do not, as a consequence of possessing
concepts of divine attributes, thereby view one creaturely attribute as
more perfect (by degree) than another given the fact that it resembles
the divine attribute more closely.
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that resembles, but fall short of, a certain perfection.
Descartes’ triangle example can be used to illustrate how
the apprehension of imperfection constitutes the creation
of a novel idea.133 Prior to attaining the insight that the
drawn figure is an imperfect triangle, Descartes claims we
apprehended it simply as a triangle. Though grasping its
imperfection enabled us to then see that this original
notion of a geometrical triangle was in fact the notion of
a perfect one, we did not thereby augment this latter
notion. We do, however, emerge with a new idea—that of a
thing that resembles, but falls short of, a triangle. This
is an idea that is distinct from both the notion of a
triangle and the figure apprehend as a mere assembly of
lines. This new idea of an imperfect triangle is created
via what Descartes here calls a “negation,” though
elsewhere he clarifies that this is really a partial
negation, a matter of “taking something away” from the idea
of being in general. The idea that would be produced by a
complete negation would simply be the idea of a thing that
is not a triangle. There is obviously more, however, to our
notion of an imperfect triangle, for we grasp the imperfect
133

Though Descartes seems to hold that we become aware of creaturely
imperfection via the amplification process, he never suggests that a
similar process must hold for geometrical cases, for example. Burman
doesn’t specifically suggest that we derive the concept of a true
triangle by amplifying the attributes of imperfect ones, but that we
“deduce the perfect triangle from the imperfect.”
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as in some sense resembling the perfect. Though the drawn
figure is not a triangle, it is nevertheless like a
triangle. The nature of this positive relation between the
perfect and imperfect will be the subject of the next few
chapters.

Conclusion: The Recognition of Imperfection
That the achievement of philosophical reflection is
not an awareness of the perfect thing as such but the
recognition of its perfection presents us with one more
parallel between Descartes and the Platonic tradition.
Plato is most often interpreted as holding that, prior to
an explicit awareness of the Forms, some knowledge of them
is already involved in everyday concept acquisition.134
Recollection provides us with the ability to classify
particulars under concepts that we otherwise would have no
way of acquiring. As Lee Franklin argues,

Most people have no idea that the items of the
sensible world are images of Forms. This is an
awareness granted only by philosophical reflection.
Nevertheless, what all people can do is classify
sensible particulars by reference, in most cases
unknowing reference, to the Forms. According to Plato,
134

Dominic Scott, however, has argued in his Recollection and Experience
(1995) that Plato held recollection involves only the explicit
awareness of the Forms and hence that ordinary concept acquisition is
to be explained in empiricist terms.
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our ability to do this requires that we are acquainted
with the Form itself, and that we have it in mind
whenever we predicate it. In this way, Forms play a
role akin to that of concepts. Just as children and
non-philosophers can possess a concept without giving
any thought to concepts as such, so Plato thinks we
can have a Form in mind without knowing it.135
Similarly, Descartes seems to hold that, prior to
philosophical reflection, we nevertheless draw on our
innate knowledge in our everyday cognitive activities.
Before we ever distinguish a true triangle from an
imperfect or finite (false) instance, we implicitly employ
the concept of a perfect or infinite (true) triangle when
we classify various sensible instances as triangles. An
unreflective awareness of the divine nature seems to play a
similar role, enabling us to classify, for example, various
human properties as instances of knowledge, power, goodness
or beauty. Only subsequently do we recognize that these
creaturely instances fall short absolutely of the standards
we had unknowingly employed, and hence that these standards
constitute the true instances of these attributes. Indeed,
Menn suggests that, in the Second Meditation, the
narrator’s notion of intellectual attributes are,
unbeknownst to the narrator, really notions proper to God’s
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2005, 298.
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intellect.136 Descartes appears to say as much when he
claims that the idea of “intellectual nature in general […]
is the idea which, if considered without limitation,
represents God, and if limited, is the idea of an angel or
a human soul” (CSMK 55).137 If this is the case, however,
the notions must not yet be clear and distinct, since the
narrator does not apprehend his intellectual properties as,
for example, intrinsically incomprehensible. Such confusion
is, perhaps, to be expected at the beginning stages of the
narrator’s meditation. After he has established that he is
a thinking thing, he can then achieve the insight that “I
am not myself the supreme being and am lacking in countless
respects” (CSMII 38). This apparent disambiguation of the
ideas of self and God is, if Menn is correct, the
derivation of the idea of the imperfect from the notion of
the perfect.
The arguments from amplification were intended to
undermine the claim that the idea of God is innate by
136

“When we learn in the second Meditation that the soul thinks (knows,
judges, doubts, desires to know more), we are already implicitly
conceiving an ideal standard of thought, a being which possess of
itself the intellectual perfections we can only gradually acquire[…]”
(288).
137
Descartes’ use of the phrase “in general” here appears to be
equivalent to the sense of “infinite” or “perfect” in CPP. This is the
sense of the phrase that Malebranche appears to employ in the Search
After Truth when he describes God as “the being without individual
restriction, the infinite being, being in general” (240), and the idea
of God as an idea “of being in general, of being without limit, of
infinite being” (318). He likewise describes our desire for infinite
goodness, or the good as such, as an “impulse towards the good in
general” (267, and 268-9).
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showing how we could construct ideas of divine perfections
(and, indeed, the idea of God himself) by merely amplifying
our ideas of creaturely perfections. The principle of CPP—
namely, the claim that I could not apprehend something as
falling short of the perfection definitive of a thing
without already possessing a notion of the thing in
question—shows why none of these amplification arguments
can indeed provide us with an authentic idea of God (i.e.,
an idea representing God’s nature). First, if amplification
presupposes an awareness of the creaturely attribute’s
absolute imperfection, we must already possess a notion of
the perfect kind the creature falls short of. Second, if
such an apprehension of absolute imperfection is not
assumed, and we apprehend creaturely attributes as either
the things they are or imperfect relative to other
creaturely attributes, there is no way we could arrive at
notions of the divine perfections by modifying the
creaturely ones by degree; this is so because of the
qualitative distinction described by CPP—the imperfect is
seen to fall short of the perfect absolutely, i.e., insofar
as it fails to be the same kind as the perfect. Though we
cannot therefore construct ideas truly representing God’s
attributes by amplifying ideas of our own, we can use such
amplification to represent to ourselves (conceive)
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approximations of those perfections that we can otherwise
only “reach” in thought (i.e., understand imperfectly).
Just as the fact that we know that we can ‘approach,’ but
cannot construct, a concept of a circle (or calculate its
exact area) by amplifying the number of sides of a regular
polygon betrays knowledge of the approximated nature (a
circle), so our awareness that the amplification of our
ideas of creaturely properties can gives us only
approximations of the divine perfections demonstrates a
similar implicit understanding of these natures.
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Ch. III. The Positive Relation Between the Perfect and the
Imperfect

The notion of imperfection at issue within CPP is that
of an absolute or qualitative difference; the imperfect is
imperfect insofar as it fails to be the same kind as the
perfect. The concept of the perfect is thus prior to the
concept of the imperfect in the sense that apprehending
something as not-x presupposes a notion of x. When applied
to the case of creatures and God, the qualitative
difference does not consist in creatures possessing
features that God lacks. Rather, human beings fall short of
God by virtue of 1) failing to possess correlates of all
the divine properties 2) possessing correlates of that
which exists in God eminently (e.g. extension); and 3)
possessing correlates that are mere imitations of divine
properties. Since they are qualitatively distinct from the
divine attributes, the creaturely correlates in (3) are
also imperfect in the sense indicated by CPP. Yet
qualitative difference is obviously not a sufficient
condition for one thing, or one property, to be an
imperfect instance of another; a square, a cantaloupe and
the Magna Carta all fall short of being triangles, but it
doesn’t follow that they can be correctly described as
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“imperfect triangles.” As the image-model metaphor
suggests, there must be a resemblance relation between the
imperfect and the perfect; an imperfect x is apprehended as
not-x, but also as somehow like x. The third sense of
creaturely imperfection—their possessing imitations of
divine perfections—is also the source of some form of
resemblance between the perfect and imperfect. The task for
this chapter will be to explore various ways of making
sense of this positive relation.

I. The Modal Relation and Resemblance
Robert Rubin has recently argued that a modal
relation ought to be our model for understanding the
conceptual and ontological relationship between finite and
infinite substance.138 Appealing to Descartes’ efforts to
define substantiality in terms of criteria of ontological
and conceptual (in)dependence, he suggests that creatures
and God are not “really distinct” but, like modes in
comparison to finite substances, only “semidistinct.”139 For
Descartes, claims Rubin, A and B are really distinct if
each can exist without the other, while A is merely
semidistinct from B if B can exist without A but not vice
138
139

2008, 62-88.
2008, 62.

134

versa. Interpreting the relation as one of semidistinctness
has many advantages, claims Rubin. First, if the
relationship between creatures and God resembles that which
obtains between creatures and modes, then there is a
“single axis running through [Descartes’] hierarchy.”140
Further, we can take Descartes’ use of the term “substance”
for both creatures and God as an invitation “to view God as
standing to His ontological dependents (at least in some
respects) as created substances stand to their properties
or modes.”141 And most importantly, we can see how the
conceptual dependence isomorphic with the ontological
dependence of semidistinctness may have “led [Descartes] to
the conclusion that we cannot conceive of ourselves without
conceiving of a primary substance from which we are
semidistinct.”142
Understanding the relationship between finite and
infinite substance in terms of the modal one of
semidistinctnes seems to provide a relatively simple
account of the positive (resemblance) relation between
them. If we consider the attribute of a created substance
(e.g., extension) in isolation from its modes, Rubin
suggests that this is simply the idea of boundless
140
141
142
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extension. When we predicate a mode of a created substance,
however, we are introducing limits or bounds to this
attribute—what Descartes will at one time describe as a
“defect or limitation of perfection” (CSMII 114). Thus, for
example, “to say of a table that it has the mode of being
three feet long is to say it falls short of infinite
extension in a certain way.” To conceive of a mode is thus
to think of an attribute as being limited or determined in
some way.

In his own analysis of CPP, Stephen Menn has

also suggested that this priority can best be understood
through the analogy of spatial limitation insofar as we
“conceive of a limited space by adding the ideas of limits
to the idea of space as such, and space as such is
infinite.”143
Yet it seems that the modal relation of
semidistinctness is able to secure the resemblance of the
imperfect to the perfect only at the cost of eliding the
qualitative distinction between the two. For Rubin, the
table’s imperfection qua modified thing does not consist in
its failing to be extended but in its failing to possess
the attribute in a quantitatively unlimited fashion.
Similarly, the finite space in Menn’s example still appears
to be an instance of space. Notice also that the
143

1998, 284.
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distinction between infinite and finite space consists in
the fact that finite space is a part of space. It is clear
that we cannot conceive of something as being a part of x
without possessing the concept of x. Yet this is not the
priority relation that Descartes describes holding between
our concepts of God (infinite being) and creatures (finite
being), for the perfection of creatures does not fall short
of God’s perfection by virtue of being a limited part of
that perfection. Or to turn to the triangle example, an
imperfect triangle is not imperfect by virtue of
constituting a part of a perfect one, but by falling short
of a numerically distinct perfection. Menn and Rubin’s
examples are in this sense better suited to Spinoza’s
pantheistic version of CPP, in which finite things are
modes of infinite substance in something like the sense of
parts.144 For Spinoza, the modal distinction would seem to
entail univocity, as creaturely properties are for him
merely quantitatively distinct from God’s.145

144

Some scholars have, however, questioned whether Spinoza’s
substance/mode relation is really an endorsement of pantheism (as the
whole/part analogy would indicate). Edwin Curley, for example, argued
that the relation is simply that of causal dependence (1969, 4-28).
Others such as Yitzhak Melamed have countered that Spinoza is indeed a
pantheist, but that it is a mistake to treat the substance/mode
relation as a whole/part relation (2013, 49-60).
145
Adams argues that, for Spinoza, “thought and extension are predicated
univocally of finite things and God. What they are is the same in
finite things as it is in God, or at least in the infinite and eternal
modes of God. The difference is just that the thought or the extension
that is in a finite thing does not contain the complete system of
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In contrast to Rubin’s claim that creatures and God
are not, for Descartes, really distinct, recent analyses of
Descartes’ theory of distinctions in the context of late
scholastic thought give us good reason to believe that he
viewed the separability of one thing from another (and,
consequently, the ability to clearly and distinctly
conceive of one thing apart from another) as merely a sign
(sufficient condition) of the former’s real distinction
from the latter.146 When Descartes, in the Principles,
asserts that “we can perceive that two substances are
really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly
and distinctly understand one apart from the other” (CSMI
213), it does not follow that the conceivability of two
things apart from one another is a necessary condition of
their being really distinct. That creatures cannot exist
thinking or extended being that is in God.” In a footnote, however,
Adams notes that, Spinoza denies univocity when we conceive of God’s
intellect as constituting the divine essence. In the Ethics, for
example, he states that “God’s intellect, in so far as it is conceived
to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both as to
its essence and as to its existence, and cannot agree with it in
anything except in name” (IP17S). A further complication is the fact
that Spinoza does not apply the part/whole mode/substance analysis to
divine attributes other than thought and extension. As Adams observes,
divine attributes such as immutability or eternality are propria of
God, “and Spinoza is not committed to finite things’ having properties
of the same nature with them” (101).
146
As Marleen Rozemone (2011, 243) has argued, Eustachius of Saint Paul,
as well as other scholastics, held that separability is not a necessary
condition for a real distinction. One of the examples he gives is the
distinction between God and creatures –there is no separability
(creatures cannot exist without God) and yet there is a real
distinction. Paul Hoffman (2002, 68) also argues that Both Suarez and
Descartes recognize the capacity to exist apart as a ‘sign’ of a real
distinction, not a necessary feature of it. See also Gonzalo Rodríguez
Pereyra, 2008.
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apart from God does not entail they are not really distinct
from him, for one thing could be really distinct from
another so long as the ontological dependence relation is
merely causal. In the Correspondence, for example,
Descartes can say that “when we call a created substance
self-subsistent we do not rule out the divine concurrence
which it needs in order to subsist” (CSMK 193). As Suarez
would put it, creatures are really distinct from God not
because they can exist apart from him (for they cannot),
but because they can exist without being in a “real union”
with him. Shape, on the other hand, fails to be really
distinct from extended substance not because it merely
cannot exist without it, but because it cannot exist
without existing in the substance (as a mode of extension).
Indeed, the need to account for the relationship between
creatures and God seems to have been a primary motivation
for the scholastic effort to show that a real distinction
is compatible with ontological and conceptual dependence.
Many thinkers affirmed that creatures could neither be nor
be conceived (at least properly) apart from God; few would
have done so, however, if the consequences were inevitably
pantheistic.
The advantages Rubin claims of viewing the relation as
one of semidistinctness are similarly questionable. It is
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doubtful that Descartes would have taken the asymmetry of
the ontological relations (God/creature; substance/mode) as
a cause for concern, since he repeatedly emphasizes the
ontological and conceptual distance between creatures and
God. Indeed, given God’s nature in comparison to our own,
it would be odd if it were to turn out that the relation
between the two were not sui generis. Nor should we take
Descartes’ willingness to call both creatures and God
“substances” an indication that creatures stand to God as
modes do to substances. God is a substance in the primary
sense, and it is the extension of this designation to
creatures that requires the explanation. We should
therefore take it as evidence for the very opposite
conclusion: namely, that Descartes is willing to extend the
term “substance” to creatures because he does not want his
readers to think that creatures stand to God as modes do to
creaturely substances. Here his concern was probably less
for the independence and identity of creatures than with
the threat such modification would pose to the sovereignty
of God.147 God cannot be modified, for this would entail a

147

Being a bearer of properties is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for being a substance since 1) God is identical with his
attributes and 2) modes can have modifications of their own. Descartes’
description of substance in terms of this traditional Aristotelian
conception ought not to be taken as a definition of substance, but
merely a statement of a necessary condition for created substance. See
Rozemond, 245.
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complexity, mutability, and limitation inconsistent with
his absolute perfection.148 In other words, applying the
modal relation to creatures and God is inappropriate not
because it would reduce creatures to mere modes, but
because it would reduce God to a modifiable thing.
Descartes is able to preserve the ontological dependence of
creatures on God without jeopardizing God’s transcendence
because a real distinction between creatures and God is
fully compatible with such ontological dependence. His
designating creatures “substances” should therefore be
taken to express the view that such a real distinction does
indeed obtain, despite creatures’ ontological dependence on
God.
Nor, finally, is Rubin correct in arguing that the
conceptual dependence of the idea of the finite on the
infinite is sufficiently similar to that obtaining between
the idea of a mode and a created substance. The conceptual
independence of the idea of a created substance (with
respect to mode) does not resemble the conceptual
independence of the idea of infinite substance (with
148

In the Principles, Descartes argues “we do not, strictly speaking, say
that there are modes or qualities in God, but simply attributes, since
in the case of God any variation is unintelligible” (CSM 211). The
classic early-modern expression of such a critique can be found in
Pierre Bayle’s objections to Spinoza’s thesis that created things are
modes of God. Bayle, however, also focuses on the alleged consequence
that God would possess contradictory properties and would be
responsible for evil.
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respect to finite substance).

Rubin is right that we can

conceive of a created substance without conceiving of any
particular mode, just as we conceive of infinite substance
without conceiving of any particular finite substance. In
the Rules, for example, after Descartes asserts the
conceptual dependence of modes,149 he argues that, “though
most people count them as contingent,” the idea of my own
existence presupposes that of God’s. Yet he immediately
qualifies this statement, noting that “very many necessary
propositions, when converted, are contingent. Thus from the
fact that I exist I may conclude with certainty that God
exists, but form the fact that God exists I cannot
legitimately assert that I too exist” (CSM 46).
Propositions concerning the existence of a particular mode
are similarly inconvertible: from the fact that a given
substance exists, I cannot infer that a certain mode
exists.
Yet while we can conceive of a created substance
without conceiving of any particular mode, we cannot
clearly and distinctly conceive of a created substance
without conceiving of it as being modified in some way.
This dependence is an ontological feature of created
substance—it cannot exist without being modified in some
149

“[W]e cannot conceive of a shape which is completely lacking in
extension, or a motion wholly lacking in duration” (CSM 46).
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way. As Secada argues, the conceptual relation between a
mode and a created substance is that of a determinate to
its determinable: Determinable essences cannot exist
without being determined in some way.150

Just as I cannot

conceive of something having figure without also having
some kind of determinate shape, so I cannot conceive of the
essential attribute of a created substance (extension or
thought) as existing without existing in some determinate
way (e.g., as having modes of thought or extension).151
Rubin cites the example of the idea of wax in the Second
Meditation, noting that it is there conceived apart from
everything semidistinct from it: “[The narrator] finds that
it does not per se have any bounds to its extension;
boundaries imply modes, which he has conceptually set
aside.” Yet what the narrator has set aside here are the
particular modes inhering in this wax. In the Fifth
Replies, Descartes clarifies that “I did not abstract the
concept of the wax from the concept of its accidents
150

“Descartes understood inherence as determination, and accidents or
modes as ways of being of the one essential attribute of the substance
to which they belong. He conceived substances as existing determinable
essences, and he took their non-essential real properties to be
determinates of these essences: the idea of a mode of a substance
involves the idea of its essence as the idea of a determinate involves
the idea of its determinable (e.g., as the idea of square involves the
idea of figure)” (2000, 14). As Eric Funkhouser argues, “An object
instantiating a determinable must also instantiate some determinate
under that determinable. Colored objects must be red or yellow or blue,
etc. No object is merely colored simpliciter” (2006, 2).
151
Rodríguez Pereyra too notes that “substance needs modes to exist, but
it does not need any particular modes” (2008, 81). See also Bernard
Williams 1978, 125.

143

[modes]” (CSMII 248). As he argues in his Conversation with
Burman, though he “conceded and stated that these
accidents, such as hardness , cold, and so on, leave the
wax, he also stated and expressly remarked that others
always replace them, so that the wax is never without
accidents.”152

However, the idea of infinite substance is

the idea of something that is unmodified and unmodifiable,
and does not presuppose in any way the existence of finite
substances. This conceptual independence reflects the
traditional theistic belief that God could exist without
creation; created substances, however, cannot exist without
modes.
Rubin seems to be equating the infinity of
(creaturely) attributes understood as generality with the
infinity of (divine) attributes understood as absolute
perfection (or reality). When we conceive of the created
attribute of extension in general, we are conceiving of it
with respect to the (infinite) range of its potential
modifications. As Secada puts it, “the distinct and
complete conception of a [finite] substance, which is just
the conception of its essence, contains its possible modes
or properties, in the same way in which a determinable
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contains its determinates.”153

Thus the process of

conceiving of a particular created substance with a certain
modification is an act of limitation in the sense of
specification, not in the sense of limiting perfection.
This is not similar to the process by which we derive a
concept of created substance from the concept of divine
substance. True, in his Correspondence, Descartes will
argue that the “notion of intellectual nature in general […
is] the idea which, if considered without limitation,
represents God, and if limited, is the idea of an angel or
a human soul” (CSMK 55). But “general” here is not
equivalent to “unspecified” in the sense of a determinable,
and the act of limitation is not that of conceiving of it
as determined. Rather, “general” should here be read as
“absolute,” the limitation of which is not specification
but qualification. God’s attributes are not and cannot be
determinables, for they already exist ‘in’ him in a
determinate fashion. The act of partial negation is not a
process of determining a determinable, i.e., specifying
which of the range of potential determinations actually
apply, but of deriving, from the concept of one (divine)
determinate property, the concept of a (creaturely)
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determinable one—a process, as we shall later propose, of
analogical derivation.

II. The Image-Model Metaphor and Resemblance
We have seen that the image-model metaphor is
particularly suited to capturing the negative relation
between the perfect and the imperfect.

Since images, qua

images, fail to be the same kinds of things as their
models, this metaphor suggests that the imperfect resembles
the perfect while remaining qualitatively distinct from
it.154 But can the image-model metaphor tell us something
about the positive (resemblance) relation between the
perfect and imperfect? When Descartes, in his Conversation
with Burman, defends his use of the “image and likeness”
analogy, he argues that creatures must in some sense
resemble God since he created them. Whereas a house need
not resemble its builder since the builder’s activity is
merely applying “active forces to what is passive”—and
hence is one of many necessary causal antecedents—God is
the
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total cause, the cause of being itself. Anything
produced by this cause must necessarily be like it.
For since the cause is itself being and substance, and
it brings something into being, i.e. out of nothing (a
method of production which is the prerogative of God),
what is produced must at the very least be being and
substance. To this extent at least, it will be like
God and bear his image.155
Descartes subsequently states that the term “image” should
not be taken in the “ordinary sense of an effigy or picture
of something, but in the broader sense of something having
some resemblance with something else.” Yet what is the
nature of this resemblance? On this point Descartes is
silent.
In his own effort to explain the relationship between
Forms and particulars in light of the image-model analogy,
Patterson provides an interesting (though ultimately
unsatisfying) way of understanding how a grasp of divine
perfections is necessary for the comprehension and
evaluation of creaturely perfections. Knowledge of a Form,
he claims, enables us to identify its participant and gauge
its relative excellence in the same sense that knowledge of
155
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a painting’s model or subject enables us to recognize the
painting as being of that subject as well as the excellence
(understood here as accuracy or correctness) of the
painting.156 Patterson, however, fails to provide an
adequate explanation of the positive relationship
(likeness) between a participant and its Form that makes
this evaluation possible. A given particular is what it is
by virtue of its participation in a given Form, just as a
given image is what it is (a picture of a horse) by virtue
of what it is an image of (a horse). But what justifies our
description of something as a “horse” and thus a
participant in the Form of horse? How would knowledge of
the Form of horse enable us to correctly identify two
things as horses and correctly exclude a third thing as not
a horse? Patterson notes that there is a sense in which an
image can correctly be said to be of a given model by
reference to something extraneous to features of both the
image and model. It is in this sense that a child’s finger
painting of Napoleon could be said to be an image of
Napoleon even though it looks nothing like him, for here
the criterion might be artistic intention. A similar
extraneous criterion could be cited in cases of photographs
and reflections—there a given thing is an image of a given
156
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model insofar as it bears a certain causal relation to it.
Patterson finds that such criteria are, however,
inapplicable to particulars and Forms.157
A more promising sense in which an image can be said
to be of a given model is one that appeals to some sort of
qualitative resemblance. A given image is an image of a
particular model by virtue of resembling that model’s
qualities. In this sense the child’s finger painting could
be said to be an image of a clown if it (whatever the
child’s intentions) indeed resembles such a thing. Yet an
image and its model cannot resemble one another by virtue
of sharing the quality definitive of the model. An image
possessing 60% of the features of a horse, Patterson
explains, is not a 60% horse—it is not a horse at all.158
Referring to Austin’s example of a decoy duck, however,
Patterson introduces an alternative form of resemblance
according to which “imaging—and by analogy, participation—
must involve resemblance in some respects other than F
being image and model. A decoy duck must be similar to real
ducks in some relevant respects if it is to be a decoy
duck; imitation leather must have something in common with
real leather, and so on. Likewise, one might argue, there
157
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must be some relevant similarity between sensible and
intelligible F.”159 According to this sense of resemblance,
a decoy duck could be said to resemble a real duck insofar
as it shares with it qualities such as shape and color. Yet
Patterson dismisses this form of resemblance too: “One
finds no evidence whatever that sensible Fs are in general
supposed to resemble the Form of F in (relevant) respects
other than F.” The principal barrier to this
interpretation, he explains, is that Forms do not possess
phenomenal properties.
Patterson ultimately concludes that the relevant model
for the positive relation of images to their models lies
not in their qualitative resemblance but in a resemblance
defined as accuracy or truthfulness, i.e., “the quality of
the information conveyed by the image.”160 This notion of
correctness, he says, has a “liberating effect on the study
of representation, freeing it from unreflective servitude
to similarity.” But how does an image, qua image, convey
information? Signs can convey information by virtue of
convention; and perhaps various psychological regularities
could explain why a given image inspires, in the minds of
viewers, thought of something qualitatively distinct from
the image. Yet it is difficult to understand how images
159
160
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could convey information by virtue of something intrinsic
to their nature without in some way resembling that which
they represent. Indeed, it is the model of a symbol, rather
than a sign, that seems to be better suited to Patterson’s
criterion. Unlike a sign, a symbol conveys information
about its model by participating in that which it
represents, i.e., by resembling it. So, for example, the
spoken word “buzz” actually imitates the very sound to
which it refers. If it is as symbols that particulars
convey information about the Forms in which they
participate, then it is indeed the qualitative resemblance
of these particulars to their Forms that determines their
accuracy.
Patterson’s suggestion that Forms are like models in
the sense that they are used to determine the existence and
accuracy of their participants is, however, applicable to
Descartes’ account. Carol Rovane, for example, argues that
the ideas of perfection or infinitude “are not simply
standards against which we can make sense of their complete
absence or negation—they are standards against which we can
make comparative judgments concerning one thing being more
perfect or greater than another.”161 Yet it doesn’t seem
that extraneous criteria such as divine intention and
161
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divine causality could explain these abilities. We do not,
obviously, have direct knowledge of God’s intentions, and
so it cannot be by reference to these that we justify our
description of a given attribute as, for example, imperfect
goodness. Nor is knowing merely that God is the cause of
these attributes sufficient for distinguishing them and
gauging their relative perfection.
Yet there is a deeper problem with such extrinsic
criteria, for even if they could explain our ability to
identify and measure various instances of the imperfect,
they seem to establish only an equivocal relation between
terms. Urine with certain characteristics might be
designated “healthy” because it is a unique effect, and
hence a sign, of a healthy physiology, but there is no
sense in which the characteristics of healthy urine
resemble those of a healthy body. Likewise, if a creature
is called “good” merely because it is caused by something
good (God), it doesn’t follow that there is anything in the
creature resembling those characteristics that make God
good. The same goes for intention. A portrait intended to
depict Napoleon may look nothing like the man himself. Of
course, God’s perfection entails that none of his
intentions will be frustrated, but we wouldn’t want to say
that creatures are “good” merely because He caused or
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intended it. Indeed, such a reading would be inconsistent
with Descartes’ claim that certain creaturely attributes
are contained formally within God. Moreover, this reading
would attribute to Descartes a radical position quite at
odds with traditional theism. Though he is perfectly
willing to say that creaturely reality and goodness falls
short of God’s absolutely, there is little indication that
he believed creation is not intrinsically real or good in
some sense—after all, God created it.
Though Patterson dismissed the option of resemblance
by partial qualitative identity for the relation of Forms
and particulars, perhaps this form of resemblance could
apply to Descartes’ account. According to this reading, a
decoy duck could be like a duck insofar as its general
shape and color (or aspects thereof) are qualitatively
identical to the shape and color of the real thing.
Similarly, one might argue that the imperfect resembles the
perfect by virtue of sharing a constituent part of the
property possessed by (and definitive of) the perfect
thing. So, the argument continues, while a thing possessing
the imperfect property can’t be said to possess a limited
degree of the perfect property, it could be said to possess
(either completely or by degree) a more basic constituent
feature of the perfect property.
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Yet such partial qualitative identity cannot explain
the resemblance relation entailed by Cartesian CPP. First,
such an account would entail that creatures and God
actually share some qualities, but nowhere does Descartes
suggest that this might be so. Indeed, his claim that “no
essence can belong univocally to both God and his
creatures” is unqualified, and would lose much of its force
if it were. Further, we have seen that Descartes, in
clarifying his own use of the image-model metaphor, does
not say that images imitate a model by virtue of being
identical with them in some respect(s). Such a claim would
leave him open to the very anthropomorphism critique to
which he was responding. Rather, he states that images
resemble a model because they “imitate it in some
respects.” This is not the response one would expect if
Descartes believed that imitation were reducible to
qualitative identity in some (more basic) respect(s).
It is true that, despite God’s metaphysical
simplicity, we must, due to the limitations of our own
minds in comparison to his immensity, conceive of him in
terms of multiple perfections. God is powerful and good and
loving etc. Each of these attributes is taken as a primary
attribute and hence as expressing his essence. One might
then argue that if we can conceive of the divine essence in

154

terms of a diversity of attributes, perhaps we can also
conceive of each attribute in terms of diverse parts. One
might then look to these constituents as a basis for
univocity. But if Descartes rejected the univocity of
perfections on the basis of their real identity with God’s
essence (and the other attributes), the same reasoning
would seem to apply to any conceptual constituents of these
perfections. So even if we could conceive of God’s
attributes as though they were complex, the conceptual
constituents could not provide a basis for univocal
predication. Nor are Descartes’ claims about God’s
incomprehensibility consistent with the view that while
God’s perfections are globally incomprehensible, some of
their constituents are perfectly comprehensible. Since only
the finite is comprehensible, such a view would entail that
God is, in some respects, finite.

So if we assume, as

Patterson does, that qualitative resemblance requires some
form of qualitative identity, then it is impossible to
treat Descartes’ account of the positive relation between
the perfect and the imperfect as one of qualitative
resemblance.
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III. Adams on Leibniz and Resemblance by Comparative
Properties

We have seen that the chief problem for understanding
the positive relation between the perfect and imperfect in
Descartes’ account is that of explaining how creaturely
properties could be said to resemble divine ones without
presupposing some form of univocity. In his analysis of the
priority of the perfect in continental rationalism, Adams
addresses a related problem in explaining how creaturely
predicates could be derived from divine ones in Leibniz’s
metaphysics.
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He chooses to focus on Leibniz rather than

Descartes because the latter’s system does not allow for a
comprehensive “top-down” account of the derivation of
creaturely perfections from divine ones: unlike Spinoza and
Leibniz, Descartes did not hold that all creaturely
attributes are contained formally within God. Extension, at
least in its creaturely form, is incompatible with divine
perfection. Since Leibniz denied the reality of extension,
and Spinoza was willing to predicate it of God provided it
be understood as indivisible, both thinkers could provide a
comprehensive derivation. Though Spinoza’s version is the
simplest, it is idiosyncratic since he substitutes for what
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Adams calls the Cartesian “exemplar/imitation relation” the
relation of substance to mode. For Spinoza, says Adams,
thought and extension can be predicated univocally of
finite creatures and God since “the difference is just that
the thought or the extension that is in a finite thing does
not contain the complete system of thinking or extended
being that is in God.”163 This sort of derivation, however,
will not do for either Leibniz or Descartes.
Adams explains that, like Descartes, Leibniz believed
that divine perfections must be qualitatively distinct from
creaturely ones. Leibniz claims that God, as the “subject
of all perfections,” contains “every simple quality” that
is “positive and absolute” insofar as it “expresses without
any limits whatever it expresses.”164 Leibniz’s notion of
the divine perfections is thus similar to Descartes’
account of actually infinite properties.165 For both
thinkers, concepts of the divine properties are prior to
creaturely ones because creaturely perfections are
limitations or partial-negations of divine attributes that
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possess their reality “without any limits.”166 Further,
according to Adams, Leibniz held that “all properties or
concepts are either simple or constructed from simple
predicates by logical operations such as conjunction and
negation”167 and that “all the simple predicates […] are
among the attributes of God.” Thus the concepts of
creaturely perfections “must all be composed, by logical
operations including various degrees of limitation or
partial negation, from the simple perfections of God.”168
Adams observes that the primary obstacle to explaining how
concepts of creaturely perfections could be thus derived
from divine ones is that the conceptual simplicity of
divine perfections seems to forestall any partial negation
of them:

On a Leibnizian account the perfection of power [for
example] should be partly denied and partly affirmed
of finite things. But how can an absolutely simple
property be partly denied of anything. What part of it
is to be denied, and what part affirmed, given that it
has no parts at all? If a simple property is to be
166
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affirmed or denied of something, it would seem that it
must be affirmed or denied as a whole. But can a
property be partly affirmed or denied as a whole?169
The Cartesian account seems to run into a similar problem.
Descartes invokes partial negation to explain how we can
derive a creaturely property that is neither the same, nor
simply a negation of, a divine one. Finite being, for
example, is neither being itself, nor the negation of being
(non-being). Yet if a creaturely perfection cannot resemble
a divine one by virtue of partial qualitative identity, it
is difficult to understand how such partial negation is
supposed to work. Since neither Leibniz nor Descartes ever
provide an explanation, one might suspect it was a mystery
to them as well.
Adams does, however, provide an interesting, though
ultimately inadequate, account of how a simple property
could be partially negated. In response to the above
question as to whether a property can be partly affirmed or
denied as a whole, he suggests that we regularly do this
with respect to comparative properties. So, for example, “I
can and do say that bananas are less sweet than pineapples
without presupposing any analysis of sweetness into parts.
‘Less sweet’ functions here as a partial negation, one
which implies ‘not as sweet as the comparison case’ but
169
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does not imply ‘not sweet at all.’” He explains that if God
has the simple perfection of power (P), a complex concept
of a creaturely perfection could be derived by adding “the
limiting or partly negative property-forming operator the
one billionth degree of.”170 He is quick to note, however,
that the creature cannot be said to possess P. Such a
conclusion would obviously violate Leibniz’s denial of
univocity. Instead of speaking of creatures having
“degrees” of P, therefore, he suggests we should “speak
only of degrees of approximation to P.”171 Such an account,
it appears, could work for Descartes as well.
Adams acknowledges, however, that this analysis of
“partial negation” will hold only so long as the property
in question is a “scalar magnitude”, i.e., a property “that
varies primitively, in intensity or strength.”172 One shade
of a color, he notes, can differ from another without
supervening on more basic qualitative differences. If the
comparative property is not such a scalar magnitude, it
must supervene on non-comparative properties. For Leibniz,
however, “there is no provision for a positive, noncomparative property to be possessed by the creature as
part of the basis for its possessing the positive
170
171
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comparative property.”173 Thus Adams’ account requires us to
assume that the property in question cannot be analyzed in
terms of non-comparative properties.
Yet he thinks there are three problems with such a
premise: First, it is difficult to understand how the
concept of a given quality could be derived from the purely
quantitative notion of a given degree of approximation.
Knowing that a given shade of purplish-red is “217
thousandths” of the way from pure red to pure purple, will
not enable us to understand its phenomenal quality. Such a
derivation “involves substituting largely structural
content for purely qualitative content, and the positive,
purely qualitative content cannot be given in that way.”174
Second, Adams does not think it is plausible that
creaturely attributes such as knowledge or power could be
understood as degrees of a scalar magnitude, for “it seems
that degrees of knowledge and power do supervene on facts—
quite complex and not obviously comparative facts—about
what their possessor knows and can do, and how.”175 Third,
even Leibniz himself acknowledges that we don’t fully
understand the simple perfections of God or how we derive
creaturely properties from them. Yet how can we then
173
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maintain that creaturely properties could be constructed
from divine ones if we “don’t know how, nor from what
properties?”176
Adams suggests that if we wish to preserve a top-down
account of at least some of the properties of creatures, we
should do away with the condition that the qualities be
simple and opt for an “account in which the key
relationship is the more or less holistic one of
resembling, rather than the more analytical one of being
constructed out of”—a relationship that he thinks is more
in line with the Platonic tradition.177 Divine knowledge,
for example, would then be viewed not as “a constituent
from which less perfect cases are constructed” but rather
“an archetype which they imperfectly resemble.” Human
knowledge could still be seen as supervening on more basic
properties that creatures possess fully. Adams argues that
we do something like this when we attribute cognitive
states such as belief or purpose to dogs by using human
beliefs and purposes as models. Doing so enables us to
understand dog cognition better than “if (per impossibile)
we allowed in our minds only the sort of beliefs and
purposes that dogs have.”178 Similarly, even though we don’t
176
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understand what perfect knowledge is like, “the one who had
divinely perfect knowledge would understand it, and would
understand better than we do in what ways we do and do not
know.”179
The problem with Adams’ proposal, however, is that it
fails to explain the nature of this “holistic” sense of
resembling. As we have argued above, explaining how a given
divine property could be partly denied and partly affirmed
of a creature is a problem not only for the assumption that
divine attributes are simple, but equally so for the
premise that nothing can be predicated univocally of
creatures and God. Even if we jettison the assumption of
simplicity, we still have to explain in what sense human
knowledge could be said to resemble its divine correlate
without in any way sharing features of it. The notion of a
dog’s purpose, for example, surely resembles that of a
human’s by virtue of partial univocity: though a human
action, unlike a dog’s, is usually deemed purposeful only
if the end in question is something the person has
cognitive access to as a goal or reason for action, this
sort of purpose shares with the canine version the fact
that the intelligibility of each requires reference to a
certain end. As I will argue in later chapters, the notion
179
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of a primitive form of resemblance is as crucial for making
sense of likeness in the absence of univocity as it is for
explaining how a simple property could be partially
negated.

IV. Denial of Univocity Does Not Entail Equivocity
In the conclusion of his analysis of Descartes’
account of the priority of the perfect, Adams wonders how
the “denial of univocity is supposed to be consistent (as
Descartes must have supposed it to be) with the claim that
some attributes of finite things are contained formally
(though without their limits) in the idea of God.”180 If
denying univocity entails endorsing equivocity, then it is
indeed difficult to understand how Descartes could assume
that creatures resemble God. It is doubtful that Descartes
would have viewed this claim as paradoxical on its face,
however, for one of the purported achievements of the
scholastic tradition in which he was educated was the
explanation of how the absence of univocity could be
consistent with the claim that creatures are in some sense
images of God. We are referring, of course, to the socalled doctrine of analogy—“so-called” because, as we will
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see in the next chapter, it was less a single cohesive
doctrine than a general schema that scholastic thinkers
adapted in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes.
Generally speaking, analogy was viewed as a mean
between univocity and equivocity in that it ostensibly
showed how a term could have different, though related,
senses. While “animal” is predicated univocally of both a
dog and a man because it has the same meaning in both uses,
the term “bank” is used equivocally when it is predicated
of both the shore of a river and a lending institution
since the meanings of the two uses are completely distinct.
Drawing on Aristotle and commentaries on his work, however,
many medieval and scholastic thinkers sought to carve out
space between univocation and equivocation. A classic
example, derived from Aristotle, is the related
significance of the term “healthy” when predicated of, for
example, the body and things that are conducive to the
body’s health (e.g. diet). Though the term “healthy” does
not have the same significance when it is used to describe
both an organism’s physiology and a dietary regimen, the
meanings of the two uses were considered to be related in
way that distinguished their usage from pure equivocation.
In this case, a healthy diet is one that is conducive to a
healthy body.
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This example and similar ones illustrated a broad
notion of analogy that was inapplicable, however, to cases
where the desired relation was one of ontological
resemblance. Though a healthy diet might be conducive to a
healthy body, and although one cannot really understand why
a given diet would be healthy without knowledge of bodily
health, the features of such a diet in no way resemble the
features of a healthy body. When perfections such as
“goodness” or “power” are predicated of God, however, the
claim is not that God merely bears some relation (e.g.,
causal) to creaturely goodness or power or vice versa
(though this could be part of its meaning); rather, it was
held that there is something intrinsic to God’s nature that
the qualities of creaturely goodness and power can be said
to resemble. Aquinas, as well as later scholastics,
grounded this resemblance in terms of the ontological
relation of participation: creatures are like God to the
extent that they participate in him.
A crucial presupposition of such analogical
resemblance is that it cannot be reduced to or explained in
terms of any form of qualitative identity that would allow
for univocal predication. From a theological perspective,
many philosophers and theologians held that any form of
real community between creatures and God enabling univocal
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predication would threaten God’s transcendence and was
incompatible with divine simplicity. From a strictly
metaphysical perspective, the special case of the predicate
“being” seemed to require a theory of irreducible or
primitive analogical resemblance. Aristotle had argued that
being cannot be a genus since the differentiae restricting
being to various species would also have to be instances of
being. Since we cannot isolate a univocal core of the
meaning of “being” predicated of qualities and substances,
the features that distinguish the being of qualities from
the being of substances must be the same as those that
ground their resemblance.181
Though Descartes never endorses a theory of analogy,
we noted that he does explicitly employ analogy in the
Objections and Replies to explain the sense in which God
can be said to be self-caused. He argues, for example, that
“God stands toward himself in a relation analogous to that
of an efficient cause” (CSMII 170). It is natural that
Descartes would invoke analogy in his account of God’s
self-sustaining (i.e. independent) existence, for he had
originally denied that the term “substance” applies
univocally to creatures and God (in part) because of the
self-sustaining nature of divine existence. In this case,
181
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at least, it is clear that the denial of univocity is meant
to entail analogy, not equivocity. When, in a later
chapter, we explore Descartes’ use of analogy in detail, we
will find that he argues that an equivocal notion of
existence would be inconsistent with his second causal
proof for God.
Despite the fact that Descartes explicitly relies upon
a theory of analogy in his account of divine existence,
there are a number of reasons why he may have decided to
forego providing an account and defense of analogy in
general. First, he was notoriously cagey about his
philosophical influences, and he may have wished to avoid
linking his own metaphysical ontology to such a hoary
scholastic doctrine; alternatively, he may have viewed an
implicit assumption of analogical resemblance to be
relatively uncontroversial and avoided invoking it simply
because he didn’t think it needed to be explained or
defended;182 on the other hand, since he was undoubtedly
acquainted with the endless scholastic disputes concerning
the nature and validity of analogy, perhaps he simply felt
his energies would be better spent elsewhere. It is of
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course true that Descartes presented his philosophy as a
repudiation and correction of much of scholastic thought.
Yet as his causal principle suggests, he was not averse to
drawing from scholastic thought when it served his broader
critical purposes.
Perhaps, however, Descartes avoids discussion of
analogy because he saw that his system would require a
version of analogy strikingly different from scholastic
ones. The traditional account, which we might (following
Adams) call a “bottom-up” approach to transcendental
analogy, begins with concepts of creaturely attributes and
then derives concepts of analogous divine attributes by
modifying (e.g., qualifying or amplifying) the former. Yet
as we saw in the previous chapter, this is precisely the
sort of process that Descartes argued against in his
replies to Gassendi and others.183 We may represent to
ourselves (conceive) divine perfections by amplifying
creaturely ones, but Descartes believes that this
amplification is guided by an implicit awareness of the
perfection approximated. Instead, Descartes would have to
endorse a “top-down” approach to analogy, one that begins
183
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with concepts of divine attributes and derives concepts of
analogous creaturely ones by modifying (i.e., via partial
negation) the former. Analogy is not here used to explain
how we conceive of God’s attributes but how we conceive of
those creaturely attributes that imitate the divine ones
(i.e., the pure perfections and transcendentals). Since
this approach to analogy appears to have been without
precedent in scholastic thought, perhaps Descartes chose
not to call attention to it out of fear that it would draw
controversy. Indeed, in his defense of the analogy of selfcausation, he affirms that he is “extremely anxious to
prevent anything at all being found in [his] writings which
could justifiably give offence to theologians” (CSMII 171).
Descartes may have therefore believed that he would have
had little to gain—and much to lose—if he were to provide
an explicit account and defense of the particular theory of
analogy that his system entails.
Nor is there reason to believe that Descartes’
ontological innovations are somehow incompatible with a
theory of theological analogy. Marjorie Grene famously
wrote that, in transforming the medieval many-leveled
hierarchy of degrees of reality into an austere threeleveled universe of infinite substance, finite substance
and modes, Descartes thereby “cleaned out the lumber room
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of scholastic thought so thoroughly as to leave what seems
a barely habitable shelter.”184 Yet it is curious that the
structure left standing corresponds to the basic framework
of scholastic predicational (or “categorical”) and
transcendental (or “theological”) analogy. While
transcendental analogy had traditionally been invoked to
explain the relationship between our concepts of created
substances and God, predicational analogy was used to
explain the same with respect to accidents and created
substances. For Descartes, however, what had traditionally
been the field of predicational analogy is altered: he
reduced accidents to modes of mental and physical
substance, and since modes—as even the scholastics held—are
not truly res, he consequently denied the conceptual and
ontological separability of those qualities traditionally
designated accidents.185 It is not clear whether Descartes
could use the same model of analogy to explain, on the one
hand, the relations between the meanings of “being” as it
is predicated of both finite and infinite substances and,
on other hand, the relation of the meanings of “being” as
it is predicated of finite substances and their modes.
Since modes can exist only by virtue of a real union with
184

1985, 104.
Accidents are modes of the principal attribute (extension or
thought), which is itself really identical with substance. Though modes
are not res, they are not nothing (they have some ‘degree’ of reality).
185
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the substance of which they are modes, one could argue that
they have no being that is properly their own.186 To speak
of the being of a given substance’s mode is, perhaps, to
speak elliptically of the being of the substance in which
it inheres.187
Yet Descartes did not, like Spinoza after him,
similarly transform the relationship between creatures and
God. Despite Rubin’s claims otherwise, he never suggests
that the ontological and conceptual dependence of created
substances on God resembles that of modes on created
substances.188 Kenny expresses the distinction as that of
“logical” versus causal dependence:

The way in which modes depend on substance is not the
same as that in which finite substances depend on the
infinite substance. Modes are logically dependent on
substance; they ‘inhere in it as subject.’ Statements
with modes for their subjects must be translatable
into statements with substances for their subjects, as
statements about the Cheshire Cat’s smile must be
186

The ontological situation is, perhaps, a bit more complicated than
this. Given the narrator’s assertion that “the mode of being by which a
thing exists objectively or representatively in the intellect by way of
an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so
it cannot come from nothing” (CSM II, 29; AT VII, 41), it appears that
Descartes would also need to explain the sense in which “being” could
be predicated of ideas considered in terms of their objective
existence.
187
As we shall see in the next chapter, perhaps he could use an analogy
of attribution for predicational analogy, for it does not presuppose an
ontological resemblance between discrete entities but merely a
definitional priority of the primary usage to a secondary one. “Being”
is predicated of modes only by extrinsic denomination since they,
unlike accidents, have no inherent being.
188
Woolhouse agrees: “There is no evidence that he confusedly thought
that the dependence of created substances on God was of the same kind
as that of modes on substances” (1993, 17).
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translatable into statements about the Cheshire Cat.
Created substances are not logically, but causally,
dependent on God. They do not inhere in God as
subject, but are effects of God as creator.189
Since the ontological relation between creatures and God is
causal, statements about creatures are not translatable
into statements about God. As we stressed earlier, it is
likely that Descartes viewed a real distinction between
creatures and God as a necessary condition for securing
divine perfection. Since in this sense Descartes’ account
does not differ from the traditional scholastic position
that creatures are really distinct from God, there is no
obvious reason why a traditional theory of transcendental
analogy could not apply.
If Descartes did implicitly endorse a version of
transcendental analogy, he could be understood to hold that
a creaturely property can be said to exist “formally” in
God insofar as an analogically similar correlate does.190 As
he suggests in his response to Mersenne’s amplification
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1968, 134.
A theory of analogical resemblance may provide Descartes with a way
to answer Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. Descartes can agree
that, in a sense, God really does possess every attribute. Granted, he
does not possess the creaturely imitations of these attributes, but he
possesses all of the positive reality they do (and more). What
differentiates creaturely attributes from God’s is not a positive
reality but nothingness or non-being. Thus Descartes can assert that
creatures do not share God’s attributes (since they possess only
imperfect versions of them) but maintain that it does not follow that
God thereby lacks some reality or perfection since there is nothing
‘in’ these creaturely versions that cannot be found in God’s more
perfect qualitatively distinct attributes.
190
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argument, we “recognize” that certain “indefinite
particulars of which we have an idea” are “contained
formally in the idea of God” because we apprehend their
analogical resemblance to the infinite (true) versions of
these properties (CSMII 99). Beyssade, for example, seems
to support this reading. While Descartes concludes that
God’s simplicity precludes any univocity, Beyssade notes
that the divine perfections “are nonetheless conceivable,
for their relation to our own perfections precludes our
speaking of a simple equivocity. What we have here is
analogy in the most traditional sense.”191
Such a reading also seems to enable us to understand
how Descartes’ reference to “degrees” of reality and being
could be compatible with his explicit rejection of
univocity. Though Aristotle, as we will see in the next
chapter, suggested that comparisons of “more and less” are
quantitative and hence involve univocal predication,
Aquinas detailed two other modes of comparison according to
“more and less” that are qualitative and hence analogical
in nature. In The Power of God, Aquinas states the
objection that “more and less do not differentiate species”
and hence when we say that God is better than creatures, we
are assuming that “we can univocally predicate good of God
191
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and a creature.”192 To this he responds that comparisons of
“more and less” can also be analogical insofar as “one
thing is shared, and another thing expressed essentially,
as we might say that goodness is better than good” and
“insofar as something the same belongs to one in a more
eminent way than to another, as heat belongs to the sun in
a more eminent way than to fire, and these two ways prevent
the unity of a species and univocal predication. And we
accordingly predicate something more and less of God and a
creature [...].”193
Thus to say that God is better (or possesses “more”
goodness) than creatures, need not entail that God merely
has a higher degree of a quality (goodness) that he shares
with creatures. Similarly, for Descartes, the reality of
things can “admit of more and less” without presupposing
that “real” or “being” can be predicated of things
univocally. To use Adams’ language, lesser “degrees” of
being or reality are, in truth, approximations to being or
reality, not lesser instances of them. Descartes’ 1641
letter to Hyperaspitstes, which Broughton had dismissed as
expressing merely an “abstract and contentious metaphysical
doctrine,” emphasizes this very point: “What makes the
infinite different from the finite is something real and
192
193
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positive; but the limitation which makes the finite
different from the infinite is non-being or the negation of
being.” Created being is not being that is imperfect, but
imperfectly being.194 “Being” is partially affirmed and
partially denied as a whole of creatures insofar as they
are said to be neither being (infinite being) nor the
complete absence of being (nothingness), but something
“intermediate between God and nothingness” (CSMII 38). In
this way, the new paradox of partial negation is the old
paradox of analogical resemblance. Only God is truly real,
truly being—everything else can be said to be “real” or a
“being” in some related yet qualitatively distinct way,
i.e., analogically.
Yet some scholars have resisted attributing a doctrine
of analogy to Descartes. Robert Ariew notes that since
Descartes sided with the Scotists on a number of issues,
“it could be argued that Descartes agrees […] that the
194

Simon provides an eloquent description of this paradoxical notion:
“Take the division of being into infinite and finite: to obtain the
differentiating factor of the infinite, nothing is needed except an
unqualified assertion of being—an assertion that is not held in check
by any negation. But in order to obtain the differential factor of the
finite, being has to elicit a limitation of itself. It cannot be said
that being is indifferent to infinity and limitation as triangle is
indifferent to the particularities of its species. Infinite being,
never-ending being, expresses being infinitely more genuinely and
faithfully than being limited, and circumscribed by an area of
nonbeing. In comparison with the infinite being, things finite disclose
mostly their kinship with nothingness. That the limitation of being is
itself a way of being, derived from being and from nothing else, is a
paradox indeed. But let us be aware that a similar paradox is involved,
more or less noticeably, in every analogy of proper proportionality”
(1999, 151) (emphasis mine).
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concept of being may hold univocally between God and
creatures.”195 In a note to this suggestion, however, he
backtracks, adding that “as much as I would like to push
Descartes into the Scotist camp on this issue […] Descartes
officially denies univocal predication with respect to
substance.” Other scholars have argued that Descartes must
have embraced some form of equivocity. Jorge Secada, for
example, argues that since Descartes never states that the
term “substance” is applied analogically, “he must, then,
be read as stating that it is applied equivocally to God
and creatures.”196 Secada therefore thinks that Descartes’
denial of univocity is at odds with his “insistence that
God is properly substance, while creatures are so only
imperfectly and qualifiedly.”197 The same logic would
suggest that Descartes thinks other attributes can be
predicated only equivocally of creatures and God.198
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Ariew 1999: 55.
The same argument could also be used against Secada’s reading:
because Descartes never says the term “substance” is used equivocally,
it must therefore be used analogically. Oddly enough, Secada seems to
think that Descartes, in denying univocity and thereby implicitly
endorsing equivocity, “is explicitly invoking scholastic doctrine”
(Gaukroger 2006, 77). This would be true only if we identify scholastic
doctrine with Scotistic accounts that assume that the only alternative
to (logical) univocity is equivocity—but this, of course, was in direct
opposition to the prevailing Thomistic view that analogy was also
consistent with the absence of univocity.
197
Secada 2000, 85. Yet Secada himself notes that if Descartes did
endorse equivocity, then it would be “directly, even if covertly, at
odds with Suarez’s [analogical] account.”
198
Schectman too seems to think that equivocity follows from Descartes’
denial of univocity. See 2011, 27-33.
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Attributing equivocity to Descartes, however, leaves
us saddled with the problems Adams noted: it renders
vacuous all the “image and likeness” language; it fails to
do justice to the distinction between God’s formal versus
his eminent containment of creaturely properties; it cannot
explain how apprehension of creaturely perfections would
trigger innate concepts of divine correlates nor why
possessing an idea of a divine perfection could enable us
to amplify a creaturely

one; it cannot explain Descartes’

endorsement of partial negation, i.e.,

his claim that, in

order to form the idea of a finite being, he need only
“take something away” from the idea of infinite being; and
it is inconsistent with Descartes’ explicit appeals to
analogy in his account of divine independence. Further, the
equivocity reading is historically unmotivated. In
Descartes’ own day, and for centuries prior, philosophers
and theologians had appealed to analogy to find a middle
way between univocal and equivocal predication. Tad
Schmaltz, who attributes a doctrine of analogy to
Descartes, appeals to the historical context as well,
noting that “most scholastics who denied univocal
predication followed Thomas Aquinas in affirming an
analogical predication of terms that apply primarily to God
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and only derivatively to creatures.”199 With the exception
of Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (who advocated a theory of
univocity), the scholastic authors Descartes had studied at
La Flèche (the Coimbrans, Toletus, and Rubius) espoused
broadly Thomistic views.200 In the absence of direct
evidence to the contrary, both the historical context and
the coherence of his own philosophical system suggest that
Descartes’ denials of univocity should be read as an
endorsement of some form of analogy.

199
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Ch. IV. CPP and Analogy
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief
account of the theory of analogy as it appears in Aristotle
and Aquinas. This will allow us, in later chapters, to
determine what a top-down account of analogy would look
like, to gauge the strength and weaknesses of the top-down
account in comparison with the traditional bottom-up
approach (especially with regard to criticisms leveled by
advocates of univocity such as Scotus), and determine how
analogy can invoke a primitive form of qualitative
resemblance. Though we are not completely done discussing
Descartes, the concern now is not Descartes as such but how
the relationship between the perfect and imperfect within
CPP can be analyzed in terms of analogy. This more general
approach will enable us, in the final chapters, to assess
the broader significance of CPP within contemporary
philosophy of religion.
Analogy was invoked to address a variety of problems
in medieval and scholastic thought.201 Logicians sought to
distinguish and clarify the general usage of terms,
especially in cases such as “healthy” (above) where the
terms appear to have related yet distinct meanings.
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I am here paraphrasing Ashworth 2013.
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Metaphysicians used analogy to explain the meanings of
terms predicated across the Aristotelian categories (the
transcendental terms “being” “one” “true” and “good”). They
were concerned to show, for example, how the meaning of
“being” predicated of substance is related to the meaning
of “being” predicated of accidents. And theologians used
analogy to explain how terms expressing pure perfections
(e.g. “wise”) could be justifiably predicated of both God
and creatures. It is this latter application of analogy
that is of interest to us.
Further, in addition to terms, concepts and things
were also described as “analogous.” This reflected a
traditional assumption about the relationship between
language, concepts, and reality. As James Ross explains, in
the classical theory of analogy, “the meaning of a word was
thought to be a concept derived by abstraction from
perceptual experience of things (including oneself), so
that conceptual differences, and therefore word-meaning
differences (for example ‘sees’ applied to a ship’s lookout
and to a bird), were thought to track the real difference
between intelligent sight and animal perception.”202 Analogy
among terms could thus be expressed in terms of an analogy
among concepts that, in turn, reflect an analogy in things.
202

Ross 1998, 119.

181

Indeed, after the 14th century, discussions of analogy
chiefly concerned the relationships between concepts. One
of Ross’s criticisms of the traditional theory is its
assumption that the meanings of terms are concepts and
hence private or subjective, and he has thus offered an
alternative account that avoids reference to them.203
However, since CPP is a theory about the relationship
between concepts (particularly, their order of derivation
and resemblance), we are interested in the traditional
theory of analogy primarily to the extent that it applies
to concepts and, to a lesser extent, the ontological
relationship between things. The pertinent question is not
“What does the term ‘good’ mean when applied to God” but
“How are we conceiving of God when we describe him as
‘good’”? While the former may indeed be a question of the
extramental meaning of the term “good,” the latter concerns
the concept of goodness we employ when using the term.
The distinction between the public, extramental
meanings of terms and the concepts we employ in using and
understanding language will be especially relevant in our
discussion of Aquinas’s theory of analogy. He argues that,
even though our concepts of divine attributes are derived
from concepts of creaturely ones, creaturely perfections
203

See Ross 1981.
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nevertheless must be defined in terms of divine ones since
creatures possess in a limited fashion the perfections that
God possesses absolutely. The meaning of terms is to be
cashed out not in terms of our concepts of things but in
terms of those things themselves. “Good” is primarily used
of God and derivatively of creatures because God possesses
this perfection by identity and fully whereas creatures
merely participate in it. Since Aquinas describes both the
conceptual and the definitional order in terms of semantic
priority, his account has led to some confusion. However,
since the form of semantic priority that concerns us is
that involving the derivation of concepts rather than the
definition of terms, Aquinas’s account of semantic priority
in terms of definitional priority will be largely
irrelevant.
As the earlier example of “healthy” suggests, while
analogy does not presuppose a theory of ontological
resemblance, transcendental analogy does. The traditional
problem of religious language concerns the legitimacy of
extending terms that originally designated creaturely
attributes to an infinite and simple being of whom we have
no direct experience. Using these terms literally of God is
legitimate only if there is some ontological resemblance
between the creaturely attribute the standard use of the
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term designates and the divine nature to which it is
extended. When we describe urine or a diet as literally
“healthy,” we are not claiming that there is something in
the urine or the food that resembles those characteristics
definitive of bodily health. Yet when we make literal
claims about the nature of God—e.g., that God is “good” or
“wise”—we are affirming that there is something in God that
the creaturely qualities of goodness and wisdom originally
designated by these terms resemble. Many theologians held
that the status of theology as a science would be in
jeopardy if such predications of God were not literally
true. After all, inferences made from the nature of
creatures to the nature of God—e.g., every being is good;
God is a being; therefore God is good—would be invalid if
the predicates were used equivocally. That such ascriptions
could be literally true without presupposing the sort of
qualitative identity required by univocal predication is
the promise and challenge of transcendental analogy.

I. Aristotle and Analogy
Given the indebtedness of scholastic thought to
Aristotle, it is unsurprising that the two most popular
forms of transcendental analogy in the scholastic era—
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analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution—can
be found in his works.204 In his biology, Aristotle used the
term “analogy” to describe the indirect comparison of
similarities across kinds, a version of the analogy of
proportionality. There he distinguishes similarity by
comparative degree (differing “by the more and the less”)
from analogical similarity. Things that differ by the more
and the less belong to a similar species or genus and their
features can be distinguished solely by comparatives. A
given bird’s beak, for example, can be distinguished from
another bird’s by citing its length or sharpness. Or, to
use an example with which we are already familiar, an
imperfect apple could be distinguished from a perfect one
by citing its relative lack of sweetness or crispness.
Yet Aristotle also wanted to be able to make
comparisons in cases of non-generic or remote likeness,
cases where there were no obvious morphological
similarities. These comparisons were made by employing a
four-part formula first developed by Presocratic thinkers
for use in mathematics and later applied to nonmathematical topics by Plato, roughly expressed as “A is to
B as C is to D.” Aristotle explains that such a four-part
formula describing a similarity of relations is called for
204

See Hesse 1965; Wilson 2000; White 2010, 27-72; Hochschild 2010, 410.
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when “we may have to do with animals whose parts are
neither identical in form nor yet identical apart from
differing by the more or the less: but they are the same
only by analogy, as, for instance, bone is only analogous
to fish-bone, nail to hoof, hand to claw, and scale to
feather; for what the feather is in a bird, the scale is in
a fish.”205 While the resemblance between feathers and
scales is too slight to be captured in terms of
comparatives alone, their similarity can be expressed by
noting the relations they bare to their respective
subjects. Just as feathers protect a bird’s body and aid in
its characteristic locomotion (flight), so scales protect a
fish’s body and aid in its characteristic locomotion
(swimming).206
Though transcendental analogy was occasionally
expressed in terms of proportionality in the scholastic
205

Quotation from White 2010, 31.
Sometimes Aristotle uses the analogy of proportionality to express
what appears to be a direct (non-relational) similarity between two
things. He says, for example, that both bone and fish-bone share an
“osseous nature.” And though he describes a proportional resemblance
between windlessness in the air and calm in the sea, he nevertheless
affirms they are both forms of rest. This has given some scholars the
impression that the four-part formula identifying a relational
similarity is but a roundabout way of identifying a direct similarity
in nature between two things. Perhaps the Aristotelian notion of
“function” in biology can explain why this might be so, for he
identified the nature of a faculty with its function and the function
with the faculty’s relation to the subject (more specifically its
telos). If the nature of a faculty is its function and its function is
its relation to the subject, identifying a relational similarity seems
to be an indirect way of expressing a similarity in nature. The extent
to which analogy of proportionality is able to express direct
similarity is a matter of both scholastic and contemporary debate.
206
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era, it was not the most popular form of analogy. Rather,
analogy of attribution was the preferred model for
religious language.
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Like proportionality, it too can be

traced back to Aristotelian philosophy, but in this case to
Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics. While Aristotle does
not use the term “analogy” in these contexts, later
thinkers would incorporate his analysis into the medieval
and scholastic doctrine. In his metaphysics, Aristotle
attempted to explain in what sense it was legitimate to
apply the same terms to entities that belonged to distinct
metaphysical categories and hence lacked any qualitative
identity. The problem is, as we have noted, particularly
acute in the case of “being” since he held that it cannot
designate a genus capturing various specific ways of being.
Aristotle’s solution is what is known as pros hen
equivocation or “focal meaning,” a model in which a variety
of secondary uses of a term are explained in terms of a
single primary use.208 The classic example is the various
applications of the term “healthy” and their relation to
bodily health. He argues that “just as everything which is
‘healthy’ has reference to health, one thing in that it
preserves health, another in that it produces it, another
207

Ashworth 2013.
The term “focal meaning” was coined by G.E.L. Owen. See Wilson 2000,
116-74.
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in that it is a symptom of health, another because it is
capable of it,” likewise all things are said to “be” by
reference to “one starting point”—the being of substance.209
The characteristic feature of analogy of attribution
is the definitional priority of the primary usage of a term
to that of a secondary, a feature that Aquinas will
incorporate into his own account of transcendental analogy.
Healthy food, for example, must be defined with reference
to that which makes a body healthy. What distinguishes
analogy of attribution from pure equivocation is the fact
that there is some relation between the two uses. Yet as we
have mentioned, analogy of attribution does not presuppose
any form of ontological likeness. Joshua P. Hochschild
consequently calls this form of analogy “associated
meaning,” claiming that it is “not so much a matter of how
things are related, but of how words are used.”210 Later
scholastics such as Cajetan, will argue that in cases of
analogy of attribution such as “healthy,” the term is
extended beyond its primary usage merely by “extrinsic
denomination” since to describe urine or food as “healthy”
is not to predicate of these things the quality the term
designates in its primary application.211 To describe food
209
210
211

Quotation from White 2010, 73-4.
2010, 2.
Cajetan 1953, 15-23.
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as “healthy” is to name it according to something that is
extrinsic to it, i.e., a particular causal relation it
bears to those bodily qualities we describe as “healthy.”
If the term “healthy” were extended to food by “intrinsic
denomination,” however, we would be affirming that there is
something like the quality of bodily health within the food
as such. Though scholastic thinkers will apply analogy of
attribution to the relationship between divine and
creaturely predicates, they will usually do so with the
assumption that there nevertheless is also some ontological
resemblance underscoring the usage.
Aristotle’s account of how comparisons can be made
across kinds has obvious significance for religious
language. As Roger M. White observes, “With analogy, we can
compare things that are different in kind, no matter how
strictly we interpret the idea of “different in kind,”
without violating the fact that they are different in kind.
It is precisely because of this that we can find in
Aristotle’s use of analogy an initial indication of how it
is that, when we move beyond Aristotle, analogy seems to
offer a way of comparing God and humanity without violating
the infinite difference between them.”
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Indeed, Aquinas

will explicitly adapt Aristotle’s models of analogy to
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religious language. Like Descartes, he appeals to divine
simplicity to explain why univocal predication of God and
creatures is impossible. Unlike Descartes, however, he
explicitly denies that divine names are purely equivocal,
for he argues that would undermine our ability to speak
intelligibly of God.213 He appeals to analogy to resolve
this paradox.

II. Aquinas and Analogy
Though Aquinas’s treatment of transcendental analogy
would be a model for later scholastic accounts, he never
offered a systematic account of analogy in general.214
Moreover, it is difficult to gauge the significance of many
of his discussions of analogy, for he appeals to it to
address a variety of philosophical and theological
concerns. Like Aristotle, Aquinas appears to employ a
general notion of analogy that includes cases of both
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For example, In the Summa Theologiae, to the question “Is what is
said of God and creatures univocally predicated of them?” Aquinas
responds by saying that if the names of God and creatures were
“completely equivocal [… ] then it would follow that from creatures
nothing can be known of God. Thus names are predicated analogically” (
ST . I.13.5).
214
As Hochschild puts it, “there is no ex professo teaching on analogy
in Aquinas’s corpus […] the mentions of analogy are occasional and ad
hoc. There is no dedicated treatise or section of a treatise, no
systematically elaborated doctrine of analogy” (2010, 10).
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intrinsic and extrinsic denomination.215 And though he
prefers analogy of attribution to proportionality as a
model for transcendental analogy in his mature works, it is
not clear to what extent this represents a doctrinal change
rather than a mere shift in emphasis.216 It is unsurprising,
therefore, that there is a historical and ongoing
interpretive dispute regarding Aquinas’s theory of
analogy.217 For our purposes, however, the most important
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Mondin, for example, notes that “Aquinas uses ‘analogy’ to mean
direct similarity, similarity of proportions, reasoning by resemblance,
proportionate distribution, right degree of being, metaphor, simile and
several modes of predication” but that “for both Aquinas and Aristotle
analogy is first of all a logical category concerning the meaning of
names.” 5-7. Alston too cautions that Aquinas’s logical notion of
analogy doesn’t presuppose any form of ontological likeness: “We must
be careful not to read Thomas on analogy in terms of some likeness or
similarity between things. Analogically related uses of terms, or the
things they are applied to in these uses, need not be markedly similar
to each other. Similarity is only one of the relations that can tie
together analogically related senses.” 152. White agrees: “Among
mediaeval theologians ‘analogia’ became a generic term, covering all
cases where a word was used in many different ways, but where it was
not by chance that the same word was used” (2010, 73).
216
He appears to favor analogy of attribution in the Summa Contra
Gentiles and the Summa Theologiae. Ashworth (2013) suggests he
abandoned analogy of proportionality (as advocated in De veritate)
because “the problem of divine names arises precisely because the
relationship of God to his properties is so radically different from
our relation to our properties.” Montanges (2004, 74) suggests that he
initially prefers analogy of proportionality because it does not assume
a direct likeness between God and creatures but rather a resemblance in
terms of their relations to their qualities and so seems to safeguard
divine transcendence. Yet proportionality seems to preserve
transcendence at the risk of entailing equivocity. Yet, in De Nominum
Analogia, Cajetan argues that analogy of attribution is always
extrinsic and hence it is the analogy of proportionality in Aquinas
that justifies extending predicates to God. Hochschild (2010, 19-29)
argues that it is a mistake, however, to read De Nominum Analogia as an
interpretation of Aquinas.
217
Topics of dispute include: the status of analogy of proportionality
vis à vis analogy of attribution in Aquinas’s works; whether and how
his views on analogy developed throughout his works; whether analogy
should be understood exclusively as a matter of logic rather than
metaphysics; and the role of judgment in analogy.
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features of Aquinas’s treatment of transcendental analogy
are the following: a) his appealing to Platonic principles
of exemplarism, participation, and causal transmission to
explain the ontological resemblance between creatures and
God; b) his insistence that, since God possesses the
perfection in question fully and by identity whereas
creatures possess the perfection only by participation, a
given term applied to God has definitional priority over
its creaturely analogate; and c) his providing a
paradigmatic example of a traditional bottom-up derivation
of analogical concepts of the divine nature.

A) Ontological Resemblance:
Aquinas explicitly denies that transcendental analogy
of attribution entails an extrinsic denomination of the
sort suggested by examples like “healthy” or “medical.”
Rather, he argues that it is in virtue of a real
ontological similarity that predicates are legitimately
extended from creatures to God. Montagnes has thus argued
that one of Aquinas’s most important innovations with
respect to the Aristotelian theory of analogy is his
insistence that, between the primary and secondary
analogates, there exists “a real community of being, and a
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communication of being by the causality of the first
being.”218 The analogy of attribution is for Aquinas an
analogy of intrinsic attribution. God can be said to be
“good” not merely because he is the cause of creaturely
goodness, but because he and he alone is fully good—in
fact, he is Goodness itself—and creatures are good in only
a derivative sense.219 Though the fact that God is the cause
of creaturely goodness explains why God himself must be
good, it is this latter intrinsic feature of God rather
than his causal relation to creatures that justifies the
ascription.220 In his own analysis of Aquinas’s doctrine of
analogy, Mondin emphasizes this point:

intrinsic attribution requires a real similarity
between analogates and that this similarity is based
on a relation of efficient causality. For example,
there is analogy between the Venetian painting and
Titian, because Titian is the author of the painting.
But efficient causality of itself alone does not
guarantee a similarity between cause and effect…we may
know that an omelet has been prepared by the Chinese
Chiang, but this fact gives us no assurance that the
omelet is Chinese. […] the possibility of analogy of
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2004, 31.
ST I. 13. 2. “’God is good’ therefore does not mean the same as ‘God
is the cause of goodness’ or ‘God is not evil’; it means that what we
call ‘goodness’ in creatures pre-exists in God in a higher way.”
220
As Alston puts it, “in deriving the sense of the predicate in
application to God from its sense in application to creatures we are
exploiting the causal dependence of the prior analogate on the
posterior one (in the order of meaning derivation), but we are doing so
in awareness of the fact that by virtue of this causal dependence there
is, and must be, a commonality in intrinsic form, though possessed in
more and less perfect ways.” (157)
219
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intrinsic attribution rests, then, on the validity of
the principle of likeness between cause and effect.221
Though indebted to Aristotle for the model of attribution,
Aquinas frequently appeals to Platonic and Neo-Platonic
principles of exemplarity, participation and causal
transmission to explain the likeness between creatures and
God.222 As we have discussed at length, Descartes had
appealed to similar principles in his own discussion of the
resemblance relation between creatures and God. All three
principles emphasize an unequal relation of two things to a
given perfection. While creatures perfectly imitate the
ideas God has of them (“intellectual exemplarism”) they
only imperfectly imitate God’s attributes (so-called
“natural exemplarism”).223 Creatures are good, but only
insofar as they imitate divine goodness, only insofar as
they receive from God a limited version of that perfection
that exists in him in an unlimited fashion.224 Participation
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Mondin 1963, 67.
Rolnick observes that “The analogy of participation turns out to be
used more abundantly (126 times) than any other kind of analogy in the
Thomistic corpus. Furthermore, it is employed over the entire span of
Aquinas’ writings, with increasing emphasis in the later works.
Participation analogies are closely linked to exemplarity analogies and
analogies of causal proportion; indeed, in Aquinas’ later works,
exemplarity and causal proportion seem to be subsumed in participation
analogies” (1993, 46).
223
See Doolan 2008, 148-152.
224
However, Rolnick notes that for Aquinas “creaturely participation is
not in the divine esse, but in the esse received from God, an
affirmation which is consistent with creation ex nihilo. Allowing a
direct participation in the divine Ipsum Esse Subsistens might generate
a pantheistic account of creation, essentialism, or something like
222
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implies a similar relation. In his Commentary on Boethius,
Aquinas argues that “to participate is to receive as it
were a part; and therefore when anything receives in a
particular manner that which belongs to another in a
universal [or total] manner, it is said to participate it.”
Creatures are thus said to participate in the divine
perfections to the extent that they fail to possess them in
an unqualified manner. It is easy here to see in the case
of exemplarism and participation a Christianized Platonism,
the identification of God with the form of the Good in
which every other “good” thing participates.225
In his more mature works, however, Aquinas tends to
argue for resemblance by appealing to the principle that
every agent produces something like itself. Since God is
simple and infinite, however, Aquinas designates him an
“equivocal” or “analogical” cause rather than a “univocal”
cause since the perfections of his effects must fall short
absolutely of his own: “Every effect of a univocal agent is
adequate to the agent’s power: and no creature, being
finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent
which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a

Scotus’ assessment of being as a univocal core common to God and
humankind. Instead, Aquinas keeps the infinite God and finite creature
distinct while providing an account of their similarity through the
divine being as cause of all other being.”
225
See Quinn 1996, 19-25.
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creature to receive a likeness to God univocally.”226
Nevertheless, some resemblance must hold. In the Summa
Contra Gentiles, he uses the example of the sun to
illustrate this point:

[T]he heat generated by the Sun must bear some
likeness to the active power of the Sun, through which
heat is caused in this sublunary world, and because of
this effect the Sun is said to be hot, even though not
in one and the same way. And so the Sun is said to be
somewhat like those things in which it produces its
effects as an efficient cause. Yet the Sun is also
unlike all these things in so far as such effects do
not possess heat and the like in the same way as they
are found in the Sun. So, too, God gave things all
their perfections and thereby is both like and unlike
all of them.227
The heat the sun generates in a stone must resemble, in
some way, a property of the sun itself. Knowing the nature
of an effect thus enables us to make inferences about the
nature of the cause. Since God is the first cause, we can
draw conclusions about his nature based upon the nature of
creation. Of course, knowing that a given property is
possessed by a creature does not alone justify the
inference that God possesses an analogically similar
property. Only those properties that are co-extensive with
being (the transcendentals) and that do not entail some
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Quotation taken from White 2010, 86.
Ibid., 84.
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form of imperfection (the pure perfections) can be
predicated of God in a literal fashion.
The general theory of CPP does not, however,
presuppose a causal relation between the perfect and the
imperfect. An imperfect circle’s resemblance to a perfect
one is not explained by the former being an effect of the
latter. Of course, when it comes to the relation between
creatures and God, such a causal relation will obtain.
Nevertheless, what justifies the extension of a predicate
from the perfect to the imperfect will be some form of
resemblance between the two. On this point, Aquinas’s
insistence that the transcendental analogy of attribution
is an intrinsic analogy, i.e. founded upon the ontological
resemblance between the analogates, holds for analogy
within CPP as well. But what is the nature of this
ontological resemblance? Is it reducible to some form of
qualitative identity and hence amenable to some form of
univocal predication? The question can also be framed in
terms of the concepts purportedly analogical predicates
express: how can the content of one concept be similar to
the content of another without there being some sort of
overlap between the two?228
228

As we shall see, for Scotus these questions are separable: conceptual
univocity is in fact compatible with ontological diversity (i.e. the
complete absence of any qualitative identity).
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In his own effort at rehabilitating Aquinas’s theory
of transcendental analogy, Alston argues that, even though
the proper meanings of analogical terms predicated of God
and creatures are not univocal, we can generate a more
generic meaning that encapsulates both uses by abstracting
from the differences between the meanings.229 He claims that
there is some basis in Aquinas’s theory of abstraction for
such an account. Aquinas, for example, thinks that we can
“form a very general concept of corporeity that abstracts
from the difference between corruptible and incorruptible
bodies, and hence can be predicated univocally of both.”
Alston therefore wonders why we shouldn’t be able to “form
a concept of willing, knowing, forgiving, or loving that
abstracts from the differences in the ways in which these
forms are realized in God and creatures, and hence that can
be predicated univocally of both?”230
Alston’s account of analogy as partial univocity may
have merit as a theory of religious language. Such an
account is certainly easier to understand than traditional
analogous predication. Yet, from the perspective of the
traditional theory, what Alston is proposing is no longer a
doctrine of analogy. The consensus interpretation of
scholastic accounts of transcendental analogy is that at
229
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Alston 1993.
Ibid., 175
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both the ontological and the conceptual level the
resemblance is primitive and hence irreducible to any form
of qualitative identity or conceptual overlap allowing for
univocal predication.231 In the case of the relationship
between God and creatures, any sort of qualitative identity
would seem to be a violation of divine transcendence, and
indeed impossible given divine simplicity.232 Like Alston,
other contemporary philosophers of religion in the analytic
231

Burrell, for example, argues that “the most promising of the
traditional statements on ‘analogy’ emphatically deny the presence of a
single common property, for the usage they sought to explain could not
be restricted by a ‘something common’ clause. We need not imply that
God and Socrates share any features when we call them both just. If we
could find anything identifiably common, analogy would prove
superfluous” (1973, 19). Yvres R. Simon argues that treating analogy as
though it were analyzable in terms of some sort of overlap in meanings
is to commit a “beginner’s” mistake: “In the beginner's understanding,
to say that a term is not purely equivocal but analogical is the same
as to say that, in spite of all, the meanings do have in common some
feature, albeit a very thin one, which survives the differences and
makes it possible for a term, whose unity is but one of analogy, to
play the role of syllogistic term” (1960, 6). Even Alston acknowledges
that “the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition has been committed to the
theses that certain predications are essentially or irretrievably
analogical, in that we are incapable of getting below the proportional
similarity so as to specify features that are wholly in common. The
favorite examples for this are the ‘transcendentals’, terms that apply
across the Aristotelian categories. Thus it is frequently said that
‘being’ is said analogically of substance, quality, quantity,
relations, and so on. A substance and a quality each is in a way
appropriate to its category, but there is no way of specifying a
neutral sense of being, such that a term for that sense is univocally
predicable of things in any category. Needless to say, this is all
highly controversial” (1993, 153).
232
Aquinas notes that divine simplicity also renders the subjectpredicate grammatical form (modi significandi) of creaturely
predication inadequate for literal predication of God. I agree with
Alston, however, that this issue is actually extraneous to the issue of
analogy: “The inaptness of our modi significandi for theological
application is not going to affect inferences insofar as they depend on
the meanings of the terms employed, for the mode of signification is
distinguished from that. Thus, to the extent that implications of
divine knowledge or will or goodness depend on the specific content of
those concepts, it will not matter that our grammatical forms are illsuited to talk about God. Any trouble here will come from differences
in the res significata” (1993, 168).
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tradition have criticized traditional accounts of analogy
for assuming that such a primitive resemblance relation
holds between analogates.
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It is argued that similarity in

meaning must either be explicated in terms of partial
univocity or be dismissed as equivocation. The notion that
two properties might be similar without thereby being the
same in some respect, or that concepts of similar
properties might not share content, is rejected more or
less outright. For better or worse, however, this is
precisely the sort of resemblance that intrinsic analogies
assume.
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“Among analytic philosophers, the standard objections to the
Thomistic theory of analogy are generally variations on a theme,
clustered around a rejection of the notion of intrinsically analogous
concepts. Similarity in meaning, it is argued, requires at least
partial sameness in meaning and hence an element of univocity in the
terms we use to describe both God and human beings. As such, there can
be no intrinsically analogical terms; any proposed examples of such
terms can always be analyzed in such a way that their meaning is partly
univocal and partly equivocal, so that the appearance of irreducible
analogy is eliminated. Thus, the analytic philosopher proposes a
dilemma for the Thomist: either the terms used of God and of creatures
are at least partly univocal, so that there is enough commonality of
meaning to constitute them as related in meaning, or they are not, in
which case they share no common meaning and are thus purely equivocal”
(Duncan 2006, 72). Interpreting analogy as a form of partial univocity
is not unique to so-called “analytic” philosophers. For example, the
philosopher of religion, Ronald Nash, has argued that, in Aquinas’
thought, “the very thing that keeps an analogy from being equivocation
is the presence of some univocal element. […] If someone says that a
bird’s nest is analogous to a beehive, there must be something that the
nest and the hive have in common” (1999, 178-9).
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B) Definitional Priority of the Primary Analogate
We have noted that in extrinsic analogy of
attribution, the term as it is applied to the primary
analogate has definitional priority to the term as it is
applied to the secondary. We cannot provide a proper
account of what “healthy” predicated of food means without
including in its definition the meaning of “healthy”
predicated of the body. Food is “healthy” insofar as it is
a contributing cause of the condition constitutive of
bodily health. Does a similar definitional priority apply
to transcendental analogy of attribution as well? Certainly
the definition of divine goodness need not make any
reference to creaturely goodness, for God is not designated
“good” merely because he is the paradigm for or cause of
creaturely goodness.
Yet Aquinas nevertheless insists that there is a
definitional priority in transcendental analogy of
attribution. Theological reflection leads us to conclude
that we must define creaturely goodness in terms of that
goodness in which it participates. As Mondin puts it “the
primary analogate possesses [the perfection] essentially,
absolutely, and therefore by identity and not by
participation. Only the secondary analogate is not
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identical with the analogous perfection but has a limited
degree of it and is, therefore, said to participate in
it.”234 In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas argues that this
unequal relation of creatures and God to a given perfection
means that, from an ontological perspective, it is the term
as it is used of creatures that is the “extended or
analogical use”:

Whenever a word is used analogically of many things,
it is used because of some order or relation to some
central thing. In order to explain an extended or
analogical use of a word it is necessary to mention
this central thing. The primary application of the
word is to the central thing that has to be understood
first; other applications will be more or less
secondary in so far as they approximate to this use.
[…] When we say He is good or wise we do not simply
mean that he causes wisdom or goodness, but that he
possesss these perfections transcendently. We
conclude, therefore, that from the point of view of
what the word means it is used primarily of God and
derivatively of creatures, for what the word means—the
perfection it signifies—flows from God to the
creature.235
Since human goodness and wisdom is merely a likeness of
divine goodness and wisdom, the divine qualities are the
primary senses of “good” and wise.”
As we suggested in the introduction, Aquinas’s account
of semantic-cum-definitional priority ought to be
understand as a claim regarding the analogy of terms rather
234
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Quotation from White 2010, 89. Emphasis mine.
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than the analogy of concepts. Though Aquinas holds that
analogical concepts of divine qualities are derived from
concepts of creaturely ones, he does not believe that we
ought to define divine “goodness” or “wisdom” in terms of
creaturely “goodness” or “wisdom.” Rather, given the
ontological fact that creaturely qualities are mere
participations of divine ones, he thinks we ought to define
the latter in terms of the former. Consider the example of
a fake duck discussed earlier. A child’s only familiarity
with ducks might be with decoys. As far as the child knows,
the primary sense of “duck” applies to these decoys. Yet
when the child learns what a real duck is, he understands
that the term “duck” is used only derivatively of the
decoys. He learns that a decoy can be said to be a “duck”
only insofar as it is an imitation of one, and that one
cannot understand the derivative sense in which the decoy
is a duck unless one understands the standard sense of
“duck.” Likewise, “good” and “wise” may initially appear to
apply primarily to creatures since our initial concepts of
goodness and wisdom are derived from experience of them.
Yet when we come to understand (however inadequately) the
supereminent version of these qualities within God, we may
then view the creaturely qualities as imperfect instances
of the real thing. Consequently, we may define terms
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designating these creaturely qualities in terms of the
divine qualities they imitate.
A similar train of thought has appealed to
contemporary thinkers. Charles Hartshorne, for example,
notes that there is a sense in which the divine meanings of
terms can have priority over their creaturely applications,
even though our concepts of God are derived from concepts
of creatures (in this case concepts of our own cognitive
abilities):

I have […] sometimes argued that, unless we have in
our own natures instantiation of concepts (say that of
decision-making) which we use to conceive God, we
could not have these concepts [of God]. But I have
also sometimes argued that we can conceive our own
form of knowing, say, by introducing qualifications
into what we know of divine cognition. God knows—
period; we—partially, uncertainly, vaguely; and much
of what we can hardly avoid taking as knowledge is
erroneous belief. The appearance of contradiction here
has sometimes occurred to me.236
Aquinas, as we have seen, seems to go even further, arguing
that since the terms designating divine perfections have
definitional priority over their application to creatures,
there is a sense in which terms predicated of God have a
semantic priority to their application to creatures.
Lyttkens, as well as other commentators, have taken this
claim to be a consequence of Aquinas’s Platonic and
236
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Neoplatonic influences. Roger White agrees, and argues
further that Aquinas’s insistence on the semantic priority
of the divine predicates over creaturely ones is his “most
important contribution to the theory of religious
language.”237 White argues that if we give semantic priority
to terms as they are used of creatures, we thereby run the
anthropomorphic risk of measuring God according to the
human. He notes that Aquinas portrays the image-model
relation as asymmetric, for “just as we do not say that man
is like his image, although the image is rightly said to be
like him” so we cannot say that God is like a creature.238
If we use terms designating pure perfections and
transcendentals as if they designated God’s nature
primarily and only secondarily and imperfectly the
attributes of creatures, we can avoid the anthropomorphic
tendency to understand God in terms of creatures.
Nevertheless, this definitional priority provides only
a superficial barrier to anthropomorphism. Though we may
define creaturely attributes in terms of divine attributes,
Aquinas’s account suggests that we conceive of God via
concepts derived from our experience with creatures.
Indeed, White provides an interesting, though ultimately
mistaken, account of how this definitional priority is
237
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reflected in Plato’s account of reflection in the Phaedo.
Understanding how Aquinas’s account diverges from the
Platonic one will help us to distinguish definitional
priority from the issue of concept-derivation. Noting that
Aquinas must respond to the commonsense objection that our
initial acquaintance is with creaturely attributes and that
the meanings of terms such as “good” or “wise” are, for us,
in initially creaturely in nature, White suggests that
Aquinas could appeal to Plato’s account of geometrical
notions in the Phaedo in support of this notion of
semantic-cum-definitional priority. “Plato’s basic point,”
he says, is that geometrical terms such as “equal in
length” are never “perfectly exemplified in experience” but
describe “an ideal, or standard, to which empirical
phenomena approach to a greater or lesser extent.”
Nevertheless, when

we first learn the meanings of these geometrical
terms, we inevitably start with their empirical
employment, talking of square buildings or round
cushions. But part of what we learn, when we learn to
apply those words empirically, is that we can make
sense of the idea that to a greater or lesser extent
they fall short of perfect squareness or roundness,
and that what we mean in calling things square or
round is that they approximate to an ideal of
squareness or roundness. Even though it is only by
subsequent reflection on our everyday practice of
classifying everyday objects as square and round that
we arrive at the geometer’s conception of squareness
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and roundness, it is the geometer’s conception that
explains our everyday practice and not vice versa.239
The same relation holds for predicates applied first to
creatures and only subsequently to God, for this “is no
barrier to saying that the primary application of such
words is to God, as setting the standard by which all
earthly goodnesses, wisdoms and justices are to be measured
and judged.”240 White fails, however, to recognize that this
example from Plato indicates an epistemological priority
that is absent in Aquinas’s account. The standard reading
of Platonic recollection holds that our initial use of
geometrical terms –“talking of square buildings or round
cushions” –is guided by a prior awareness of the ideal
standards to which these empirical objects approximate. For
Plato, the geometer’s concepts “explain[ ] our everyday
practice” in the robust sense that an implicit awareness of
them informs our everyday judgments or classifications;
subsequent reflection on this activity is a way of making
explicit what had hitherto been a latent yet cognitively
active item of knowledge. We had noted that Descartes and
Cudworth provide a similar account: prior to an explicit
awareness of the imperfection of sensed triangles in
comparison to the perfection of the geometer’s notion, we
239
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unknowingly draw on an innate idea of a perfect triangle in
our everyday classifications.
But this cannot be the sense in which concepts
“explain” our practices in White’s example, for there we
can be said to possess the geometer’s concept only after
reflection on our everyday practices. As an empiricist,
Aquinas would not agree that our initial capacity to
recognize creaturely instances of goodness is guided by a
concept of ideal (divine) goodness. Rather, our ability to
classify various creatures as “good” is to be explained
solely by an abstracted notion of creaturely goodness, and
it is by manipulating this notion that we arrive, for the
first time, at a concept of divine goodness. After all, if
we did not really possess concepts of creaturely goodness
or wisdom in this manner, how could we arrive at concepts
of divine goodness or wisdom by manipulating these original
notions? It is perhaps true that, once we have reached a
concept of divine goodness by modifying a creaturely one,
we may, as it were, ‘return’ to the creaturely concept and
modify it in light of our concept of the divine; we may, in
other words, recognize creaturely goodness as being merely
an imitation or imperfect example of its divine correlate.
Thus there might be a sense in which we can provide a
proper definition of creaturely goodness only after we have
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compared it to its divine case. Nevertheless, the meaning
of “good” as it is predicated of God is obtained by
manipulating a prior notion of creaturely goodness.

C) Direction of Analogical Derivation
What distinguishes traditional accounts of analogy
such as Aquinas’s from that required by CPP is thus the
fundamental direction of the analogical derivation of
concepts. Aquinas, along with most scholastic thinkers,
held that our concepts of divine perfections are
constructed out of our concepts of creaturely ones. This is
what Adams had called the “bottom-up” approach to divine
predicate formation. Even if God’s perfections are
definitionally prior to our own, our initial notions of
goodness, for example, originate in our experience of
instances of creaturely goodness. For Aquinas, the meaning
of a word is a concept of the thing the word signifies. In
order to extend “good” in a literal fashion to God, we need
to possess a concept of divine goodness. We do this,
according to Aquinas, by modifying our concept of
creaturely goodness. “When we say that God is good […] the
meaning is, Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-
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exists in God, and in a more excellent and higher way.”241
The concept of divine goodness thus produced is not the
same as the notion of creaturely goodness. Rather, it is
the notion of a goodness existing in “a more excellent and
higher way,” and is thus only analogous to the creaturely
concept.
Aquinas does not, however, believe that we can possess
any quidditative knowledge of God (i.e. knowledge of God’s
nature). As is suggested by the vague intensifier “more
excellent and higher,” the concept of divine goodness is
not adequate to the reality to which it refers in the way
our concept of creaturely goodness is.242 As Wippel puts it,
“this name, like any other we may apply to him, leaves the
thing signified as something which we do not comprehend and
something which surpasses any meaning we may give to the
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ST 1.13.3
Some interpreters have suggested that analogy in Aquinas must be
understood in terms of a special role of the act of judgment. These
interpreters will allow that the concepts we employ in speaking of God
are inherently creaturely. What makes our language about God analogical
rather than univocal, however, is not the nature of the concept of the
divine we employ prior to judgment but a concept produced through the
act of judgment itself. Rocca, for example, allows that “Aquinas does
not hesitate to assert that the names we employ in divine predication
are known to us only insofar as they are used of creatures. For some,
such a claim would immediately raise the specter of cryptic univocity:
for if the meanings are inherently creaturely, then are we not simply
saying something creaturely of God whenever we predicate of God names
taken from creatures? How could a divine name really mean anything
different when predicated of God? […] Aquinas’ path around the obstacle
of univocity is to recognize a judgment that both uses and produces
concepts, all the while transcending them” (2004, 192). I do not,
however, understand in what sense an act of judgment could either
“produce” or “transcend” concepts.
242
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name.”243 Since this admittedly imperfect knowledge of God
is derived from knowledge of creatures, however, Aquinas
suggests that the meaning of terms designating creaturely
attributes have a semantic priority over terms designating
divine ones: “Since we arrive at the knowledge of God
through things other than God, the reality referred to by
the names predicated of God and other things exists by
priority in God according to his own mode, but the meaning
of the name belongs to God by posteriority, and thus God is
said to be named from His effects.”244
This claim (from the Summa Contra Gentiles) that the
creaturely meanings of terms have semantic priority by
virtue of their epistemological priority seems to be in
direct conflict with the earlier quotation (from the later
Summa Theologiae) in which Aquinas asserts that the divine
predicates have semantic priority by virtue of their
definitional priority. While White suggests that the later
(Summa Theologiae) account represents a development of
Aquinas’s views, other interpreters have suggested that
Aquinas is somewhat confused on this point.
243
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Lyttkens argues that the ambiguity of semantic priority in Aquinas is
a product of his effort to reconcile discordant elements of his system.
From the philosophical perspective, says Lyttkens, Aquinas give
semantic priority to terms used of creatures when he is “thinking
logically,” whereas he gives semantic priority to the terms used of God
when he is “thinking ontologically” (1952, 369). From a historical
244
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describes the confusion as follows: “The difficulty is that
we are apparently moving in a circle. The concept is first
stated analogously of God, who must be named from creation
because we do not know what He is per se, and afterwards
used to designate a likeness in creation to the divine. But
if, logically, the concept is the first time characterized
by its import in creation, and then stated of creation as a
designation from God, the same is apparently stated of the
same.”246 The problem can be expressed in terms of the value
the definitional priority of divine predicates are
purported to have. Though we may define creaturely goodness
in terms of divine goodness, we cannot understand what
divine goodness is except by reference to the only form of
goodness we have experienced—creaturely goodness.
In any case, the meanings of terms as they are
applied to creatures are semantically prior to their
meanings as they are applied to God in the sense that the
latter are derived from the former. The kind of semantic
priority identified with definitional priority is a
secondary and relatively superficial sort when compared to
this initial order of derivation. There is nothing ‘in’ the
meaning of the divine sense of a term that is not obtained
perspective, the ambiguity can be attributed to his attempting to do
justice to both Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of epistemology and
ontology.
246
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by modifying the original creaturely sense. Responding to
the paradoxical passages like the one above that suggest
that the meanings of divine terms are definitionally prior
to creaturely ones, Alston argues that, “be that as it may,
I am concerned here, as Aquinas is primarily concerned in
these discussions, with semantic order, with what meanings
are derivative from what others, with what meanings have to
be explained in terms of what others. And on that point he
is quite clear that the application to creatures is
semantically prior.”247 Even if a proper definition of
“good” as it is applied to creatures requires us to make
reference to the divine goodness of which it is merely a
likeness, this definitional priority is to be distinguished
from the more basic semantic priority of, as Alston puts
it, “what meanings are derived from what others.” It is
this more basic semantic priority, rooted in the
epistemological order, that distinguishes the geometrical
example in the Phaedo from Aquinas’s account. For Aquinas,
there is no getting around the fact that we conceive of God
in terms of concepts that are derived from experience with
creatures.
Gyula Klima too takes the derivation of concepts of
the divine attributes from concepts of creaturely ones to
247
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constitute a defining feature of Aquinas’s account of
analogical derivation. In fact, he distinguishes Aquinas’s
account from the sort of ‘top-down’ account of analogical
derivation required by CPP. He begins by noting that “since
according to Aquinas we gain our primary concept of being
from created substances, we need to understand divine being
by analogically ‘stretching’ our mundane concept.”248 Thus
even though “the primary significate of the term “being” in
the ontological order has to be divine being […] this is
cognized by us only secondarily, on the basis of a primary
concept we first acquire from creaturely being.” Klima
adds, however, that

if we gained our primary concept of being directly
from God, that is, if the primum cognitum of our minds
were divine being, and not created being in general,
then we could understand created being directly as a
sort of diminished being, delimited and specified by
the limited nature it realizes, and then the cognitive
order would match the ontological order. However,
since our mind is first confronted with the being of
created substances, it has to arrive at the cognition
of divine being in this more circuitous way, at least
in accordance with Aquinas's doctrine.249
Here Klima is comparing Aquinas’s account to the top-down
account of analogy required by CPP, a form of analogy that
(contra White) adheres more faithfully to the Platonic
tradition. This sort of analogy is “top-down” in the strong
248
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sense that concepts of certain creaturely attributes are
obtained, not from experience, but by limiting or
diminishing concepts of divine attributes, concepts that
are not the product of modifying concepts of creaturely
ones. Terms designating pure perfections and
transcendentals are said primarily of God and secondarily
of creatures not merely because the divine terms are
ontologically and hence definitionally prior, but because
our concepts of the creaturely versions of these attributes
are derived from prior concepts of the divine attributes.250
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As we indicated in the second chapter, Descartes would not deny
Aquinas’ claim that the way in which we represent to ourselves God’s
goodness, or any of his other perfections, is by ‘stretching’ (i.e.,
amplifying) our concepts of creaturely perfections. However, he would
argue that in so doing we are guided by an innate understanding of
these (qualitatively distinct) divine perfections.
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Ch. V. Analogy and Abstraction by Confusion
The theory of CPP claims that we apprehend certain
creaturely attributes as absolutely imperfect, i.e.,
falling short of the kind definitive of the perfect.
Additionally, the theory assumes that the imperfect is
apprehended as being in some sense like the perfect. Even
though creaturely goodness, for example, is grasped as
failing to be an instance of genuine goodness, it is
nevertheless viewed as resembling or imitating it and hence
worthy of the designation “goodness.” In chapter III we
introduced various ways of making sense of this relation
and argued that Descartes, in his own version of CPP, may
have been appealing to a theory of analogical resemblance.
In the last chapter, we noted that the traditional theory
of analogy treated resemblance as primitive in the sense
that it cannot be explained by or reduced to any form of
univocity. For many contemporary and historical critics of
analogy, however, similarity in meaning presupposes partial
sameness in meaning and qualitative resemblance presupposes
qualitative identity. Hence, the “irreducible resemblance”
of meanings of purportedly analogical terms can always be
shown to rest on a latent partial univocity, and the
primitive likeness of things can be reduced to some form of

216

qualitative identity. In this chapter, we will attempt to
dispel some of the mystery surrounding the notion of
primitive resemblance by exploring traditional scholastic
accounts of how such resemblance can be cognized and by
drawing parallels to more modern accounts of concept
formation in cases of inexact similarity.

I. Abstraction by Confusion
The traditional theory of transcendental analogy
invokes a resemblance or unity at both an ontological and a
conceptual level. A single term used in different contexts
is taken to signify, via concepts that resemble one another
without sharing content, things that resemble one another
without sharing a common nature or form.

That the

foundation of similarity between two things, or two
concepts, could in some way be inextricably bound up with
the foundation of their difference is indeed a paradox.
Yet, as Yves R. Simon has observed, “the understanding of
analogy begins when we realize that between likeness and
difference there is, in analogy, such a link, such an
essential relation of interdependence that if the
differential is removed, the like is removed also and
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nothing is left.”251 The scholastic critics of the
traditional theory often attempted to undermine the notion
of a primitive metaphysical resemblance by rejecting the
unity of analogical concepts and therefore “denying the
logical possibility of analogy.”252 The great scholastic
critic of analogy, Duns Scotus, argued that only univocal
concepts possess a unity of meaning such that they 1) can
be employed as the middle term of a valid syllogism and 2)
cannot be affirmed and denied of the same thing without
contradiction.253 Though Aristotle and Aquinas had assumed
that analogical concepts could be used in reasoning without
committing the fallacy of equivocation, they had never
explained precisely how this could be done.
Later scholastic advocates of analogy therefore
attempted to show how analogical concepts could possess
sufficient unity (or resemblance) to be employed in valid
reasoning, a resemblance that was taken to reflect a
primitive analogical resemblance of things. Oftentimes this
was framed as a matter of identifying a single analogical
concept capable of representing imperfectly or confusedly
each of the analogous natures. This sort of solution, in
251

1955, 7.
Hochschild 2010, 139.
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Hochschild observes that even though Scotus’ criticism concerns the
logical nature of analogy, his “logical assumptions are just an attempt
to shore up his denial of the metaphysical category of proportional
unity” (2010, 39).
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fact, can be traced back to the account of analogy at which
Scotus’ critique was primarily aimed—that of Henry of
Ghent’s. Though Ghent held that our analogous concepts of
divine and creaturely being cannot be said to overlap in
any way (indeed, as simple, they cannot), he nevertheless
suggested that, due to their primitive similarity, we tend
to confuse the two notions in thought, producing a single
concept of the two analogous natures.254 Later scholastics
attempted to respond to Scotus’ criticism and open up a
logical space for analogy by supplying a formal analysis of
such abstraction by confusion. Cajetan, who favored a model
of analogy of proportionality, argued that the natures of
analogous things are proportionally similar such that the
concepts of each bear a proportional similarity to one
another.255 The proportional similarity of these concepts
enables us to form a single concept that represents each of
the analogous natures, a concept that can be employed in
syllogistic reasoning. Yet since analogous natures are
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1998b, 302-3.
Even though analogy of proportionality is usually taken to express a
resemblance of relations (A:B::C:D), for Cajetan, the analogy signifies
not a relation but the “foundation of a relation.” Here we see, as we
did with Aristotle, how the four-part scheme of proportionality can be
a roundabout way of describing a direct proportion between two things.
Though Cajetan deviates from Aquinas in explicitly rejecting analogy of
attribution, he accepts the bottom-up account of analogical concept
derivation: “[W]hen men rose to a knowledge of the divine nature and
saw the proportional similitude between us insofar as we are wise and
God, they extended the name wisdom to signify in God that to which our
wisdom is proportional” (1953, 73).
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similar without possessing anything in common, this concept
is neither a generic one derived by abstracting something
they share, nor a notion of a mere arbitrary collection.

256

Cajetan argues that while proportional natures are
each represented by their own “perfect” concept, each
perfect concept can represent other proportional natures
confusedly or “imperfectly.”257 Given two perfect concepts
of proportional natures, we can form a sort of quasiabstraction whereby we apprehend a single concept
representing both natures imperfectly.
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This is not the

abstraction of something common to each proportional
256

Cajetan: “Things which give rise to univocation are similar to one
another in the sense that the foundation of similitude in one has
exactly the same nature as the foundation of similitude in the other.
Thus the notion of one contains in itself nothing which the notion of
the other does not contain. In this way, the foundation of univocal
similitude in both extremes abstracts equally from the extremes
themselves. On the other hand, things which give rise to analogy are
similar in the sense that the foundation of similitude in one is
absolutely different in nature from the foundation of similitude in the
other. Thus the notion of one thing does not contain in itself what the
notion of the other contains. For this reason the foundation of
analogous similitude in either of the extremes is not to be abstracted
from the extremes themselves but the foundations of similitude remain
distinct, although they are similar according to proportion, and
because of this they are said to be the same proportionally or
analogically” (1953, 30-1).
257
So, Cajetan argues that “every concept of a creature is a concept of
God, just as every creature is a kind of likeness of God” 1953, 80.
258
Hochschild notes an interesting ambiguity here: “[I]s what we call
the imperfect concept another concept in addition to the distinct
perfect concepts? Or is what we call the imperfect concept really just
(any) one of the (many) perfect concepts, considered insofar as it
imperfectly represents the other analogates of which it is not a
perfect concept?” He suggests that there is evidence for both, but
argues that “the two alternatives may not be so different: the many
imperfect concepts implied by the latter alternative—each a perfect
concept of a distinct analogate, imperfectly representing other
analogates—may be regarded as proportionally one imperfect concept—
insofar as they all represent all analogtes imperfectly—as implied by
the former alternative” (2010, 147-8).
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nature, says Hochschild, but “a kind of abstraction by
confusion: the diverse proper analogues are considered as
similar, and their diversity is ignored or ‘confused.’ What
is confused (blurred, or made indistinct) is the
distinction between the proportionally similar rationes, so
that what is considered is their proportional
similarity.”259 Even though there is not some commonly
abstractable ratio (i.e., concept), abstraction by
confusion successfully yields a single concept because
proportional similarity is a genuine form of similarity.
While the foundation of univocal predication is shared
conceptual content reflecting a qualitative identity, the
foundation of analogy is the proportional similarity of
such content reflecting the proportional similarity of
forms or natures. Thus an analogous term can signify these
analogous natures insofar as they are similar. And just as
the process of abstraction by confusion is not a matter of
isolating a common element, so the reverse process
(contraction) is not the addition of a differentia to a
generic notion, for what distinguishes one analogous nature
from another must already be “contained” in the imperfect
concept. Rather, a concept imperfectly representing a
plurality of analogates is rendered a perfect concept of a
259

Ibid., 149.
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given analogate by uncovering or rendering explicit their
primitive diversity.260
Cajetan holds that his account can justify inferences
employing proportionally similar concepts. When the
different concepts are regarded according to what makes
them distinct (i.e. as perfect representations of their
respective natures), he notes that employing them in
reasoning would indeed “lead to the error of
equivocation.”261 But if we regard the concepts according to
their unity (i.e. via an abstraction by confusion) he
claims that then “one does not commit any fault, because
whatever belongs to one belongs also to the other
proportionally, and whatever is denied of the one is also
denied of the other proportionally. The reason is that
whatever pertains to a similar object as such pertains also
to that to which it is similar, proportionality of course
being always duly observed.” Cajetan provides the following
example of such an inference: “Every simple perfection is
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John of St. Thomas notes that since standard abstraction proceeds by
way of adding “something extraneous […i.e.,] something of which the
abstracted concept cannot be predicated,” standard contraction occurs
by adding something extraneous to the abstracted concept. In analogy,
however, contraction proceeds not by “the addition of anything
extraneous but needs merely something of which the abstracted concept
can be predicated.” So, for example, “in order that ‘being’ be
contracted to ‘substance’ or ‘accident’ or ‘living’ or ‘body,’ it needs
something which also is being, and of which being is predicated and
which, consequently, is not extraneous to being. Such contraction is
not effected by addition” (Simon 1955, 173).
261
1953, 69.
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in God; Wisdom is a simple perfection; Therefore, [wisdom
is in God].”262 The fallacy of equivocation is avoided, he
says, because “the word wisdom in the minor does not stand
for this or that notion of wisdom, but for wisdom which is
proportionally one, i.e. for both notions of wisdom, not
taken in conjunction nor in disjunction, but insofar as
they are undivided proportionally, insofar as one is the
other proportionally, and insofar as both constitute a
notion which is proportionally one.” Nor can the confused
concept of wisdom be affirmed and denied of the same thing
without contradiction. Though one can say God is both wise
and not wise when employing concepts perfectly representing
divine wisdom (the former) and perfectly representing
creaturely wisdom (the latter), one cannot do so when
employing an imperfect concept of wisdom in both uses.263

II. Modal Distinction vs. Abstraction by Confusion
It may seem, however, that this account of abstraction
by confusion is itself unclear. Can we possess a concept
representing the analogical unity of two things without
262

Ibid., 71.
Responding to Scotus’ definition of a univocal concept in terms of
the principle of contradiction, Cajetan argues that “if identity which
is sufficient for contradiction is made the definition of univocation,
then it is clear that, by stating that being is analogous and unified
merely by proportion, one will fulfill the definition of univocation”
(1953, 72).
263
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thereby isolating an element of qualitative identity? And
if the concept is not produced by isolating a shared
feature, what distinguishes this concept from that of an
unrelated or arbitrary collection?264 The kind of example
that best expresses the intuitive plausibility of
abstraction by confusion is, somewhat ironically, the very
kind favored by Scotus in his own account of univocity:
scalar properties like color that are taken to vary
primitively in intensity or strength. Scotus had wanted to
show how univocal predication of creatures and God could be
consistent with the fact that, unlike most natures
admitting of univocal predication, they don’t share in any
reality and hence the natures and proper concepts of each
are in fact only analogous to one another. Since the proper
concepts of God and creatures are not distinguished from
one another by differentiae added to a genus, we cannot
form a generic concept common to God and creatures.
Nevertheless, he argues that if the proper concepts are
distinguished as concepts of different determinates (or
intrinsic modes) of a determinable magnitude, we can form a
common univocal concept by conceiving of this magnitude
without determining it to a given mode. This univocal
264

Yves R. Simon asks the same question. Since we cannot isolate a
feature shared by analogous items, he notes that “it is reasonable to
ask whether the unity of an analogical set is anything else than that
of a collection” (1960, 8).
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concept can be only an imperfect representation of the
creaturely and divine realities since the magnitude exists
in each only as contracted to a given mode.
Scotus derived this so-called “modal distinction” from
the scholastic theory of the intension and remission of
forms.265 Previous thinkers had attempted to explain how
certain accidental qualities could undergo changes in
magnitude without altering the species of the form itself.
Though a piece of paper might become less intensely white
with age, because whiteness is a quality admitting of
remission, the underlying form of whiteness remains the
same. This reasoning could also explain univocal
predication in such cases; though one piece of paper might
be more intensely white than another, we can predicate
“white” univocally of both. Scotus suggests that a similar
sort of univocity is possible in cases of predicating
attributes to God and creatures. He suggests that the idea
of infinite being is related to the idea of being in the
way that the notion of intense white is related to the idea
of white in general. Different degrees of white do not
represent different species, for the color white is the
sort of nature that varies primitively in degree. Thus
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Dumont 1998b, 317-8.
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when I say “infinite Being,” I do not have a concept
composed accidentally, as it were, of a subject and
its attribute. What I do have is a concept of what is
essentially one, namely of a subject with a certain
grade of perfection-infinity. It is like “intense
whiteness,” which is not a notion that is accidentally
composed, such as “visible whiteness” would be, for
the intensity is an intrinsic grade of whiteness
itself.266
Even though white can exist only as contracted to a given
degree of intensity, we can nevertheless form a univocal
concept of it. We do this not by abstracting white from its
intrinsic degree (which is impossible), but by regarding
the reality in an imperfect manner.

The same follows for

the idea of being and the other pure perfections and
transcendentals. Even though being exists only as
contracted to a given degree, we can nevertheless form a
univocal concept of it. The univocal concept is not the
idea of a reality (e.g. being) distinct from infinite or
finite being, but is simply an imperfect representation of
being as it exists according to its intrinsic modes.267
One might suspect, at this point, that the dispute
between Scotus and Cajetan is merely a verbal one. In fact,
266

Scotus 1962, 27.
As Dumont describes it: “some particular instance of white existing
at the tenth grade of intensity can be conceived perfectly, and then it
is known according to the degree of perfection with which it is
actually found. That same instance of white can be conceived
imperfectly, and then only the nature of ‘whiteness’ as such, apart
from the real condition of its grade of intensity, is known. The former
is a proper concept of whiteness in some determinate grade, the latter
a concept common to the various instances of white differing in
degrees.” (1998 319)
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the late scholastic John of St. Thomas, who endorses
Cajetan’s position, characterizes the unity of the
imperfect analogical concept as a sort of modal
distinction, according to the “way of having a form, for
each analogate has its form not in the same way, but
proportionally.”
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The key question in clarifying the

distinction between Scotus’ account and abstraction by
confusion is this: what is the difference between 1) an
imperfect univocal concept obtained by prescinding from the
intrinsic modes of various natures and 2) an imperfect
analogical concept obtained by confusing or ignoring the
diversity of various natures. St. Thomas goes into some
detail in describing abstraction by confusion. Whereas
standard abstraction proceeds by changing the content of
what is conceived (i.e., by excluding any contracting
differentiae) abstraction by confusion consists in changing
how the content is apprehended, and thus unlike the
standard abstracted concept, it includes contracting
features in act rather than in potency (as a standard
abstracted univocal concept does). To illustrate how this
is done, he provides the example of viewing a collection of
similar things from a distance:
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Simon 1955, 171. Emphasis mine. St. Thomas also interprets Aquinas as
holding that “being is not contracted by addition but by modes” 174.
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[W]hen, from a great distance, I see a thousand men or
a hill of sand, I do not discern the individual {men
or grains of sand}, I see the whole multitude in one
vision. The individuals are many and they terminate
one act of vision as if they were one thing, yet you
cannot say that in such apprehensions the many are
attained only in potency: they are attained in act,
though confusedly. This is how the confused concept of
being is related to all its analogates: it represents
immediately all things under the confusion of ‘having
existence,’ and the only thing that it tells
explicitly is ‘having existence.’269
He goes on to explain that a confused concept is like an
equivocal one in the sense that it “requires the actual
plurality of the things that are taken confusedly, as
happens when I perceive a multitude.”270 However, whereas an
equivocal concept signifies “several as several, that is,
as having nothing in common,” the analogous concept “which
attains several things confusedly unites those things
through that confusion itself and the only thing that it
expresses in explicit fashion is the unity of those several
things: again, this unity is not one of isolation, but of
confusion.”271
St. Thomas alleges that the Scotistic account of
transcendental univocity is ultimately inconsistent. If, as
Scotus claims, being is contracted by intrinsic modes
rather than differentiae, then this either a) implies that
269
270
271
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“the concept of being cannot be perfectly separated from
the modes which contract it [and thereby] vindicates our
own theory” or b) means that “being abstracts perfectly
from its modes” which would render the modes differentiae
and being a genus.272 According to St. Thomas, the Scotists
mistakenly assume that if a concept does not explicitly
represent its inferiors (i.e, the entities falling under
it) in act, it therefore does not include its inferiors in
act. Rather, the example of seeing a multitude as unified
is intended to show that what is not represented in act
explicitly many nevertheless be included implicitly.273 Just
as we can say that the diversity of the individuals is seen
yet “confused” within the perceiver’s perspective, so the
diversity of individual analogical natures can be included
within a concept even though it is their unity that is
expressed explicitly.
272

Simon 1955, 198-9.
James F. Anderson, who endorses the sort of abstraction by confusion
proposed by Cajetan and St. Thomas, explains that “the intrinsically
analogous and formally ontological concept that characterizes Analogy
of Proper Proportionality does not prescind from its instances so as to
remain ‘in potency’ to them, as does the univocal sort of notion.
Because of this the latter is limitable by the addition of some
extrinsic differential factor. ‘Living organism,’ for example, is
conceptually univocal with respect to all its species, including its
dividing differences only ‘potentially,’ thus being divisible
extrinsically by them. I.e., it is because such terms are univocally
conceivable, when one prescinds form their various kinds, that the
items responsible for their specific differentiation ‘lie outside’
their definitive natures. (Every cow is a living organism, but not
every living organism is a cow. On the other hand, since all nonunivocal objects –and of these ‘being’ is the principal one-really
embrace their ‘differences,’ they cannot in truth simply exclude them
even conceptually)” (1967, 58).
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Part of the force of Scotus’ argument is the
assumption, shared by both advocates and opponents of
abstraction by confusion, that the sort of change accounted
for by the theory of remission and intensification of forms
allowed for univocal predication.

274

Yet if we jettison the

metaphysical assumption of a common form, we can see how
our ability to produce a common concept of a color might be
best explained by a process like abstraction by confusion.
In his own attempt to explain the intuition underlying
Scotus’ claims for univocity, Richard Cross uses the
example of different shades of blue:

I take it that we can talk of a word's having two (or
more) similar senses only if there is something in
common between the two senses. But the senses can have
something in common only if the attributes signified
by the terms themselves have something in common. The
attributes, presumably, include some more basic
property that they have in common. If they did not, it
would be difficult to see how we could claim that they
were similar (rather than wholly different). For
example, we could not claim that light blue and dark
blue were similar colors unless they both had a
feature in common—in this case blueness—in virtue of
which they could be said to be similar to each other.
Now, we can presumably find, or invent, a term to
signify any common basic attribute. And this term will
274

It should also be noted that some scholastics denied that a single
form could undergo change in (for example) intensity; rather, they held
that when a given color became less intense, this was due to the fact
that the original form was replaced by another. This issue is, however,
distinct from the question of whether univocity is preserved, for even
if there is a numerically different form in cases of such qualitative
change, it does not follow that the same kind of quality (e.g.
whiteness;) is no longer present when, for example, a sheet of paper
becomes less intensely white.
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be univocal: it will be used in the same sense in all
statements.275
The underlying assumption at work here is that similarity
must be explained in terms of the possession of a common
feature.276 Though Scotus denied that God and creatures
possess something in common in the sense allowing for
standard abstraction, Cross argues that Scotus does seem to
assume that some sort of ontological commonality
constitutes their analogical resemblance and makes possible
univocal predication.
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Unfortunately, Scotus never

explicitly addresses this issue. In fact, Dumont has shown
that Scotus’ fourteenth century followers were themselves
divided on the topic. While Scotists such as Antonius
Andreas and Peter Thomae felt that there must nevertheless
be some real community underlying the univocal concept of
being, he explains that others, such as Peter of Navarre
and Peter of Aquila, held that “the univocal concept of
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Cross 1999, 33.
Or as Burrell puts it in his own analysis of Scotus: “if the same
word names (or signifies) different things, then it must do so by a
feature they hold in common” (1965, 651).
277
Cross thinks that Scotus’ account is intelligible only if it assumes
that some sort of real commonality underlies univocal predication.
Though God and creatures are really diverse, Cross explains that “this
does not, according to Scotus, exclude all commonality. He notes that
the idea (ratio) of a simple transcendental attribute (i.e., the
attribute considered without its intrinsic modes) is common ‘as a
transcendental is.’ The account is not very explanatory, since Scotus
offers no further account of what it is for a transcendental to be
common. But it is clear that Scotus does not want to deny all
commonality. (If he did, of course, his own univocity theory could not
be sustained)” (1999, 39).
276
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being results purely from an indifference in the mode of
conception.”278
Neither option appears to be fully consistent with
Scotus’ account.
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Andreas argued that if the common

concept of being does not correspond to “something common
in reality serving as its foundation,” then this would
violate Scotus’ stated aim that metaphysics constitute a
“science of reality.”280 On the other hand, if Andreas is
right that there is a “real unity” underlying univocal
predication of creatures and God, then this would seem to
threaten their real diversity and hence God’s transcendence
and simplicity. The advocates for abstraction by confusion,
however, would claim that both disputants are laboring
under the false assumption that the only kind of
ontological unity capable of grounding conceptual unity is
a unity of commonality. As Hochschild argues, the Scotists
have overlooked the possibility that this conceptual unity
could be explained by invoking a form of analogical
similarity irreducible to any sort of commonality.281
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1992, 144. Unlike Andreas, Thomae holds that the real community does
not lie outside the soul, but in “intentional or conceptual being […] a
type of middle existence between a being of reason and an actually
existing being in reality” (145).
279
I am not here considering Thomae’s account since I don’t fully
understand it.
280
Dumont 1992, 142.
281
“[T]he Scotist simply refuses to recognize something that is, in
fact, real: proportional sameness, analogical unity. Although Scotus
argues against the analogy of ’being’ by denying the logical
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Indeed, if we look at Cross’s example of the two
shades of blue more closely, we see that both Scotistic
options prove difficult to defend. What is the common
feature that explains their similarity? It cannot be
explained by their sharing a common color in addition to
their own particular shades, for each just is the color it
is and no other. To explain their similarity by reference
to their both being instances of the color blue is to beg
the question, for the fact that we can truly predicate
“blue” of both is what needs to be explained. And even if
we could isolate a common property, what would distinguish
the sort of predication it underwrites from standard
univocal predication? On the other hand, if the univocity
of the concept blue is not given any foundation in the
colors themselves, there seems to be no explanation for why
these two colors are represented by it while a third, say a
shade of orange, is not. This concern is similar to the one
Andreas raised regarding being. Just as there must be
something in reality that secures the truth of the claim

possibility of analogy, we can see based on these considerations that
in fact Scotus’ logical assumptions are just an attempt to shore up his
denial of the metaphysical category of proportional unity; that is why
he must define univocation in terms of its capacity to serve as the
basis for contradictory statements and so to preserve inferences from
the fallacy of equivocation. While plausible enough at first sight,
this is a radical innovation; but Scotus could do it only because he
refused to countenance the reality of proportional unity” (2010, 139).
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that both creatures and God are beings, so something must
ground the truth of the claim that both shades are blue.

III. Modern Accounts of Resemblance
The difficulty of explaining why a given thing
satisfies or falls under a given concept has been discussed
in modern philosophy in the context of the problem of
universals. Though it is comparatively easy to use
universals to explain the extension of concepts in cases of
exact resemblance, the problem is more difficult in cases
of inexact resemblance. In his own analysis of resemblance,
H.H. Price considers the example of various white objects—
snow, chalk, paper, an unwashed tie—each of which exhibits
a different degree of whiteness. Though they certainly
resemble each other in terms of their color, he asks
whether we can maintain that the same color (whiteness)
really recurs in each. Since it instead appears that each
object is characterized by a different color (and hence a
different universal), “the resemblance seems to be ultimate
and underivative, not dependent on the presence of a single
universal in all these objects.”
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The unity of the class

of white objects, it would then appear, is constituted not
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by qualitative identity but by a primitive (“ultimate and
underivative”) form of resemblance. The concept “white”
would accordingly apply to a given range of objects because
there is a sufficient likeness between them with respect to
their color, not because they possess a color in common.
Hume made a similar claim in his Treatise regarding
comparisons between simple ideas, arguing that resemblance
is compatible with simplicity:

It is evident, that even different simple ideas may
have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is
it necessary, that the point or circumstance of
resemblance should be distinct or separable form that
in which they differ. Blue and green are different
simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue or
scarlet; though their perfect simplicity excludes all
possibility of separation or distinction. It is the
same with particular sounds, and tastes, and smells.
These admit of infinite resemblance upon the general
appearance and comparison, without having any common
circumstance the same. (1.1.7.7, emphasis mine)
There is little doubt that we possess concepts of whiteness
or blueness in general, and that such concepts can be
employed in reasoning without producing an equivocation.
Nevertheless, philosophers have found ways of explaining
the unity of classes and the extension of such concepts
without assuming a form of resemblance irreducible to
identity.
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The realist about universals could insist that the
extension of the concept white is to be explained by a
shared property, so long as we make a distinction similar
to the modal one employed by Scotus—a distinction between
determinate and determinable properties. A determinate
property can be described as a specific way of having a
determinable one. So, for example, lime-green and forestgreen could be characterized as determinates of the
determinable property green. The resemblance in color of a
lime-green object and a forest-green one could thus be
explained in terms of the existence of the same
determinable characteristic (green) in both objects.
Crucially, the determinate/determinable relation differs
from the species/genus relation insofar as the former is
always non-conjunctive; that is, the determinate’s relation
to its determinable is not analyzable as the product of
adding a contracting third property (as the species ‘man’
is created by adding the differentia ‘rational’ to the
genus ‘animal’).283 Rather, the determinate “marks-off” a
“space” within the determinable without the assistance of a
logically independent differentiating property.284 In this
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Rosenberg 2009, 210.
See Searle 1959: “in order for some property to be a genuine
differentia of a species within a genus, it must be logically possible
that entities outside the genus could have that property, i.e., the
differentia must be logically independent of the genus. For example,
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sense, the determinate/determinable relation appears to
capture the paradoxical feature of analogical resemblance,
namely, that similarity and difference spring from the same
source.
Other realists about universals agree that resemblance
must always be reducible to some form of identity, but
reject the existence of determinable properties. D. M.
Armstrong argues that there is no property being red
corresponding to the predicate “red” since all universals
must be determinate. That this must be so, he thinks,
follows from the principle that nothing can agree and
differ in the same respect. If redness is a property in all
red particulars, then the same respect—their redness—will
be the foundation of both their sameness and their
difference. Yet since “it is impossible that things be
identical and different in the very same respect [and it
is] undeniable that different shades of red are different
properties […] it follows that redness is not a property

even if humans are in fact the only rational things it is at least
logically possible that calculating machines, spirits, etc., could show
signs of rationality. But it is not logically possible that things
without shape could have all points on their surface equidistant from a
common centre. […] In short, a species is a conjunction of two
logically independent properties-the genus and the differentia. But a
determinate is not a conjunction of its determinable and some other
property independent of the determinable. A determinate is, so to
speak, an area marked off within a determinable without outside help”
(143).
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common to all red things.”285 Armstong argues instead that
the predicate “red” designates not the determinable
property being red but a class of resembling shades. He
claims that this resemblance is ultimately to be cashed out
in terms of partial identity. Though properties like color
seem to lack complexity, he argues that just because we do
not recognize the partial identity underlying a given
instance of resemblance, it does not follow that that
resemblance is not actually constituted by partial
identity. In support of this claim, he cites Thomas Reid’s
example that we can and do recognize the resemblance of two
faces even if we can’t specify those respects in which they
are, in fact, identical.286
If we use abstraction by confusion to explain the
extension of the concept white, however, the unity of the
class falling under the concept (e.g., the brilliant white
of fresh snow, the off-white of a dirty collar) will not be
285

1978, 117. A related problem arises when a defender of determinable
properties asserts that resembling shades of a color do not appear to
share a quality because determinables are abstract universals and hence
unobservable. Panayat Buchvarov counters that it is “nonsensical” to
claim that while two resembling properties are observable, the
determinable constituting their resemblance is not (1966, 146). Given
the unique logical relationship between determinates and determinables,
if the common quality instantiated is unobservable, so must be the
instances themselves.
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He takes Reid’s example to show that either our awareness of a
respect of resemblance is 1) “vague and […] perhaps cannot be put into
words”; 2) “unconscious”; or 3) “even if both inarticulate and
unconscious awareness of a respect is lacking, it might yet be the case
that the resemblance which we were aware of was in fact resemblance in
a certain respect” (98).
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attributed to either an identity of determinable properties
or to a latent partial identity of the determinate ones.
Nor does it follow, however, that the class of white things
is a mere arbitrary collection, the unity of which lacks
any foundation in reality. Rather, abstraction by confusion
assumes that the unity of the class flows from a primitive,
irreducible resemblance between the properties themselves.
In this way, abstraction by confusion treats cases of
inexact resemblance in the same way contemporary theories
such as trope nominalism do, for they both take similarity
between distinct attributes to be an unanalyzable feature
of the world.287

Analogical resemblance could be said to

represent a third option, lying between identity and
difference. If two simple properties are not qualitatively
identical, it does not follow that they are qualitatively
diverse, for they could still be analogically similar.
Because they are similar, they can be conceived either with
respect to their diversity (their failing to be
qualitatively identical) or with respect to their unity
(their failing to be wholly diverse). This latter operation
is abstraction by confusion. Because the items in the class
are not identical in color, the term “white” does not refer
287

However, abstraction by confusion could be consistent with a mixedaccount in which universals are employed to explain exact but not
inexact resemblance.
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to a universal; yet since the properties are not completely
diverse, the term represents something more than a mere
arbitrary collection. As St. Thomas would put it, “white”
would signify “not an aggregate of all its inferiors but
their kinship in an analogical notion.”288
It is at least possible that the classes of concepts
of scalar properties such as color are unified through a
primitive form of resemblance, and that the concepts of
these properties are produced by something like abstraction
by confusion. Perhaps, however, the realists are right and
these and other instances of inexact resemblance can always
be attributed to some sort of identity. Such an analysis,
however, will not work for explaining the resemblance
relationship between creaturely and divine attributes
without substantially altering the traditional theistic
notion of God.289 Whereas the ontological simplicity of
colors and other scalar properties is assumed (rightly or
wrongly) on the basis of their phenomenal simplicity,
divine simplicity is taken to follow from divine
perfection. And, even if divine simplicity is denied,
qualitative identity (however slight) between creaturely
and divine attributes is traditionally held to be
288
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inconsistent with divine transcendence. This is not to deny
that there might be other reasons, and good ones, for
questioning the traditional doctrines of divine simplicity
and divine transcendence. It is, however, a mistake to
argue that we must either assume some form of qualitative
identity and deny the traditional theistic concept of God
or embrace equivocity and its consequent agnosticism.290 On
the contrary, we can affirm both that 1) there is a
qualitative distinction between creaturely and divine
attributes and 2) creation is an image and likeness of God,
so long as we assume that their resemblance is analogical
and hence irreducible to any form of qualitative identity.
291
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According to CPP, this would be agnosticism regarding creatures.
This issue is distinct from the question as to whether the
traditional conception of God is consistent with univocal predication.
Scotus, as we have mentioned, affirmed that God and creatures are truly
diverse and yet they can nevertheless be conceived univocally.
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Ch. VI. Top-down Analogy
The goal of this chapter is to understand how analogous
concepts of creaturely pure perfections could be derived
from concepts of divine ones. To this end, we will first
address one of Scotus’ critiques of bottom-up derivation.
Though Scotus took his argument to apply to all doctrines
of analogy, we will argue that it can actually be taken to
support top-down analogical derivation. In the next
section, we will attempt to show how Descartes’ explicit
application of analogy to the notion of divine selfcausation can be understood in terms of a top-down
derivation. Finally, we will end the chapter with a few
examples of transcendental top-down derivation suggested by
Hartshorne and Descartes.

I. Top-down Analogy and the Traditional Problem of
Religious Language

The problem of religious language is traditionally
framed in terms of the adequacy of creaturely concepts. If
the language we use to speak of God’s nature is
intelligible only in light of concepts derived from
experience with creatures, it is feared that any effort to
describe God’s nature will entail anthropomorphism—i.e.,
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the illegitimate attribution of creaturely attributes to
God. One solution to this problem was to abandon any
pretense of being able to conceive of God in terms of
positive attributes. Instead, the tradition of negative
theology maintained that we can at most conceive of God in
terms of what he is not. There are at least two problems
with this sort of solution. First, it seems to violate our
own intuitions about the perfection of God; a God who
cannot be conceived as good or wise no longer seems to be
worthy of worship. Second, negative theology undermines the
scientific aspirations of theology, specifically our
ability to make inferences about God based upon the nature
of his effects. Transcendental analogy was introduced to
solve this dilemma. We can obtain analogous concepts
adequate to the nature of God by “stretching” certain
concepts derived from our experience with creatures. God is
good, but good in a higher or more perfect way that is only
analogous to creaturely goodness.
CPP, however, turns the problem of religious language
on its head. The problem is not how we might conceive of
God in terms of concepts derived from our experience with
creatures, but instead that of conceiving of creatures in
terms of concepts derived from concepts of God. This is not
the issue of how we might define creatures in light of
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notions of God derived from our experience with creatures.
Rather, this issue concerns the more radical proposal of
Descartes, Leibniz and others that we might, perhaps
unknowingly, conceive of creaturely pure perfections and
transcendental attributes via concepts of these attributes
in God.292 If the concepts are unchanged, the risk is not
anthropomorphism but what Hartshorne has termed
“deimorphism”—the illegitimate attribution of divine
attributes to creatures. Alternatively, if the attributes
of God are deemed too perfect or otherwise unsuitable for
creatures, the consequence is (to use another term from
Hartshorne) a “negative anthropology”—the conceiving of
creatures either in terms of their lacking various positive
properties of God, or merely by extrinsic denomination as
effects of God.293
In our analysis of Descartes, we observed that
deimorphism may characterize some of our pre-philosophical
292

Ronald Nash briefly proposes such an account as a solution to what he
sees as the anthropomorphic consequences of Aquinas’s theory of
analogy, which he thinks is analyzable as a form of partial univocity.
“Anthropomorphism is avoided when the person explaining our knowledge
of God is not an empiricist. Thomas’s explanation founders because of
his insistence that human concepts are derived from sensory experience.
But if empiricism is rejected, if one holds instead that humans possess
a priori knowledge given to them by God, we have an explanation of how
the univocal knowledge about God that grounds analogical knowledge is
possible” (1999, 179).
293
So, for example, creatures would be said to be “good” not because of
any intrinsic feature they possess but because they are effects of that
which is intrinsically good (God). This sort of anthropology is
negative in the sense that it does not propose to say anything about
the positive (intrinsic) nature of creatures.
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understanding of creatures. Just as we may initially judge
and classify what are really imperfect triangles as
(perfect) triangles, we may also unknowingly apprehend
creaturely goodness, for example, as an instance of genuine
(perfect) goodness. It is only when we become aware that
the creaturely instances of goodness fall short of true
goodness that we can be said to possess a notion of
imperfect (creaturely) goodness. Deimorphism in this way
resembles the naïve anthropomorphism that is often said to
characterize an individual’s understanding of God prior to
theological reflection.
A similar parallel can be found between negative
theology, which typically arises through theological
reflection, and negative anthropology. Indeed, Simon has
observed a tendency towards negative anthropology in the
history of religious thought. He claims that “many
metaphysicians and religious thinkers are driven, more or
less consciously and consistently, by the tendency to
believe that being, goodness and the other absolute
perfections belong to God in such an exclusive fashion that
they can never be predicated of a creature in an intrinsic
way.”294 As we noted, Hartshorne provides a contemporary
version of this tendency, observing “a strange sense in
294
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which the analogical concepts apply literally to deity, and
analogically to creatures.”295 Citing the example of the
perfection of knowledge, he suggests that “It is indeed a
curious thing to see how much need there is, not so much of
a negative theology as of a ‘negative anthropology.’ We say
we know—ah, but do we? We guess, on more or less reasonable
grounds, but do we literally know? If “know” means to have
conclusive evidence, then when do we literally attain
knowledge?”296 Interestingly, for Hartshorne negative
anthropology is not merely a matter of how we might define
creaturely perfections, but a consequence of the fact that
our concept of a given human perfection may be, as he puts
it, “a derivative concept, produced by drastically
restricting the idea arising from our intuition of
deity.”297 On this score, he ties his account directly to
the Cartesian doctrine that our ideas of our own
perfections are (partial) negations of an innate notion of
God:

I really believe that we know what “knowledge” is
partly by knowing God, and that though it is true that
we form the idea of divine knowledge by analogical
extension from our experience of human knowledge, this
is not the whole truth, the other side of the matter
being that we form our idea of human knowledge by
295
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exploiting the intuition (called by Descartes, ‘innate
idea’, and as such not really disproved, except in a
strawman version, by Locke) which we have of God. To
‘know’ ought to mean, having conclusive evidence, such
as God has, shutting off the very possibility of
error; but to apply this idea to man we must tone it
down drastically indeed.298
Yet if negative anthropology does justice to our intuition
of divine infinity, it seems to do so at the cost of
violating our sense of the reality and goodness of the
world. Hartshorne, for example, questions whether we “honor
deity by denying to ourselves and the creatures generally
even the most modest analogon to the divine attributes.”299
Similarly, Simon argues that if we take seriously the claim
that only God is good and real, “the created world
disappears into a vacuum.” Yet he claims that this is a
viewpoint that cannot be maintained for long, “since any
such experience as that of pain or love or duty causes us
again to touch the universe of finite perfection […] All
mystics proclaim that God is He who is, and that I am the
one who is not; but these mystical expressions of God's
infinity and of the creature's wretchedness are balanced by
equally mystical expressions of a sense for what is real
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and great in this most wretched of all creatures,
myself.”300
A negative anthropology is not, however, an inevitable
consequence of CPP. Though we apprehend creatures in light
of that which is truly good and real (God), we need not
thereby conceive of them solely in terms of what they lack.
Just as transcendental analogy has been employed to explain
the bottom-up construction of concepts of positive divine
perfections from concepts of creaturely ones, thereby
avoiding the threat of negative theology, so it can be used
to explain how concepts of creaturely positive perfections
can be drawn from concepts of God. As Descartes had
suggested, while only God is truly being, it does not
follow that creation is equivalent to non-being; rather,
creatures are apprehended as somehow falling between being
and non-being. His claim that we arrive at a notion of
“diminished being” by partially negating an innate notion
of infinite being could thus be read as a description of
the diminishing operation of a top-down analogical
derivation. Hartshorne too points towards such a solution:
“An all too negative theology made God the great emptiness,
and an all too negative anthropology made the creatures
also empty. I suggest that nothing is only nothing, that
300
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the divine attributes are positive, and the creatures’
qualities are between these and nothing.”301

II. Scotus’ Critique of Bottom-up Derivation
In the previous chapter, we explained how multiple
simple concepts that adequately represent analogous natures
can, by virtue of their primitive resemblance, be treated
as a single concept that imperfectly (or confusedly)
represents both natures. Our ability to form a single
concept of a general color (e.g. whiteness) on the basis of
our simple concepts of various resembling shades was used
to illustrate this process. When applied to the case of
God, however, abstraction by confusion presupposes that we
already possess proper concepts (i.e., concepts
representing the natures) of both creatures and God from
which we form the confused concept representing their
analogical resemblance. What is left unexplained is how we
obtained a proper notion of God in the first place. In his
analysis of Scotus’ critique of analogy, Wolter emphasizes
this problem: “Where do we get this notion which applies
properly to God and is only analogous to the concept we
apply to creatures? Where do we get the notion of being,
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for instance, as absolutely indetermined and hence
implicitly including the mode of infinity and therefore
proper to God? Once we have it, the theory of analogy
follows logically enough. But analogical knowledge is
always a relative and comparative knowledge.”302

According

to Scotus, there are only two ways we could obtain (by
natural means) proper concepts of God: by abstracting them
from sensation or by a process of rational inference on the
basis of proper concepts of creatures. Though we can
abstract concepts of creaturely attributes from sense
experience, Scotus argues that there is no way such
experience could provide us with a proper, simple concept
of God:

No object will produce a simple and proper concept of
itself and a simple and proper concept of another
object, unless it contains this second object
essentially or virtually. No created object, however,
contains the “Uncreated” essentially or virtually […]
For it is contrary to the very notion of what is
essentially secondary to include virtually what is
prior to it. It is also obvious that the created does
not contain, as part of its essence, something that is
not merely common, but is exclusively proper to the
“Uncreated”; Therefore, it produces no simple and
proper concept of the “Uncreated” at all.303
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1946, 41.
Scotus 1962, 23. Wolter provides the following illustration of
virtual containment: “A baseball, for instance, could produce a simple
proper notion of itself as a sphere and also a simple proper notion of
a circle, for the notion of circularity is virtually contained in the
notion of sphericity. But it could not give rise to a simple notion of
triangle or pentagon” (1946, 51).
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Scotus is not here making the broad claim that we can never
derive the simple concept of a thing from knowledge of that
which is merely analogous to it. Rather, he is claiming
that, given the fact that creaturely perfections fall short
absolutely of God’s, there is nothing ‘in’ creatures the
abstraction of which will provide us with a simple concept
of a divine attribute. Hence the only way we can form a
proper concept of God is by a process of rational inference
from our proper concepts of creatures. According to Scotus,
however, this entails that 1) we must be able to derive a
univocal concept from our proper concept of creatures as a
‘bridge’ to form a proper concept of God and 2) the proper
concept of God will not be utterly simple but a composite
of this univocal bridging notion and the particular mode or
grade of perfection unique to God (infinity).
In their analyses of analogy, both Mondin and Lyttkens
concede Scotus’ point about the unavailability of a proper
concept of God for analogy by abstraction.304 Yet they
observe that advocates of both intrinsic analogy of
attribution and analogy of proportionality have often
maintained that if we possess a proper concept of the
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Mondin: “Since we do not have a direct knowledge of both primary and
secondary analogates we cannot proceed to form a concept which
represents vaguely both of them, by disregarding the different ways in
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Lyttkens 1953, 360-5.
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primary analogate (the creature), then, owing to the
analogical similarity between the creature and God, we can
use this concept as an imperfect representation of the
secondary analogate (God) of whom we have no direct
knowledge. Mondin suggests that while the procedure of
abstraction by confusion discussed in the previous chapter
is a form of “incomplete abstraction,” this latter process
is “a sort of vague intuition: in some way we intuit in the
perfectly known analogate the other analogates.” Aquinas’s
account of how we extend the term “good” from creatures to
God—“When we say that God is good […] the meaning is,
Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God,
and in a more excellent and higher way”—could perhaps be
interpreted as just such a procedure: when we use the term
“good” to describe God we are using the creaturely concept
to imperfectly represent the goodness of God.305
There are a few problems with such analogy by
intuition, however. First, it does not seem that this
maneuver produces a concept capable of meeting Scotus’s
logical criteria of univocity. Either we employ the concept
305

It should be noted, however, that the imprecision of this concept is
not the same kind characterizing the imperfection of a concept derived
from abstraction by confusion. In the latter, the proper concepts of
the analogates are included actually yet implicitly within the confused
concept, and we can attend to proper concepts of these analogates by
uncovering this latent diversity. We could not, however, derive a
proper concept of God’s goodness from the creaturely concept that is
regarded as an imperfect representation of this goodness, for it wasn’t
‘within’ the concept to begin with.
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as a perfect representation of the creaturely analogate or
we use it as an imperfect representation of the divine
analogate—since we can’t regard the concept in two
different ways at the same time, there doesn’t seem to be
any way of representing both analogates at the same time.306
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the knowledge
produced by such analogy is disappointingly thin. On the
basis of a concept of creaturely goodness we can conceive
of God as being in some way good, but we cannot be said to
possess a concept of the qualitatively unique property that
is divine goodness. We may use terms such as “perfect”
“supreme” “highest” or “infinite” to characterize God’s
goodness, but these terms must be empty apart from
signifying only that the goodness in question is greater in
some qualitatively distinct yet unknown way. If we want
these concepts to have a more robust positive significance,
it seems that our only option is to accept Scotus’ position
that they can be added to a univocal notion of goodness to
specify the mode in which that goodness is realized.
Alston has criticized Aquinas’ account of analogy on
just this point. For Aquinas, he says, “the perfection
signified is not fully specified; instead we simply
306

In other words, the claim is that since what differentiates the
concept of a creaturely property from that of its analogous divine one
is the manner in which we regard the concept, there doesn’t seem to be
any way to represent the unity of these properties.
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indicate that it is a higher form of a creaturely
perfection but without being able to say just what the
higher form is.”307 This is a problem, he thinks, because it
leaves the truth conditions of the predication unknown. If
we cannot specify the respects in which the divine and
creaturely versions of the perfections are similar and
different, then we cannot infer facts about the divine
nature by considering creation. This problem, says Alston,
“strikes at the heart of Thomistic theology, for at many
crucial points it depends on taking principles (assumed to
be) true of human so-and-so’s to be true of divine so-andso’s.”308 By yielding only indeterminate concepts of the
divine attributes, the bottom-up approach to transcendental
analogy undermines the scientific aspirations of
theology.309
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Advocates of the bottom-up approach to transcendental
analogy therefore face a dilemma: either the derivation
produces only an indeterminate (vague) concept of the
divine analogue, or it produces a determinate (proper)
concept in violation of the ontological difference between
divine and creaturely attributes. While the former option
appears to deprive religious language of much of its
presumed significance, the latter amounts to pulling a
rabbit out of a hat. Yet a top-down approach to
transcendental analogy can avoid this dilemma. Descartes,
as you may recall, shared Scotus’ skepticism regarding our
ability to derive proper notions of divine attributes from
analogous concepts of creaturely ones. He had argued that
if we did not possess an innate idea of the divine
attribute to begin with, any process that begins with a
concept of a creaturely attribute can produce at best a
notion of a divine attribute differing merely by degree.
Unlike Scotus, however, Descartes explicitly disavows any
form of univocity; and unlike many advocates for analogy,
he did not abandon the position that we possess determinate
(proper) concepts of God’s nature.
While the qualitative distinction between creaturely
and divine attributes may forestall any direct derivation
of the former from the latter, it does not follow that the
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opposite derivation cannot be made. Since God cannot be
said to lack formally any pure perfection present within
creation, it would follow that there is nothing ‘in’ the
concept of creaturely perfection that is not present, in
some way, within the proper concept of the divine
correlate. This is the possibility that Klima had raised
when he observed that if Aquinas had held that divine being
were first known, then the conceptual order would match the
ontological, for “we could understand created being
directly as a sort of diminished being.” Since what is
responsible for the qualitative distinction of creaturely
pure perfections from divine ones is not a positive quality
but merely a lack of some sort, possessing a proper concept
of a divine attribute should enable one to derive, by a
process of partial negation, a proper concept of an
analogous creaturely one.

III. Descartes’ Analogy of Divine Self-Causation
Descartes explicitly appeals to transcendental analogy
in his defense of the claim that God derives his existence
from himself. He argues that we possess a common
(analogical) concept of a preserving or sustaining cause—a
concept derived from proper concepts of self-sustaining
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causation (necessary existence) on the one hand and
external-sustaining causation (contingent existence) on the
other. If we did not possess such an analogical common
concept, derived from proper concepts of qualitatively
distinct divine and creaturely existence, we would not be
able to infer God’s existence from our own. Descartes did
not believe that any of our proper concepts of God could be
derived from those of creatures; indeed, his account
suggests that our original notion of existence must be that
of necessary existence, and it is from this concept that we
derive a notion of contingent existence. We shall further
argue that this example illustrates how philosophical
theology (in this case, a causal argument for divine
existence) can presuppose positive knowledge of the divine
nature and hence require top-down analogical derivation.
The second causal proof in the Third Meditation is
intended to show that only God could be the source of a
thinking thing with an idea of God. The narrator must
therefore show why he could not be responsible for his own
existence. To this end, he argues that if he were powerful
enough to preserve himself in existence, then he would be
powerful enough to “give” himself every perfection of which
he has some idea, and thus he would “neither doubt nor
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want, nor lack anything at all” (CSMII 168).310 Even if the
power of self-causation were not a sufficient condition for
possessing other attributes, the narrator can nevertheless
claim that it is a sufficient condition for possessing any
item of knowledge, for such knowledge would be “merely an
accident of that substance” (CSMII 33). Thus any instance
of doubt, including doubt as to whether one possesses the
power of self-causation, would be incompatible with
possessing such power.311 The narrator therefore believes
that he can be certain that his existence is sustained by
something outside of himself.
Several of Descartes’ critics, however, objected to
his description of necessary or independent existence as a
condition in which a thing “derives its existence from
itself” (CSMII 34).

In the First Objections, the

theologian Johannes Caterus argued that the expression is
ambiguous. The statement that a thing derives its existence
310

It will turn out that Descartes does not believe that God literally
‘gives’ himself further perfections, any more than he ‘gives’ himself
existence. Rather, this language is a consequence of the fact that the
proof involves treating divine formal causality as analogous to
efficient causality. Properly speaking, says Descartes, “we perceive by
the natural light that a being whose essence is so immense that he does
not need an efficient cause in order to exist, equally does not need an
efficient cause in order to possess all the perfections of which he is
aware: his own essence is the eminent source which bestows on him
whatever we can think of as being capable of being bestowed on anything
by an efficient cause” (CSMII 168).
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It is also possible that Descartes is here appealing to the
transparency of mental phenomena. Accordingly, if we (as thinking
things) possessed the power of self-causation, we would necessarily be
aware of it.
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from itself can be interpreted in the traditional way as
the purely negative claim that it is uncaused, or as the
positive (and paradoxical) claim that it somehow causes
itself as though it were its own efficient cause. Assuming
that it is impossible for something to be the efficient
cause of itself, Caterus believes that Descartes means the
expression to be taken in its traditional (negative)
sense.312 He argues that since a thing’s lacking a cause is
merely an extrinsic fact about that thing and hence does
not tell us anything positive about that thing’s nature, it
cannot license the conclusion that the thing possesses any
other perfection. Descartes, however, did intend the claim
“derives its existence from itself” to be taken positively.
He maintains that, aside from the “literal and strict
meaning of the phrase ‘efficient cause,’” there is a “place
for another kind of cause analogous to an efficient cause”
(CSMII 79). It is this analogous sense of the phrase that
gives positive meaning to the expression “derives its
existence from itself.” The bulk of his reply to Caterus,
as well as to Arnauld who will raise more pointed
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objections, is his explanation of what this positive
meaning could be.
Descartes admits that it is obvious that a thing
cannot be its own efficient cause in the sense of a mere
originating cause, for this sense presupposes 1) the
temporal priority of cause to effect and 2) the existence
of a cause distinct from the effect. Regarding the first
point, he reminds Caterus that, in inquiring into the
explanation for his existence as a thinking thing with an
idea of God, he is searching for an explanation
encapsulating both the originating and the preserving cause
of his existence. Indeed, the narrator in the Third
Meditation had argued that there is merely a conceptual
distinction between creation and preservation, for to
preserve something in existence is equivalent to, at every
moment, creating “that thing anew as if it were not yet in
existence” (CSMII 33).313 Thus even if a thing had existed
from eternity, we would still require some explanation as
to what sustains it in existence, and this efficient cause
would not be something temporally prior to it. Thus the
313

Schmaltz notes that Descartes is here endorsing “the received
scholastic position in Suarez that God conserves the world by means of
the very same act by which he created it […] the power by which God
conserves is not merely the same type as, but also token-identical to,
the power by which he creates” (2008, 83). The simultaneity of cause
and effect was a premise in Aquinas’ Second Way (his proof for the
existence of an unmoved mover based upon the existence of a series of
efficient causes). See Secada 2000, 166-7.
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concept of efficient cause does not presuppose temporal
priority.
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Yet even if the notion of an efficient cause
simultaneous with the existence of its effect is
intelligible, how could something sustain itself in
existence? Once we have established that God derives his
existence “from himself” in the negative sense that he does
not depend on anything outside himself for his continued
existence, Descartes argues that we nevertheless can and
should request an explanation for why God does not need
such an external sustaining cause, for “it is impossible
for us to imagine anything deriving existence from itself
without there being some reason why it should exist rather
than not exist.”315 The only sort of explanation we could
provide, however, is one that appeals to God’s own nature
(of which we all have a robust idea). Descartes does not

314

One way of understanding this is to say that Descartes is interested
in causation in esse rather than causation in fieri. Causation in fieri
concerns merely the becoming of a thing, whereas causation in esse
concerns the origin and continued existence of a thing. In his reply to
Gassendi, Descartes illustrates this distinction by comparing the
dependence of a house on its builder with the dependence of sunlight on
the sun: “[A]n architect is the cause of a house and a father of this
child only in the sense of being the causes of their coming into being;
and hence, once the work is completed it can remain in existence quite
apart from the ‘cause’ in this sense. But the sun is the cause of the
light which it emits, and God is the cause of created things, not just
in the sense that they are causes of the coming into being of these
things, but also in the sense that they are causes of their being; and
hence they must always continue to act on the effect in the same way in
order to keep it in existence” (CSMII 254).
315
Descartes is here appealing to a very strong version of the principle
of sufficient reason. See Schmaltz 2008, 74.
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therefore mean that God sustains himself in the way he
sustains a creature, i.e., through “the kind of
preservation that comes about by the positive influence of
an efficient cause” (CSMII 79). Rather, to say that God
preserves himself in existence is to say that “the essence
of God is such that he must always exist.” What sort of
essence is that? It is the idea of a nature possessing
“immense and incomprehensible power” (CSMII 79). If the
preserving cause of a thing lies outside it, then there is
a clear sense in which that thing lacks the power to
determine its own existence. That God’s existence is not
contingent upon anything outside himself can and should be
explained in positive terms as following from his
omnipotence.
In the Fourth Objection, however, Arnauld presses
Descartes to explain in more detail the positive sense of
causation involved in divine self-preservation. Quoting
from Descartes’ First Reply, Arnauld asserts that it is
simply “false” that “God ‘in a sense stands in the same
relation to himself as an efficient cause does to its
effect’” (CSMII 146). Like Caterus, Arnauld claims that the
notion of something causing its own existence is
incoherent, for an efficient causal relation always implies
the temporal priority of cause to effect and the
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distinction between cause and effect.316 Further, Arnauld
argues that if the explanation for God’s existence is to be
found in an examination of his essence, then it doesn’t
make any sense to cite this as a “cause” for God’s
existence: “If anyone asks why God exists, or continues in
existence, we should not try to find either in God or
outside him any efficient cause, or quasi-efficient cause
[…] instead, we should confine our answer to saying that
the reason lies in the nature of a supremely perfect
being.”317

In other words, Arnauld is accusing Descartes of

employing an equivocal notion of “cause” in his proof for
God’s existence. To ask for an explanation for the
continued existence of a thing is to request an explanation
by way of efficient cause, but this is not what is provided
when we cite God’s essence as the explanation for his
existence, for here we are providing a formal cause.
Arnauld claims that Descartes’ explanation is akin to
316

Arnauld’s objections are more detailed. As Bonnen and Flage observe,
Descartes argues for the distinction between cause and effect by citing
both the “irreflexive nature of causality” (nothing can cause itself)
as well as its “dyadic and assymetrical nature” (“there is a mutual
relation between cause and effect. But a relation must involve two
terms.") (1999, 848).
317
Italics mine. Bonnen and Flagge describe Arnauld’s objection as
follows: “[I]n appealing to efficient causation with respect to God,
Descartes has misstated the proof. Rather than repeatedly asking
whether or not the cause of one’s being is self-caused and pushing the
inquiry until such a point as one finds a self-caused being, Descartes
should have asked whether the cause of one’s being is itself caused or
is God. The chain would have ended at the point that God was identified
as an efficient cause of one of the causes of one’s being, since the
essence of God entails existence: A formal cause would have ended the
chain of efficient causes” (1999, 849-50).
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citing an efficient cause to explain why the three angles
of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
Though Descartes dismisses Arnauld’s objections as
the “least well-taken,” he nevertheless decides to answer
them at length. He argues that Arnauld has failed to
appreciate that he had claimed that God is his own
efficient cause only “in a sense” (i.e., analogously) and
hence did not suppose that “he was the same as an efficient
cause” (CSMII 165). Temporal priority is not a necessary
feature of efficient causes in general, and though the
distinction between cause and effect is a criterion of an
external sustaining (efficient) cause, it is not a feature
of the notion of a self-sustaining cause. Descartes
therefore agrees with Arnauld that God’s sustaining cause
is, properly speaking, not an efficient cause but a “formal
cause” insofar as it is “a reason derived from God’s
essence” (CSMII 165). Why, then, does he believe that
citing a formal cause could constitute an answer to, rather
than a repudiation of, the request for an explanation for
God’s existence? The answer is that, in this case, citing a
formal cause explains why God does not, and cannot, depend
for his existence on anything external to him. God is his
own cause in the sense that “the inexhaustible power of God
is the cause or reason for his not needing a[n] [external]
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cause. And since that inexhaustible power or immensity of
the divine essence is as positive as can be, I said that
the reason or cause why God needs no [external] cause is a
positive reason or cause” (CSMII 165). Descartes is not
committed to the absurd view that formal “reasons” are
always analogous to efficient “causes.” Arnauld’s triangle
objection therefore misses the mark. Rather, “the formal
cause will be strongly analogous to an efficient cause”
because, “in this context,” the formal cause can do the
explanatory work of an efficient cause (i.e., it can
explain why God exists independently) (CSMII 168 emphasis
mine).318 And the reason why a formal cause can do the
explanatory work of an efficient cause in this context is
that, in God, “there is no distinction between existence
and essence,” for his ontological independence follows from
his omnipotence (CSMII 170).
What kind of analogy is Descartes here invoking? Upon
an initial reading, one might conclude that he is providing
an account of analogy by intuition, in which we use our
determinate concept of an efficient sustaining cause as an
imperfect (indeterminate) representation of a formal self-

318

“And just as no one criticizes these proofs, although they involve
regarding a sphere as similar to a polyhedron, so it seems to me that I
am not open to criticism in this context for using the analogy of an
efficient cause to explain features which in fact belong to a formal
cause, that is, to the very essence of God” (CSMII 168) (emphasis mine)
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sustaining one. After all, Descartes states that he is
using “the analogy of an efficient cause to explain
features which in fact belong to a formal cause” (CSMII
168), and he describes the phenomenon of self-sustaining
existence in language that is normally reserved for
efficient causality, not the other way around. He appears
to suggest as much when he uses geometrical examples to
illustrate the extension of the concept of an external
sustaining (efficient) cause to the phenomenon of selfsustaining causation: “[I]n between ‘efficient cause’ in
the strict sense and ‘no cause at all’, there is a third
possibility, namely ‘the positive essence of a thing’, to
which the concept of an efficient cause can be extended. In
the same way in geometry the concept of the arc of an
indefinitely large circle is customarily extended to the
concept of a straight line; or the concept of a rectilinear
polygon with an indefinite number of sides is extended to
that of a circle” (CSMII 167). Just as we may conceive of a
circle as a rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number
of sides, so the passage suggests we may use the concept of
an efficient cause to represent self-sustaining causation.
Yet Descartes does not believe, and his geometrical
examples do not suggest, that our concept of a selfsustaining cause is nothing more than the concept of an
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efficient cause regarded indeterminately. This is the
position an advocate of the traditional (bottom-up) account
of analogy would endorse; it is the sort of bottom-up
position that Gassendi had argued for in the Fifth
Objections, where he asserts that “it is more than enough
if, on the analogy of our human attributes, we can derive
and construct an idea of some sort for our own use—an idea
which does not transcend our human grasp and which contains
no reality except what we perceive in other things” (CSMII
200-01). What needs to be distinguished is 1) the origin of
the analogous concepts from 2) how these concepts are
employed within the proof for God’s existence. Archimedies’
proof, in which a circle is regarded as though it were a
polygon with infinite sides, presupposes that we already
possess a determinate concept of a circle and grasp its
similarity to such a figure. It is only because we already
recognize that a circle is analogous to a polygon with
infinite sides that we are willing to accept that features
demonstrated of this figure have application to the circle.
Thus, Descartes imagines Archimedes asserting that “If I
thought that a sphere could not be taken to be a
rectilinear or quasi-recitlinear figure with an infinite
number of sides, I should attach no force to my proof,
since the proof does not strictly apply to a sphere as a
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curvilinear figure but applies to it only as a rectilinear
figure with infinitely many sides” (CSMII 171). The proof
will, of course, involve our treating a circle as if it
were a polygon with infinite sides rather than the other
way around, and we may consequently describe a circle as a
polygon with infinite sides. Yet this is simply a result of
the direction of the inference (our inferring features of
the circle from features of the polygon), and not a sign
that our concept of a circle is nothing more than the
concept of a polygon with an indefinite number of sides.319
Similarly, Descartes insists that, for the sake of his
proof, we must understand and describe God’s selfsustaining existence in terms of efficient causality, as a
condition of deriving existence “from himself” as though he
were his own efficient cause. But this assumes that we
already possess a notion of such self-sustaining existence
and grasp its likeness to efficient causality. “In refusing
to allow us to say that God stands toward himself in a
relation analogous to that of an efficient cause,” says
Descartes, “M. Arnauld not only fails to clarify the proof
319

If we were instead drawing an inference about the nature of a polygon
from the nature of a circle, then we would extend the concept of a
circle to that of a polygon, and we could describe a polygon with
infinite sides as though it were a circle. Similarly, if Descartes were
interested in drawing inferences about efficient causes of existence
from formal causes of existence, then he might very well describe a
case of efficient causality as a scenario in which the reason for a
thing’s existence lies outside its essence.
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of God’s existence, but actually prevents the reader from
understanding it” (CSMII 170). Just as we can infer facts
about a circle from facts about polygons only if we are
willing to treat a circle as though it were a polygon with
infinite sides, Descartes asserts that we must be willing
to treat God’s formal causality as though it were an
instance of efficient causality so as not to exclude
outright from our inquiry the case of divine existence:

[I]t is clear to everyone that a consideration of
efficient causes is the primary and principal way, if
not the only way, that we have of proving the
existence of God. We cannot develop this proof with
precision unless we grant our minds the freedom to
inquire into the efficient causes of all things, even
God himself. For what right do we have to make God and
exception, if we have not yet proved that he exists?
In every case, then, we must ask whether a thing
derives its existence from itself or from something
else; and by this means the existence of God can be
inferred, even though we have not given an explicit
account of what it means to say that something derives
its existence ‘from itself.’ (CSMII 166)
Yet if a willingness to treat an instance of formal
causality as similar to an instance of efficient causality
is necessary if we are to include God within the scope of
our inquiry, so a recognition that this formal causality is
only analogous to, and hence not the same as, efficient
causality is necessary if our inquiry is to have an end:
“How would those who do not yet know that god exists be
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able to inquire into the efficient cause of other things,
with the aim of eventually arriving at knowledge of God,
unless they thought it possible to inquire into the
efficient cause of anything whatsoever? And how could they
reach the end of their inquiries by arriving at God as the
first cause if they thought that for any given thing we
must always look for a cause which is distinct from it?”
The proof for God’s existence therefore presupposes
that the inquirer will possess, and apprehend an analogical
relation between, determinate concepts of dependent and
independent existence. This is clear from Descartes’
explicit assertion that we are able to derive an analogical
“common” concept from these concepts via a process similar
to that of abstraction by confusion. We can infer God’s
existence from the principle that everything “derives its
existence from itself or from something else” only because
we can

spontaneously form a concept of cause that is common
to both an efficient and a formal cause: that is to
say, what derives its existence ‘from another’ will be
taken to derive its existence from that thing as an
efficient cause, while what derives its existence
‘from itself’ will be taken to derive its existence
from itself as a formal cause—that is, because it has
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the kind of essence which entails that it does not
require an efficient cause. (CMSII 166)320
Efficient and formal causes of existence fall under an
analogically common concept of cause. They do not, and
cannot, fall under a univocally common concept because an
efficient cause must be distinct from its effect. Again,
Descartes allows that we can form a univocal concept of an
efficient cause embracing both instances in which the cause
is prior to its effect as well as those in which a cause is
simultaneous with its effect, for “the restriction ‘prior
in time’ can be deleted from the concept while leaving the
notion of an efficient cause intact” (CSMII 167). However,
instances of self-sustaining causation cannot fall under a
univocal concept of efficient cause since “a cause which is
not distinct from its effects is not an efficient cause.”
Yet it does not follow, he says, that the formal cause of
God’s existence is “in no sense a positive cause that can
be regarded as analogous to an efficient cause; and this is
all that my argument requires.”

320

Descartes continues “Accordingly, I did not explain this point in my
Meditations, but left it out, assuming it was self-evident” (CSMII 1667).
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IV. Descartes’ Analogy of Causation as Top-down Derivation
Abstraction by confusion presupposes proper concepts
from which the “common” analogical concept can be derived.
Accordingly, Descartes must hold that we possess proper
(determinate) concepts of both efficient and formal causes
of existence. What is the origin of these concepts? Is our
concept of independent (necessary) existence a negation of
the concept of dependent (contingent) existence? The fact
that “independent” is a grammatical negation of “dependent”
would seem to support such a reading,321 yet Descartes
repeatedly emphasizes that we possess a positive concept of
divine existence far exceeding the negative notion of
something that is merely uncaused. The narrator’s idea of
this cause or reason is a concept of the “immense and
incomprehensible power that is contained within the idea of
God” (CSMII 79).

If Descartes were an empiricist, he would

face the difficult task of explaining how we could attain,
from experience, the concept of the sort of power from
which existence follows. Yet he holds that our idea of God,
including all that it implicitly contains, is innate;
indeed, in the Third Meditation proofs for the existence of

321

For example, in the Fourth Meditation: “Cumque attend me dubitare,
sive esse rem incompletam & dependentem, adeo clara & distinct idea
entis independentis & complete, hoc est Dei, mihi occurrit;” (AT VII
53, emphasis mine)
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God, the narrator cannot yet appeal to anything more than
his own existence and his idea of God.
In fact, Descartes states that one of the reasons why
the explanandum of his proof must be his existence as a
thinking thing with an idea of God is that this idea
“provides me with the opportunity of inquiring whether I
derive my existence from myself, or from another” (CSMII
78).322 In his own analysis of this passage, Carriero
suggests that Descartes is here claiming that the idea of
God provides us with the “categories dependent and
independent in a manner that enables me to apply them to
myself and see that (1) that I fall on the dependent as
opposed to the independent side of things and (2) that
things that fall on the dependent side depend immediately
on the thing that falls on the independent side.”323 It is
clear that the idea of God, particularly his omnipotence,
provides us with a concept of independent or necessary
existence, for this existence is one of his properties. But
how could the idea of God provide us with the category of
deriving existence “from another”?
322

Descartes claims that an idea of God is also necessary for the proof
insofar as 1) the idea “contains the essence of God […] and according
to the true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything
until we first understand its essence”; 2) “this idea provides me with
the opportunity […] of recognizing my defects”; and 3) “this same idea
shows me not just that I have a cause, but that this cause contains
every perfection, and hence that it is God” (CSMII 78).
323
2009, 213.

273

The best, and indeed only, answer I think we can
provide here is that the concept of contingent or dependent
existence is derived from our concept of necessary or
independent existence. We noted that Descartes, as well as
others, describe the derivation of analogical creaturely
concepts from divine ones as a process of partial negation.
Examples of such derivation exhibit a common pattern.
According to CPP, we initially employ concepts of the
divine versions of pure perfections and transcendentals in
our everyday judgments and classifications without
realizing it. It is only when we recognize the
insufficiency of purported instances of these properties
that we attain concepts of their imperfect varieties as
well as an explicit awareness of the perfection of the
original divine analogues. That possessing the concept of
the divine version would enable us to both recognize
creaturely (imperfect) instances of this property as well
as apprehend their relative imperfection is explained by
the ontological fact that there is nothing ‘in’ the
creaturely version of the property that cannot be found to
reside formally in the divine correlate. Since this
ontological basis for resemblance cannot be analyzed by
identifying a shared feature among differentiating ones,
the resemblance must instead be attributed to a primitive
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relation between one or more aspect(s) of the (complex)
creaturely property and the divine one.324
To return to our example, how might we derive the
concept of a thing that draws its existence “from another”
from the concept of a thing that exists “from itself”?
Though Descartes often describes God’s necessary existence
in traditional terms as following from the fact that he is
identical with his essence, he actually holds that since
existence is an attribute and hence only conceptually
distinct from substance, creatures too are identical with
their existence. What distinguishes God’s existence from
that of creatures’ is that God is identical with necessary
existence, while creatures are identical with possible
existence: “Possible or contingent existence is contained
in the concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary and
perfect existence is contained in the concept of a
supremely perfect being” (CSMII 117). Just as God’s
independence follows from his completeness—particularly,
his perfection with respect to the attribute of power—
creaturely dependence could be said to follow from their
incompleteness, their possession of an imperfect analogue
of divine power. From the concept of a thing whose power
324

The resemblance could hold between individual aspects of the complex
creaturely property and the divine one, or between some or all of the
features of the complex creaturely property considered as a whole and
the divine one.
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entails existence, therefore, we could derive the concept
of a thing that possesses no such power and consequently
does not exist “from itself” but “from another.”
This analysis implies, however, that we possess
determinate concepts of divine and creaturely power. Though
the distinction between God’s power and our own is often
cast as one of degree, divine omnipotence can be
interpreted as a consequence of uniquely creative nature of
divine power. Descartes often refers to God as a “total
cause” of existence, distinguishing his creative power from
the sort of (creaturely) causal power that requires
preexisting material. In a passage in the Conversation with
Burman, Descartes illustrates this distinction as part of
an explanation of the causal similitude principle. A house
need not resemble its builder, for

[h]e is not the cause of the house, in the sense in
which we are taking the word here. He merely applies
active forces to what is passive, and so there is no
need for the product to be like the man. In this
passage, however, we are talking about the total
cause, the cause of being itself. Anything produced by
this cause must necessarily be like it. For since the
cause is itself being and substance, and it brings
something into being, i.e. out of nothing (a method of
production which is the prerogative of God), what is
produced must at the very least be being and
substance. To this extent at least, it will be like
God and bear his image.
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Whereas creaturely power is always limited by the “passive”
material on which it can work, and is therefore
appropriately described as constructive power, the divine
correlate does not require any preexisting material. God’s
power is unlimited because it is creative in the absolute
sense that he can create ex nihilo (i.e., produce being
from nothing). In a recent work, the philosopher of
religion Barry Miller suggests a similar qualitative
distinction between creaturely and divine power.325
Creaturely power, he argues, varies according the degree to
which a given effect is due to the agent versus how much is
attributable to preexisting materials.

Miller suggests we

can derive the analogically distinct notion of a purely
creative power by attending to a series of ever-greater
instances of creaturely constructive power (where less and
less of the outcome is due to preexisting material).
However, CPP suggests that our initial (unexamined) notion
of power is the absolute (creative) kind,326 and it is from
this that we derive a concept of the lesser sort.
Descartes’ analogy of causation thus implies a topdown derivation of concepts of both existence and power.
325

1996, 87.
This power is, perhaps, the ‘magical’ sort exhibited in fairy tales
and movies that most of us, as children, accepted without question.
Experience is then an education in the limits of human power; we
discover that, at least within the realm of experience, that every
instance of human creation is in fact a form of construction.
326
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God’s existence and power are the genuine or true version
of these properties. When we apprehend creaturely analogues
in light of these standards, we see they resemble existence
and power even though they fall short absolutely of these
kinds. We express the resemblance by extending the terms
“existence” and “power” to them, their difference through
the qualifications “contingent” and “constructive.” This
characterization may give the misleading impression that
“necessary/contingent” and “creative/constructive” are
differentiae, “existence” and “power” genera. Yet this is
not the case, for true existence is necessary existence,
genuine power is creative power, and the predicates
“contingent” and “constructive” do not represent positive
differentiae, but are equivalent to “non-necessary” and
“non-creative.” Again, the paradox of partial negation is
the paradox of analogy, where the same thing is apprehend
as the source of commonality and difference.
Carriero has argued that for Descartes “philosophical
theological investigations presuppose that we already have
some grasp of what God is; this is not the sort of thing we
can bootstrap our way into.”327 Indeed, the second causal
proof for God illustrates a form of philosophical theology
that would be impossible were it to be based on a
327

2009, 209.
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traditional, bottom-up account of analogical derivation.
The proof requires us to assume, from the outset, a
particular analogical relation between creaturely and
divine existence: the fact that God is like creatures in
possessing a cause but unlike them in being self-caused.328
We can grasp this analogical relation only because we
already possess an idea “containing the essence of God,”
particularly, the idea of an immense power from which
existence follows.329 Since we possess determinate concepts
of creaturely and divine existence, and can grasp the
analogy between them, we are entitled to the premise that
everything must either derive its existence from itself or
from another. Apprehending the analogy is essential for the
proof, for without it Descartes claims we would either
exclude God from our inquiry or we would assume that God
needed an external cause as well.330 Since, as Alston

328

God’s existence has a cause in the sense that there is a cause (i.e.
reason or explanation) for his not needing an external preserving
cause.
329
As Carriero puts it, “the contention that we cognize God immediately
(and positively), as something a se, and not negatively (and
obliquely), as something sine causa, is essential, Descartes holds, to
our ability to advance causal demonstrations for God’s existence”
(2009, 221).
330
If I thought that nothing could possibly have the same relation to
itself as an efficient cause has to its effect, I should certainly not
conclude that there was a first cause. On the contrary, I should go on
to ask for the cause of the so-called ‘first’ cause, and thus I would
never reach anything which was the first cause of everything else.
However, I do readily admit that there can exist something which
possesses such great and inexhaustible power […] that it is, in a
sense, its own cause.
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argued, a bottom-up approach to analogy could provide us
with only negative or indeterminate notions of divine power
and existence, it could never underwrite the
intelligibility of something deriving existence “from
itself.” Yet a top-down approach provides Descartes with
determinate concepts of both God and creatures: the idea of
God directly provides him with a determinate concept of a
thing deriving its existence from itself, and it indirectly
(via partial negation) provides him with the determinate
concept of a thing deriving its existence “from another.”

V. Top-down Derivation of Knowledge and Love
In addition to being metaphysically necessary and
omnipotent, the theistic God is also often characterized as
omniscient and omnibenevolent. Though we will not attempt
to provide detailed accounts of top-down derivation for
these properties, we can provide a rough sketch of why such
an account might be called for. An important requirement
for motivating a top-down account of analogical derivation
for a given property is being able to explain how our
concept of the divine version could differ from our concept
of the creaturely property

in such a way that prohibits

the derivation of the former from the latter (e.g., by
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amplification or negation).331 In the case of knowledge and
love, for example, we must be able to show that the divine
properties are not distinguished from their creaturely
versions merely by their scope or degree, e.g., the fact
that God knows everything there is to know and loves
everything worthy of love, for it is the qualitative
difference between the divine and creaturely versions of
these perfections that calls for a top-down derivation.
We noted that Hartshorne, in his own account of a topdown derivation of knowledge, affirms a qualitative
distinction between the divine and creaturely properties.
He suggests that the divine sense of “know” means having
“conclusive evidence […] shutting off the very possibility
of error,” and that if we “tone [this concept] down
drastically” we arrive at a concept of creaturely
knowledge, which does not require having conclusive
evidence. It is not that God merely knows more than we do,
but that his knowledge features a definitive quality absent
in its creaturely version. Descartes had suggested
something similar when he responded to Burman’s claim that
human understanding, considered essentially, is not
imperfect. He responds that it “is not just that our
understanding ranges over fewer objects than that of God:
331

Of course, this must be done without precluding the possibility of
deriving a concept of the creaturely property from the divine one.
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rather, it is extremely imperfect in itself, being obscure,
mingled with ignorance, and so on.” In the Third
Meditation, the narrator argued that we can judge doubt to
be a sign of imperfection only because we possess the idea
of a state of (perfect) knowledge precluding such
uncertainty: “[H]ow could I understand that I doubted or
desired—that is lacked something—and that I was not wholly
perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a more
perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own defects
by comparison?” (CSMII 31).
God’s knowledge does not differ from ours merely in
its scope, but in its conclusive nature. Yet we cannot take
this analysis to express a simple qualitative identity
underlying the resemblance relation (e.g., that human
knowledge is equivalent to divine knowledge minus the
feature of conclusiveness). Traditionally, the conclusive
nature of divine knowledge was attributed to the fact that
it was considered immediate, non-propositional, and
identical with divine power.332 Descartes appears to share
this view, arguing that “[i]n God, willing, understanding
and creating are all the same thing without one being prior
to the other even conceptually” (CSMK 26). In his own
332

According to CPP, these further features would ostensibly enable us
to recognize that the mediated, propositional and truth-contingent
aspects of human knowledge constitute imperfections as well.
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analysis of the Meditations, Stephen Menn therefore
emphasizes that Descartes, like traditional Neoplatonist
thinkers, held that God is not just omniscient

but that he is essentially omniscient; and since the
fact that god knows X cannot be dependent on anything
outside God, it follows that God must have knowledge
by being himself the standard according to which
knowledge is assessed, and not merely by being
perfectly conformed to that standard. This is, for
Plotinus and for Augustine and for Descartes, the
primary way of knowing; souls have knowledge only in a
weaker and derivative way, and we confuse our
conceptions of God’s knowledge if we imagine it along
the model of psychic knowledge. (emphasis mine)333
The definitive nature of God’s knowledge is due to the fact
that he is “himself the standard according to which
knowledge is assessed.”334 Its unlimited scope can be
attributed to this same fact, for an actual (quantitative)
infinity of things known could follow from the qualitative
difference that divine knowledge is not conformity to a
standard. Thus the sense in which creaturely knowledge is
“weak” or “derivative” is not due merely to the fact that
God knows more than we do and with a level of assurance
that we cannot match. Rather, God’s way of knowing is
radically different from the mediated, propositional, and
333

Menn 1998, 289
Whereas for Plotinus this follows from the fact that “Nous not only
knows all the ingelligibles, but also is them, or contains them all
within itself,” Descartes would say it follows from the fact that
“everything is either identical with God or essentially dependent on
God’s will” (289)
334
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truth-contingent nature of “psychic” knowledge. This does
not appear to be a concept of knowledge that we can produce
simply by amplifying aspects of our own way of knowing. We
can, perhaps, represent to ourselves an approximation of
such knowledge by amplifying features of our own (e.g., the
extent and degree of certitude), but we cannot construct a
concept of divine knowledge through such amplification.
Hartshorne also provides a top-down account of the
property of love.335 He argues that if love means caring
about the well-being of others (full stop), then we must
admit that humans fail to fully exhibit this property: “A
human being appreciates the qualities of this or that other
person—except the qualities he does not appreciate, through
some limitation of his own; he cares about the other’s weal
or woe, with similar exceptions; he wishes him well—except
so far as (perhaps unconsciously) he has impulses to wish
him harm, whether from envy, rivalry, fear, or what not.”336
335

Ronald Nash also uses love as an example of top-down derivation: “An
empiricist like Aquinas is forced to say that our first contact with
love comes through our experiences with other human beings. But human
love falls miles short of divine live, thus forcing us to treat our
fundamental understanding of love as an analogy. But suppose instead
that our contact of such predicates as “love” and “perfection” are ours
as part of our innate idea of God present within us as part of the
image of God. In this second case, we recognize instances of human love
(the real analogy) because we have an implicit understanding of God’s
love. We are drawing a theological application from Plato’s treatment
of equality and Augustine’s explanation of our knowledge of unity. The
reason we can recognize two equal particulars is because we first know
Equality itself. We can recognize imperfection in the creation because
we first have an innate idea of perfection” (1999, 179).
336
1962, 141-2.
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Yet God, says Hartshorne, “appreciates the qualities of all
things—period. […] He cares about their weal and woe—there
is no material qualification or negation.” As with the case
of knowledge, however, the resemblance relation is not
amenable to a simple analysis of partial qualitative
identity. I take Hartshorne to be arguing that the problem
with the human property is not merely that it is exhibited
only selectively, infrequently, and according to various
degrees, but that these very limitations are signs that the
regard is defective even when it appears to be expressed at
its fullest. To love one person while hating or feeling
indifferent towards another is to exhibit something less
than genuine love towards the former. Divine love is not
qualitatively identical to human love minus selectivity,
for example, for such differentiae (for lack of a better
term) change the very nature of the thing they specify.
Though Descartes never provides an account of divine
love, his description of the most altruistic forms of human
love suggest a qualitative distinction between the two.

In

his work The Passions of the Soul, he characterizes the
passions as inherently egoistic, originating in a concern
for, and functioning on behalf of, our own welfare. In the
case of love, says Descartes, the passion “impels the soul
to join itself willingly to objects that appear to be
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agreeable to it,” in such a manner that “we imagine a
whole, of which we take ourselves to be only one part, and
the thing loved to be the other” (CSM 356). What
distinguishes altruistic love from lesser varieties is
that, in the case of the former, we take ourselves to be
the less important part of the imagined whole. A father
regards his children, says Descartes, “as other parts of
himself, and seeks their good as he does his own, or even
more assiduously. For he imagines that he and they together
form a whole of which he is not the better part, and so he
often puts their interests before his own and is not afraid
of sacrificing himself in order to save them.” While the
scope of our love is determined by the extent of the whole
of which we imagine ourselves to be a part, its degree is
determined by how we value other parts in comparison to our
own. “In the case of devotion,” which Descartes takes to be
the proper form of love for God, “we prefer the thing loved
so strongly that we are not afraid to die in order to
preserve it” (CSM 357).
What is significant about Descartes’ account is that
human love, even in its purest and most altruistic forms,
is conditioned by the egoistic nature of human passion. In
order to love something such that we put its interests
before our own, we must engage in act of imaginative
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projection bordering on self-deception: we must regard the
loved thing as in some way connected to ourselves, as parts
of a larger whole, and thus momentarily disregard the truth
that “each of us is a person distinct from others, whose
interests are accordingly in some way different from those
of the rest of the world” (CSMK 266).337 We cannot,
apparently, love another while continuing to regard them as
they truly are, i.e., distinct from ourselves. The problem
is not that human love thereby always fails to be truly
altruistic, but that due to the egoistic nature of our
passions, altruism is attainable for us only if we engage
in an act of imaginative projection. If Descartes’ analysis
is correct, the selectivity and frailty of human love could
be attributed to the limits of such projection: it is one
thing to regard one’s children as part of oneself, it is
quite another to regard other people, especially one’s
enemies, in this way. The apparently quantitative deficits
that Hartshorne claims distinguishes human love from its
divine correlate may be rooted in just such a deeper
337

Though Descartes describes the injunction to view oneself as part of
a whole one of the “truths most useful to us,” what he wants us to
accept is not the truth that our distinctness is an illusion, but the
truth that we “ought […] to think” in this way because engaging in this
imaginative projection has practical value (CSMK 266). Frierson (2002,
325-31) provides good reasons for interpreting Descartes in this
manner. As our earlier analysis of the real distinction between God and
creatures suggests, if the distinction between creatures and God were
illusory then this would impute imperfection to God. Descartes’
description of this procedure as an imaginative, rather than
intellectual, exercise also supports this interpretation.
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qualitative distinction between the properties. As with the
case of existence, power, and knowledge, CPP would suggest
that our original, unexamined notion of love is the divine
sort—a regard that is unlimited in scope and degree because
it is totally un-egoistic in nature. This is not the sort
of concept that we can produce by merely imagining a regard
that is less selective or inconstant, for the distinction
is ultimately a qualitative one.
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Ch. VII. CPP and Perfect Being Theology
The tradition of perfect being theology (PBT) employs
the intuition of divine perfection to determine God’s
nature. A perfect being, it is held, must possess every
great-making property (i.e., pure perfection) in the
highest possible way. For Descartes, as well as other
early-modern rationalists, divine perfection is the guiding
notion for understanding God’s nature. Descartes’
endorsement of CPP, however, enables him to successfully
respond to two major critiques of PBT. The first criticism,
expressed in contemporary thought by Barry Miller, is that
PBT provides us with concepts of divine attributes that
differ only by degree from creaturely ones, thereby failing
to do justice to divine transcendence and divine
simplicity.338 Yet if Miller’s critique is justified, we are
apparently left with the difficult task of explaining how
we can attain concepts of qualitatively distinct divine
perfections in the first place. A proponent of CPP,
however, can affirm that there is a qualitative distinction
between creaturely properties and divine ones without
thereby suggesting that the concepts of (qualitatively
distinct) divine properties are derived from creaturely

338

1996, 2-4.
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ones—the sort of operation that many perfect being
theologians (e.g., Scotus) have argued is impossible. The
top-down direction of derivation in CPP also enables its
proponents to address the argument that the criterion of
perfection inevitably reflects the interests and values of
the perfect being theologian. According to CPP, however, it
is by virtue of already possessing a notion of a standard
of perfection (God) that we apprehend certain creaturely
properties as instances of pure perfections.

I. Perfect Being Theology and Univocity
Barry Miller has provided a general critique of the
univocist tendencies of PBT. Though some advocates of PBT
(e.g., the early modern rationalists) affirmed that the
divine perfections are nevertheless qualitatively distinct
from creaturely ones, Anselm as well as contemporary
advocates of PBT such as Thomas Morris often seem to
portray the distinction as one of degree. According to
these theorists, we determine God’s nature by identifying
which creaturely properties are pure perfections and then
amplifying them to their maximal degree. For example, we
recognize that the property of wisdom is always preferable
to anything incompatible with it, and that since this
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property can be realized more or less perfectly, we can and
must conclude that God possesses it in the highest
degree.339
Miller does not deny that we ought to understand God
as the absolutely perfect being. He argues, however, that
PBT fails to conceive of God as a transcendent being worthy
of worship. Though understanding God as possessing every
pure perfection in the maximal way succeeds in setting him
apart from creatures, Miller thinks that this separation
does not constitute an “absolute divide.”340 He argues that
it is “difficult to see how it could be more than a
difference of degree, since the terms indicating his
properties –‘powerful,’ ‘knowing,’ ‘loving,’ ‘merciful,’
‘generous’ and so on –seem to be used univocally of God and
creatures.”341 In treating the distinction between
creaturely and divine pure perfections as one of degree, he
thinks PBT conceives of God as merely the greatest
creature, thereby succumbing to anthropomorphism and
idolatry.342

339

Possessing wisdom is preferable both to its absence (folly) as well
as to any property (e.g. that of being a stone, or being non-conscious)
incompatible with it.
340
1996, 2.
341
Ibid.
342
“Anthropomorphism” is the attribution of human properties to God and
“idolatry” is the worship of anything less (or other) than God.
Anthropomorphism is a violation of divine transcendence, while idolatry
is the worship of something that is unworthy of worship.
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For Miller, however, the alternative is not to reject
positive predication altogether and embrace negative
theology. Rather, he thinks we can preserve the basic
intuition of perfect being theology so long as we recognize
a distinction between what he calls the “limit simpliciter”
and the “limit case.”343 Whereas the limit simpliciter is
the final member of a series of things ordered according to
which they possess a given property (F) to an increasing
degree, the limit case of such a series is that which lies
outside the series and is that towards which the series
converges. The crucial distinction is that while the limit
simpliciter of a series is an instance of F along with
every other member of the series, the limit case of a
series is not an F. What perfect being theologians have
overlooked, says Miller, is “the possibility of there being
anything similar to, but beyond, the maximum of a series of
Fs.”344
Miller asks us to imagine, among other examples, the
case of a series of regular polygons ordered according to
the number of theirs sides, taken to infinity. The limit
case of such a series, that towards which this series
converges, is itself not a polygon but a circle. Since a
defining characteristic of regular polygons (being
343
344

1996, 7.
Ibid., 10.
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equiangular and equilateral) is absent from a circle, it
does not really belong to the series. When Miller applies
the distinction to the pure perfection of power (described
in the previous chapter), he finds that the limit case of
constructive power is the qualitatively distinct property
of divine creative power. After constructing a series “in
which increasingly more of the effects produced was due to
the power employed and increasingly less to the materials
on which the power was expended,” Miller claims that he can
see that the series converges upon a “case where the
constructor has nothing whatever to work on, the case in
which all the causality comes from him and none at all from
his using any preexisting materials.”345
Yet the limit case/limit simpliciter distinction does
not imply that there is no relationship between the two.
Even though ‘F’ cannot be predicated univocally of members
of the series and the limit case of the series, Miller
argues that it does not follow that ‘F’ must be equivocal.
If the limit case of a series were merely a matter of
convention, then the limit case of one series would be
interchangeable with the limit case of another. That they
are not substitutable, however, suggests that there must be
some similarity between members of a given series and the
345

1996, 87.
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limit cases of those series. Miller concludes that the
relation must be one of analogical resemblance.346
Miller argues that if we apply the distinction to our
language about God, we will find that it radically changes
the significance of the terms we use to qualify divine
predicates. Though perfect being theologians may
distinguish divine attributes from creaturely ones by
characterizing the former as “infinite,” “perfect,” or
“unsurpassable,” Miller argues that these “qualifiers do
nothing to change the sense of the terms they qualify.”347
They merely serve to indicate that the qualities are
possessed at a maximal degree. Yet if the divine attributes
are viewed as the limit cases of creaturely ones, Miller
claims the qualifications function as “alienans
adjectives,” for they change the meaning of the terms they
qualify.348 The adjectives “decoy” in “decoy duck” or
“negative” in “negative growth” combine with the terms they
modify to designate things that are not, respectively, true
ducks or true instances of growth. Similarly, the
adjectives “infinite” in “infinite knowledge” or “perfect”
in “perfect goodness” combine with the terms they qualify
to designate divine attributes that are not, respectively,
346
347
348

He devotes a separate article to this claim. See 1990, 63-84.
Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 10.
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really instances of knowledge or goodness. God’s so-called
knowledge and goodness are qualitatively distinct from the
creaturely varieties insofar as these attributes, as limit
cases, fall outside any series of increasingly more perfect
creaturely instances of them.
Miller argues that treating God’s attributes as the
limit case instances of human attributes not only preserves
God’s transcendence without disregarding the intuition of
divine perfection, but is able to make sense of the
doctrine of divine simplicity. One of the chief obstacles
to the doctrine of divine simplicity (as well as divine
transcendence) is that it seems to preclude any sort of
likeness between God and creatures. Yet if God’s attributes
are the limit case instances of human ones, he claims that
we can do justice to the qualitative distinction demanded
by the doctrine without violating the intuition that
creatures resemble God with respect to their perfections.
Miller does not abandon the principle of divine perfection.
However, he believes that the guiding or controlling notion
that ultimately decides which of the properties are
legitimately attributed to God ought to be one that does
justice to the limit case/limit simpliciter distinction.
For this reason, he prefers the principle of subsistent
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existence (God’s identity with his existence) to that of
perfection.

II. Miller’s Critique and CPP
Much of Miller’s account is consistent with the theory
of religious language suggested by CPP. Though Descartes
and others employed the intuition of divine perfection as a
principal guiding notion for understanding God, they too
wanted to affirm a qualitative break between divine
qualities and their creaturely correlates so as to secure
divine transcendence and satisfy the apparent logical
demands of divine simplicity. Like Miller, they appeared to
rely (or so I have argued) upon a doctrine of analogical
resemblance to explain how creaturely perfections could
nevertheless be said to resemble their divine correlates.
Yet what distinguishes Miller’s account from those like
Descartes’ is his insistence that we derive concepts of
divine attributes from our concepts of creaturely ones.
Miller’s account is a contemporary version of bottom-up
analogical derivation; it suggests that we can obtain (or
construct) a concept of the analogically distinct notion of
a limit case quality by attending to a series of creaturely
instances of a given quality. The Cartesian critique of
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bottom-up analogical derivation thus applies to Miller’s
account just as it does to traditional scholastic theories
of transcendental analogy. According to this critique, we
would never be able to arrive at a proper concept of an
analogically distinct divine attribute by modifying a
concept of a creaturely one unless we already possessed
(implicitly) a concept of the divine attribute in question.
Miller outlines a basic strategy for determining
divine attributes. The first step is to see, for any given
creaturely attribute F, whether it has a limit case or not.
Miller adds, however, that since “the limit case terminates
an ordered series of instances of F, the question cannot be
answered without first specifying in what respect the
instances can be ordered.”349 Once we order a series of F in
such a way that they do, in fact, lead towards a limit case
instance of F, he thinks we will be able to ‘see’ that the
series ‘points’ to this limit case. Applied to the example
of the regular polygon and the circle, we would first
construct a series of regular polygons with increasing
numbers of sides and angles. Once we have such a series, we
can ostensibly grasp the fact that this series, taken to
its limit, converges on the limit case of a circle.
However, Descartes had questioned this assumption in his
349
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critique of amplification arguments. Could we really grasp
that the series ‘points’ to a circle without already
possessing a notion of a circle in the first place? Though
improbable, it is at least conceivable that we might
unwittingly construct the series without possessing a
notion of a circle, but it is hard to see how we could ever
‘see’ that this series converges on the limit case of a
circle unless we already possessed such a concept. Or, to
employ another example from Descartes, we might construct a
series of creatures with ever-decreasing degrees of
dependence. But could this series provide us with the limit
case concept of an absolutely independent being (God)
unless we already possessed (at least implicitly) this
notion?
Nor is Miller able to answer the broader critique of
bottom-up transcendental analogical derivation raised by
Scotus. Since creaturely perfections fall short absolutely
of their analogous divine correlates, the concepts of these
perfections cannot directly provide us with proper concepts
of the divine correlates. If proper concepts of divine
perfections are instead obtained by a process of rational
inference (of which Miller’s ‘convergence-to-a-limit’
approach seems to be an instance), there must be some sort
of univocal core to which the distinguishing factor of
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supereminence or infinity can be added. However, Miller
explicitly denies that his account of analogical
resemblance is compatible with the sort of partial
univocity favored by Scotus and Alston.350
The distinction between Miller’s account of analogical
derivation and that required by CPP can be expressed in
terms of which qualifiers are assigned the role of alienans
adjectives. According to Miller, these adjectives signal
that a limit case instance of F is not really an instance
of F. When the adjectives “infinite” or “perfect” qualify
“goodness,” for example, they indicate a (limit case)
property that isn’t a genuine instance of goodness.
According to CPP, however, the alienans adjectives are
those that apply to members of the series, signaling that
they are not really instances of the limit case property.
It is instead adjectives like “finite” or “imperfect” that
shift the meaning of the terms they modify; just as an
imperfect circle is not a true circle, so imperfect
goodness is not genuine goodness. This account of language
more accurately reflects the epistemological requirements

350

“If there were a common core of meaning between ‘F’ in ‘God is F’ and
‘Maria is F’ then the use of ‘F’ would not be analogical, but either
partly or wholly univocal. Not only that, but the effect of thus
predicating ‘F’ of God would be to apply to him some core predicates
having exactly the same senses as when predicated of creatures. The
result would be a God conceived of in the image of creatures—an
anthropomorphized God” (1996, 150).
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of the examples he provides.

We can ‘see’ that the series

of regular polygons converges on the limit case instance of
a circle because we judge that the shapes will more closely
approximate, though never reach, the shape of a circle. In
other words, we (at least implicitly) apprehend the
polygons as imperfect circles, i.e., approaching yet
falling short absolutely of the property of circularity as
such.

III. The Criterion of Perfection
By invoking a qualitative distinction between
creaturely pure perfections and their divine analogues,
proponents of PBT need not portray the distinction between
these perfections as being merely one of degree, and by
endorsing a top-derivation, they can explain how concepts
of creaturely perfections can be derived from concepts of
qualitatively distinct divine ones. A more basic criticism,
however, has been lodged against the theory. Even if we can
affirm a qualitative distinction between creaturely and
divine perfections, how do we determine which creaturely
perfections should be seen as having divine analogues in
the first place? According to PBT, we begin by asking
whether possessing a given property is preferable to
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possessing anything incompatible with it. If it is, then we
ostensibly know that creatures are more perfect (qua
creatures) to the extent that they possess it, and that God
must possess its divine equivalent.351
The problem, however, is that this procedure leans
rather heavily on our fallible and, perhaps, speciesrelative intuitions regarding which properties are
preferable to others.352 Xenophanes had famously argued that
if cows and horses could draw, they would depict gods with,
respectively, bovine and equine characteristics. Even if
these animals insisted that the gods possessed only the
divine analogues of rumination or galloping, for example,
critics could justifiably accuse them of fashioning deities
in their own images. Our ascribing analogues of human
characteristics to God could be similarly ridiculed. Nor
has there ever been complete consensus across cultures and
times as to which characteristics a greatest being must
possess. Though philosophers once held that a perfect being
must be simple, immutable, and impassible, all of these
attributes have been questioned in contemporary thought.353
351

A tree would not be more perfect as a tree if it possessed wisdom
(indeed, it would no longer be a tree). Yet it would be more perfect as
a creature if it were wise.
352
The procedure also relies on our intuitions regarding possibility and
compossibility. Divine simplicity has, for example, been criticized on
the grounds that it leads to logical absurdities (e.g., God’s being a
property).
353
Hartshorne, for example, has argued for excluding these attributes.
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Advocates of PBT are generally upfront and
unapologetic regarding the role intuition must play in
identifying great-making properties. Thomas Morris, for
example, notes that the method of PBT requires us to
“consult our value intuitions” and assumes there will be
“widespread agreement among people who are rightly
positioned and well disposed” concerning these
intuitions.354 He admits, however, that since “it is a fact
that philosophical intuitions differ,” PBT will never be
able to provide us with “the ideal of an armchair science
of easily ascertained, self-evident truths."355
Nevertheless, he argues that even if there is uncertainty
regarding what exactly perfection entails, the fundamental
principles of theism—there is “a creative source of all

354

1991, 38. In an effort to illustrate how advocates of PBT consult
their intuitions in developing a concept of God, he provides a schema
in which a perfect being is conceived in an ascending order of
greatness. God can be conceived as:
(1) conscious (a minded being capable of an engaged in states of
thought and awareness),
(2) a conscious free agent (a being capable of free action)
(3) a thoroughly benevolent, conscious agent,
(4) a thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with significant
knowledge
(5) a thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with significant
knowledge and power,
(6) a thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with unlimited
knowledge and power, who is the creative source of all else.
(7) thoroughly benevolent conscious agent with unlimited
knowledge and power who is the necessarily existent,
ontologically independent creative source of all else.
355

1987, 23. Morris thinks our intuitions provide at most “defeasible
epistemic status” for our selection of great-making properties. See
1991, 41.
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else that might exist”; “no effect can exceed its ultimate
cause in metaphysical status”; and there is an “objectivity
of value structures”—strongly support the basic contention
that God is a “maximally perfect being.”356 Since theism
places God at the very top of this hierarchy of value,
Morris concludes that it is not man but God who is “the
measure of perfection.”357 Similarly, Katherin Rogers
recognizes that our ability to correctly identify which
attributes characterize a greatest being presupposes that
we have intuitive access to an objective hierarchy of
value. Despite the fallibility of these intuitions,
however, she argues that “in all the debates between
various conceptions of the nature of God, none of the
participants argues for a God whom they judge to be less
than the best.”358
Some contemporary critics of PBT have accused
Descartes—considered by many a paragon of armchair
philosophizing—of disguising his own theological intuitions
about divine perfection as the deliverances of a priori
reasoning. Some readers find passages such as the following
to reflect an all too uncritical faith in our ability to
identify perfections appropriate to God:
356
357
358
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In order to know the nature of God, as far as my own
nature was capable of knowing it, I had only to
consider for each thing of which I found in myself
some idea, whether or not it was a perfection to
possess it; and I was sure that none of those which
indicated any imperfection was in God, but that all
the others were. Thus I saw that doubt, inconstancy,
sadness and the like could not be in God, since I
myself would have been very glad to be free from them.
(CSI 128)
Christopher Insole, for example, traces the anthropomorphic
tendencies of contemporary PBT to Cartesian philosophy of
religion. He reminds us that Descartes, in the Third
Meditation, provisionally defines “God” as an “infinite
substance, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient,
omnipotent, and by which I and all the other things which
exist […] have been created and produced.”359 This picture
of God, says Insole, is developed from an “unproblematized
notion” of human subjectivity—in truth, an Enlightenment
ideal of human nature—“that of a finite substance,
temporal, mutable, autonomous in some crucial respects,
knowledgeable to an extent, potent, the proximate cause of
some (but not all) of the things which are created and
produced.” Descartes has here inaugurated a method of
philosophical theology according to which divine attributes
are drawn from a constructed and “parochial” model of the
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human subject. By uncritically selecting such a model of
subjectivity and then attributing to God supereminent
versions of these attributes, later philosophers have
similarly claimed to have arrived at a substantive model of
God’s nature. Yet according to their theological critics,
says Insole, this procedure instead yields only “the
grotesque construction of a super-(human) subject, a
bloated infinitely magnified mirror-image of the rational,
powerful, and benevolent man.”
In his own analysis of Descartes’ philosophical
theology, Philip Clayton provides a similar critique of
Cartesian PBT. Responding to the list of perfections
Descartes attributes to God, Clayton asks: “[W]hence do we
derive these notions of perfection that we attribute to
God? Is it not, as Ludwig Feuerbach argued, merely a matter
of taking what one most values and projecting it onto the
universe itself?”360 Just as Morris had admitted in his own
defense of PBT, Clayton argues that the concept of a
greatest being seems to presuppose access to an objective
hierarchy of value: “Unless there were agreement on goods
and a consensus on their status as objective, the best one
could achieve would be a hierarchy of things that the
person, or group of persons, values. To label the top of
360
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this scale ‘God’ is to be guilty of projection in the most
blatant possible manner.”361 Clayton takes Descartes’ claim
that our concepts of God are derived by amplifying concepts
of creaturely ones as an explicit admission that our
concept of God is the result of such projection. He
consequently claims that Descartes must face what he calls
“Feuerbach’s dilemma”: “either God is unknowable through
attributes accessible to humans, which is another way of
saying that God is simply unknowable to humans; or God is
knowable in this way, but at the cost of our never knowing
for sure whether we have come to know a being separate from
ourselves or whether we have projected our own ideas of
perfection onto the universe.”362 If we reject negative
theology and aspire to understand God, concludes Clayton,
we can never be sure that we are not merely “extrapolating
from human qualities and longings (for greater power,
greater understanding, etc.) to the idea of a being who has
what we lack.”363
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Ibid., 173.
Ibid., 175.
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Ibid., 176. Maritain (1944) also objected to what he interprets as
the univocist and anthropomorphic tendencies of Cartesian PBT.
“Cartesian knowledge of divine perfections,” he says, “proceeds in a
purely geometrical fashion: God being by definition the supremely
perfection, nothing is more simple than to attribute to Him everything
which it seems to us to be a perfection to possess—without the
slightest critical elaboration of the concepts which we thus use,
without that attribution being therefore justified or compromising any
sure criterion […]; and without the possibility of any philosophical
solution being proposed to the apparent antinomies and to the essential
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There can be little doubt that Descartes endorsed an
objective hierarchy of value ordered by approximation to
divine perfection. Indeed, in his account of the human
will, he provides an explicit account of how God serves as
a non-egoist standard of value. In the Fourth Meditation,
the narrator claims that even though God’s will must be
“incomparably greater,” it is unclear how any such faculty
could surpass his own; hence he argues that “it is above
all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear
in some way the image and likeness of God” (CSMII 40).364 In
the Passions of the Soul, Descartes goes on to state that
the human will’s likeness to its divine correlate is the
foundation of its value. It is because our free will
“renders us in a certain way like God” that it serves as a
questions which concern the divine nature and operations.” He thus
concludes that “Cartesianism, in respect to Christian metaphysics
elaborated during the preceding centuries, has been one of the most
singular regressions that the history of thought has to record” (152).
Emblematic of Maritain’s misreading of Descartes is his failure to see
how Descartes’ mathematical illustration of analogy respects and
preserves the qualitative difference between God and creatures.
Maritain quotes T. L. Penido’s claim that Descartes’ Archimedean
examples betray an “anthropomorphic univocity.” According to this
reading of the mathematical examples, “One takes a created perfection,
one increases it indefinitely along the same line and one says: there
is the ‘way of eminence’ (attributing to God the perfections we know
here on earth raised to the nth power), divine perfection is at the
end” (153). To read the mathematical examples in this way, however, is
to fail to appreciate that the concept of the divine perfection at
issue is the limit case instance of the creaturely perfection, and
hence qualitatively distinct from the creaturely perfection.
364
The narrator states, however, that the equivalence between his own
will and God’s is only apparent: “it does not seem any greater than
mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense” (CSMII
40) (emphasis mine). Descartes’ commitment to divine simplicity would
suggest that the human will is, nevertheless, only analogous to its
divine counterpart.
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“good reason for esteeming ourselves” (CSMI 384). As one
commentator puts it, for Descartes, “the free will is
valued not because it is useful but because its infinitude
makes us like God.”365 Assuming this analysis would hold for
the other pure perfections as well, it suggests that their
value is rooted in their resemblance to their divine
analogues.366
How, then, do we access this objective hierarchy of
value? Insole and Clayton’s criticisms of Descartes on this
score are not new. Indeed, in the second chapter we noted
that Gassendi made similar arguments, observing that our
concepts of divine attributes are “taken from things which
we commonly admire in ourselves.” Descartes’ response to
Gassendi and other critics also applies to the contemporary
ones: we are able to attain concepts of divine attributes
different in kind from our own only because we already
possess innate notions of these attributes. Despite
appearances, the process of amplification is not really one
of forming an idea but of making an idea explicit. We do
not construct concepts of divine perfections; we enter the
world already possessing these notions and (unknowingly)

365

Frierson 2002, 324.
The only difference, presumably, would be that we value human freedom
more than other perfections because we perceive a greater likeness
between human freedom and its divine analogue than that holding between
the other human perfections and their divine analogues.
366
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employ them in our everyday classifications and judgments,
constructing concepts of the creaturely versions of these
perfections through partial negation.
If our implicit concepts of divine perfections are
actively responsible for our capacity to amplify our
creaturely perfections past the point of qualitative
difference, it stands to reason that they are also
responsible for our initial selection of these creaturely
perfections as candidates for amplification as well. In the
Second Replies, Descartes attributes our ability to
recognize that certain creaturely perfections are pure
perfections (and hence must exist “formally” in God) to our
possessing an innate idea of the divine essence:

[T]here are many indefinite particulars of which we
have an idea, such as indefinite (or infinite)
knowledge and power, as well as number and length and
so on, that are also infinite. Now we recognize that
some of these (such as knowledge and power) are
contained formally in the idea of God, whereas others
(such as number and length) are contained in the idea
merely eminently. And this would surely not be the
case if the idea of God within us were merely a
figment of our minds. (CSMII 99)
Our intuitions regarding which attributes are pure
perfections are not therefore ungrounded; they are guided
by our prior (implicit) possession of a standard of
perfection—an innate idea of God. It is because we already
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have an idea of that which lies at the very top of the
ontological hierarchy, that which is most true and real,
that we apprehend certain creaturely properties as pure
perfections and so suitable candidates for amplification.367
Just as knowing the model of a series of drawings enables
us to apprehend these drawings as more or less accurate
depictions of the model, so innate notions of divine power
or knowledge enable us to grasp certain creaturely power or
knowledge as more or less perfect instances of their divine
analogues.
In response to the claim that we project onto God
qualities we admire in ourselves, Descartes could therefore
answer that we tend to admire these qualities in ourselves
because we (unknowingly) attribute their more perfect
analogues to God. An innate idea of God serves as the
source of the deepest and most universal values common to
philosophers and non-philosophers alike. We tend to admire
human knowledge, power and freedom because it is with
respect to these features that we (implicitly) apprehend
ourselves as images and likenesses of God. In the Third
Meditation, for example, the narrator portrays God as the
implicit object of his aspiration: “I am a thing which is
367

The question of how we justify our claim that a given perfection
belongs to God is a separate issue. Here Descartes will appeal to
intuition—the “natural light” or “clear and distinct perfection.”
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incomplete and dependent on another and which aspires
without limit to ever greater and better things; but I also
understand at the same time that he on whom I depend has
within him all those greater things, not just indefinitely
and potentially but actually and infinitely […].” The
universal nature of human aspirations could be attributed
to the fact that an innate notion of divine perfection is a
common endowment.
This is not to say that we cannot make mistakes about
what divine perfection entails. Though Descartes did
believe that, at least among metaphysicians, there was a
general consensus regarding which attributes a perfect
being must possess,368 he did not claim that we have
infallible access to what is contained in our idea of a
perfect being. The average person, he allows, may “muddle
things up by including other attributes” that are in fact
inconsistent with absolute perfection (CSMII 99). And even
the experts (metaphysicians like himself) have at best only
an imperfect grasp of all that divine perfection requires.
Yet Descartes argues that such fallibility is entirely
368

In his response to the anonymous objection forwarded by Mersenne,
Descartes argues that “If the idea were a mere figment, it would not be
consistently conceived by everyone in the same manner. It is very
striking that metaphysicians unanimously agree in their descriptions of
the attributes of God (at least in the case of those which can be known
solely by human reason). You will find that there is much more
disagreement among philosophers about the nature of anything which is
physical or perceivable by the senses, however firm or concrete our
idea of it may be” (CSMII 99)
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consistent with the idea of God being innate: “That not
everyone shares the same understanding of God despite the
fact that the idea of God is imprinted on them is no more
surprising than the fact that not everyone shares the same
understanding of a triangle despite the fact that everyone
is aware of this idea” (CSMII 257). Indeed, for all the
perfections that have been disputed (e.g. impassability,
simplicity, immutability), there are others (e.g.,
knowledge, love, power, freedom) that are rarely
questioned.369 The existence of an innate notion of divine
perfection thus entails a consensus only among those who
are suitably equipped to engage in a deliberate, careful
analysis of divine perfection.370
That the perfections we ascribe to God are mostly the
analogues of those we admire in ourselves is simply a

369

Proposed supereminent versions of these qualities (e.g., omnipotence)
have, however, been disputed. One could argue, along with Hartshorne,
that omnipotence is incompatible with creaturely power and the
existence of evil, for example.
370
In his dedicatory letter to the Meditations, Descartes suggests the
number of suitably equipped meditators will be small indeed: “Although
the proofs I employ here are in my view as certain and evident as the
proofs of geometry, if not more so, it will, I fear, be impossible for
many people to achieve an adequate perception of them, both because
they are rather long and some depend on others, and also, above all,
because they require a mind which is completely free from preconceived
opinions and which can easily detach itself from involvement with the
senses.” He goes on to assert that the number of those with an
“aptitude for metaphysical studies” is surely no greater than the
number who have “an aptitude for geometry”; and whereas students to
geometry assume that geometrical propositions are introduced only when
there is “a conclusive demonstration available,” people tend to assume
that, in philosophy, “everything can be argued either way” and hence
“few people pursue the truth.” (CSMII 5)
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consequence of the fact that it is with ourselves that we
are directly acquainted. The innate notions of attributes
that we unknowingly employ in our everyday judgments will
inevitably be those that apply to our own nature and
circumstances. Thus while God may indeed have, as the
narrator in the Meditations suggests, an infinite number of
perfections, and while these perfections will also be
contained in our innate idea of him, yet, due to the finite
nature of our own minds, we can achieve an awareness of
only those that are analogous to our own perfections, for
we represent God’s perfections to ourselves by indefinitely
amplifying creaturely correlates. If, hypothetically, we
were to come into contact with beings considerably
different from ourselves, we may indeed become aware of new
perfections that are appropriate to ascribe to God.
Assuming that these beings do possess pure perfections that
we lack, our very ability to conceive of these perfections
would be explained by our accessing hitherto latent ideas
of their divine correlates. Our contact with these beings
would not provide us with the ideas of these perfections,
but would merely enable us to make these notions explicit.
The new experience would merely be the occasion for our
drawing notions of these novel perfections from our innate
idea of a perfect being.
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The version of the dilemma Descartes, and other
advocates of CPP, actually face is therefore not the one
Clayton proposed of choosing between negative theology and
anthropomorphism, but that of choosing between negative
anthropology and deimorphism: either we are unknowable to
ourselves given the fact that our self-ascription of
limited perfections are complete negations of positive
notions of God’s perfections; or we are knowable in this
way but at the cost of our never knowing for sure whether
we have come to know ourselves or whether we have projected
our ideas of divine perfections onto ourselves. We have
argued in previous chapters, however, that this is a false
dilemma—a top-down account could employ a theory of
analogical resemblance, just as many bottom-up ones do.
When we apprehend ourselves as imperfectly wise, for
example, we are not attributing to ourselves the perfection
of true wisdom; only God is really wise. Nor are we simply
denying ourselves the property of wisdom. Rather, we are
acknowledging that we possess a deficient analogue of the
genuine thing—an imitation of divine wisdom.
Though contemporary perfect being theologians tend to
assume, along with most contemporary philosophers of
religion, that our concepts of divine perfections are
derived from concepts of creaturely ones, the bottom-up
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approach to concept derivation is not an essential feature
of PBT.

371

Not only is PBT consistent with a top-down

approach, some of the most important traditional
practitioners of PBT including St. Augustine and St. Anselm
proposed something similar to the top-down derivation
required by CPP. Though neither explicitly endorsed a
theory of analogy,

372

they did appeal to theories of divine

illumination to explain both the certainty characterizing
various judgments as well as the origin of the concepts
employed in these and perhaps other judgments.373 For these
thinkers, many of our judgments regarding the perfection of
creatures presuppose reference to standards of perfection
exemplified only by God.374 Thus even traditional versions

371

Contemporary practitioners of PBT advocating for a bottom-up approach
include: William Morris (1987, 1991), Daniel J. Hill (2005) and William
Alston (1989), among others.
372
An argument for interpreting Anselm as an advocate of univocity and
not, as some interpreters would have it, a forerunner of scholastic
analogy, can be found in Ch. V of Rogers 1997.
373
For a discussion of both of these features of divine illumination in
St. Augustine’s work, see Evangelist 2010.
374
Augustine, for example, observes that we possess abstract concepts of
wisdom, unity, and goodness that could not have been derived from sense
experience. Though there is scholarly debate concerning the precise
nature of his theory of divine illumination, Ronald Nash (1969, 109-10)
has suggested that these concepts are roughly equivalent to innate
ideas. These concepts not only enable us to recognize imperfect
instances of, for example, wisdom, unity or goodness, but serve as
standards according to which we may judge their relative
(im)perfection. As Evangelist puts it, these concepts are “normative
standards which we apply when we draw comparisons between things or
judge how they ought to be” (2010, 10). In the Freedom of the Will, for
example, Augustine argues that our ability to recognize the absence of
unity in bodies presupposes our possessing a notion of absolute unity:
“When I am seeking unity in the corporeal realm and am at the same time
certain that I have not found it, nevertheless I know what I am seeking
and failing to find, and I know that I cannot find it, or rather that
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of PBT are not inherently vulnerable to the projectionist
critique. To the extent that there is a general consensus
regarding the properties a perfect being must have, this
need not be explained as a consequence of humans projecting
onto God what they value most about themselves. If an
implicit awareness of God is a constitutive feature of
human nature, our general agreement about what is both
valuable in ourselves and necessarily true of God can be
attributed to this common endowment.

it does not exist among corporeal things. When I know that no body is a
unity, I know what unity is” (2.8.21). Likewise, in On the Immortality
of the Soul, he argues that we would not be able to judge that some
things are better than others “unless a conception of the good itself
had been impressed upon us, such that according to it we might both
approve some things as good and prefer one good to another.” See Nash
(1969, 105-6). Anselm makes similar claims in the Monologian, arguing
that we would not be able to judge creatures as wise, just or good
without referring them to standards of divine wisdom, justice and
goodness. See Ch. IV of Rogers 1997.
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Ch. VIII. Analysis and Critique of Cartesian CPP
I. The Plausibility of our Awareness of Absolute
Imperfection
We concluded in the first chapter that the Cartesian
argument from CPP is simply the claim that in order to
judge that something is imperfect insofar as it is like-X
but not-X, we must possess a concept of X. The significance
of the predicates “perfect” and “imperfect” in CPP is best
captured by examples such as those we find in geometry
where the perfection in question is definitive of the kind
(rendering “perfect” equivalent to “true” or genuine”), and
hence where imperfection indicates falling short of the
kind. The idea of a perfect (or “true”) circle is prior to
the idea of an imperfect one in the sense that we cannot
conceive of a thing as resembling yet failing to be a
circle unless we possess a concept of a circle as such;
however, we can possess the concept of a circle without
possessing the concept of something that resembles but
falls short of it. As the idea of a perfect circle is
simply the idea of a circle, so the idea of a perfect or
infinite being is the idea of being as such. Since the
properties possessed by a perfect being are definitive of
being, anything that fails to possess these properties can
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be called a “being” in only a non-univocal sense of the
term. If constructing ideas of God by manipulating (via
negation or amplification) our ideas of creatures requires
an awareness of their absolute imperfection, these
operations presuppose the very concepts they are intended
to produce.

A. CPP as Transcendental Argument
The argument from CPP could accurately be described as
a transcendental argument.375 While such arguments are
usually employed to show how an uncontroversial fact about
our mental life presupposes some disputed fact about extramental reality, they can also be used to establish other
facts about our mental life, especially those of which we
are not directly aware. In the case of CPP, the claim is
that our apprehension of absolute imperfection presupposes
a concept of the kind with respect to which we see
ourselves falling short. Some philosophers, such as Barry
Stroud, believe that transcendental arguments that infer
facts about our mental life are more plausible that those
that attempt to demonstrate facts about the extra-mental
world.
375
376

376

Robert Stern, however, has questioned this

See Schechtman 2011.
2000, 158, 233-5.
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assumption: “How can claims of necessary connections
between some thoughts or experience and some others be
defended more cogently than claims of necessary connections
between some thoughts or experience and the world? Why are
such ‘bridges’ or modal connections easier to make ‘within
thought’ than between how we think and how the world must
be to make that thought possible?”377
Stern’s concern is valid for many transcendental
arguments of this type. Though it may be true, for example,
that our being able to think of ourselves as subjects of
experience presupposes our thinking of the world as
containing objective particulars independent of our
experiences, the conclusion is not obvious; it requires, at
the very least, further elaboration. Compared to a
transcendental argument such as this one, however, the
presupposition relation identified by CPP is a truism
(which may explain why Descartes and others spent so little
energy explaining or defending it). That I cannot conceive
of something as not-X without possessing a concept of X is
hardly a contentious claim. What is not obvious or
uncontroversial are the purported mental facts from which
the inference in CPP is made. Do we really apprehend
ourselves as imperfect in the absolute sense, e.g., as
377

Stern 2011.
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failing to possess true wisdom or genuine power, as failing
to be real beings?
An uncharitable reader might here accuse Descartes and
others of trading on an ambiguity—of using the
uncontroversial fact that we are aware that we are in some
sense imperfect to obscure the fact that the imperfection
in question must be the absolute sort for the argument to
work.378 Further, if our sense of imperfection is merely a
vague apprehension that we fall short in some absolute yet
unspecified way, this awareness could hardly credit the
inference that we possess proper concepts of these
qualitatively distinct perfections. Descartes’ critics as
well as later empiricists such as Locke and Hume often
responded to rationalist arguments of this type by denying
that the concept or knowledge in question possesses the
unique or rich content (or, in the case of knowledge,
378

A defender of CPP perhaps should also address a more general, if
perhaps rarely articulated, criticism: namely, that the assertion that
human beings possess an innate idea of the divine essence or receive
some sort of ongoing divine illumination is an extravagant claim and
thus requires especially persuasive evidence. From the perspective of
traditional theism, however, there is no reason why the evidentiary bar
for CPP should be especially high. If an infinite and transcendent
being exists and has the sort of special relationship with human beings
that the Abrahamic religions claim, it would be unsurprising if it
endowed us with at least an inchoate or dispositional awareness of that
which is most real and most valuable, i.e., itself. This is not to
discount the importance of revelation, but explains why the truth of
revelation has significance for us, i.e., because it answers to deep
and universal longings that are part of our nature. Leibniz expresses a
similar view: “[T]he inclination we have to recognize the idea of God
is part of our human nature. Even if the first teaching of it were
attributed to revelation, still men’s receptiveness to this doctrine
comes from the nature of their souls” (1981, 76).
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necessity or universality) allegedly incompatible with its
empirical or manufactured origin. In this case, the critic
can argue that there is less to our sense of imperfection
than advocates of CPP presume. It is true that the
rationalists could and did argue that our absolute
imperfection is something of which we are usually only
implicitly aware: Descartes and Malebranche often appeal to
implicit awareness or implicit knowledge of God, and it is
well-known that Leibniz developed a robust theory of
unconscious perception.379 Yet if the awareness of
imperfection at issue in CPP is only an implicit awareness,
then this awareness ceases to be an uncontroversial fact of
our mental life and CPP loses much of its force as a freestanding argument.

B. Transcendental Argument Against Amplification
However, Descartes can be read as providing an
argument—another transcendental argument, in fact—to show
that we do indeed apprehend ourselves, at least implicitly,
as radically imperfect in the sense required by CPP.

379

Leibniz also invokes implicit knowledge, though it is not clear
whether this is something distinct from unconscious awareness. See
Jolley 1984, 175. Jolly also emphasizes that implicit knowledge is
unlike dispositional knowledge for Leibniz in that “implicit or virtual
knowledge is in a sense really actual; it is contrasted not with actual
knowledge but with express” (173).
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Descartes’ critics had claimed that the concepts of divine
perfections that we do have are constructed from concepts
of our own via a process of amplification. He had responded
that while we do indeed use a process of amplification as a
heuristic device for making our concepts of divine
properties explicit, since the concepts thereby attained
are qualitatively distinct from the creaturely ones, our
ability to arrive at them presupposes an implicit awareness
of the divine perfections. To use the geometrical example,
we can ‘see’ that a series of polygons ordered according to
progressively greater numbers of sides converges on the
limit case instance of circularity only because we already
possess a concept of a circle. We could never construct the
concept of a circle merely by noticing that the sides of a
polygon could always be increased in number. Rather,
attending to this series enables us to ‘reach’ the idea of
a circle because we implicitly apprehend the polygons as
imperfect circles. Similarly, we can obtain concepts of
qualitatively distinct divine properties by amplifying
concepts of creaturely ones only because we, at least
implicitly, apprehend these properties as absolutely
imperfect versions of divine ones.
Yet philosophers have objected to the assumption that
amplification enables us to arrive at proper concepts of
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absolutely infinite and qualitatively distinct divine
perfections as well as to the alleged presupposition
relation that we could arrive at such concepts only if we
were already (at least implicitly) aware of them. Regarding
the first objection, the traditional scholastic view was
that even though we know that certain things are true of
God (e.g., that he is uncaused), we do not have an idea
representing his essence. None of our ideas of divine
perfections can represent these perfections as they exist
in God—all of our concepts of God are, to use a term we
employed in our discussion of analogy, improper. This view
was, in part, a consequence of general assumptions about
both the origin of our ideas in sense experience (an
assumption they shared with later empiricists) as well as
their representative capacity (i.e., that no idea, qua
finite thing, can represent the infinite).380 Though
Rationalists could address these claims by invoking a
theory of innateness and by affirming a distinction between
the objective and formal reality of ideas,

380

381

the true

Though Malebranche adopted the Cartesian account of CPP with respect
to our idea of God, he agreed with Aquinas that, since ideas are finite
entities, no idea could ever represent the infinite. Thus he held that
our ‘idea’ of God was really God’s actual presence to the mind.
381
Carriero suggests that, in response to Aquinas’s claim that “since
every created image belongs to some fixed genus […] no created image
can possibly represent God” Descartes could argue that “the argument
trades on a confusion between formal and objective reality: while it
may be true that every created representation is finite in terms of its
formal reality (determined, for example, to belong to the genus human
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strength of the objection lies in the purported
experiential fact that we don’t fully understand what
divine knowledge or power, much less the divine being, is
like. Perhaps we can be reasonably certain that God has
knowledge and power and that these properties must differ
qualitatively in certain ways from creaturely ones, yet
this knowledge doesn’t seem to presuppose the possession of
a concept representing the divine essence.
This objection assumes, however, a criterion for
concept-possession that advocates of CPP can and did
reject: namely, that possessing a concept entails an
awareness of all its contents. According to Descartes, the
inadequacy of our understanding of the infinite is not due
to the inadequacy of our idea of the infinite (for this
idea really contains infinite objective reality), but our
inability to conceive or represent to ourselves everything
contained within it. As we have noted, Descartes invokes a
distinction between comprehending something in thought and
merely “touching” it with one’s mind, a distinction that he
applies to both the general concept of an infinite being as
well as to the individual perfections that we ascribe to

intellectual idea), it does not follow that every created
representation is finite in terms of its objective reality” (2009,
182).
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this being.382 In the same way that we know that certain
perfections must be ascribed to God even though we assume
that there are (perhaps) infinitely many of which we have
no understanding, so Descartes thinks we can be certain of
various features of these perfections even though we cannot
pretend to possess knowledge of everything they contain.
For example, despite the fact that we do not know all that
infinite being entails, we can be certain that God
possesses power; and despite the fact that we do not know
all that infinite power requires, we do know that it is
incompatible with God’s relying on an external efficient
cause for his existence. We do not stipulate that an
infinite being possesses a power incompatible with
contingency, but discover it though an analysis of our
concept of infinite being.383
Even if we allow that possessing a concept that truly
represents a divine perfection or the divine essence need
382

God, says, Descartes “has all those perfections which I cannot
comprehend, but which I can somehow touch in thought.” Carriero
observes that this distinction (between ‘touching’ and ‘comprehending)
resembles the one Aquinas makes between the vision of God that the
blessed achieve after death and the sort of cognition of God that no
finite thing, even the blessed, can achieve. He goes on to argue that
Aquinas would probably agree that if, hypothetically, we possessed an
idea representing God’s essence, we would indeed have the understanding
of it that Descartes alleges we do.
383
Indeed, as we noted in the second chapter, there is a stronger claim
here too: Descartes believes that not only is non-comprehensive
awareness compatible with possessing a concept that truly represents
God’s essence, but it would in fact be incompatible with divine
infinity if we could comprehend everything contained in our idea of
God.
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not entail awareness of everything that concept includes,
we might still question the assumption that we could never
produce these concepts by modifying concepts of creaturely
perfections. Scotus, for example, believes we can form a
proper concept of a divine property (which applies only
analogically to creatures) by contracting a candidate
property to an infinite grade (or mode) of perfection.
While we can derive a notion of the pure perfection from
its creaturely instance, he realized that he must provide
some explanation of how we can conceive of this property as
intensively infinite without help from innate ideas or
divine illumination. To this end, he provides a detailed
account of how one might obtain the concept of an infinite
grade of being. In brief, he argues that we first move from
the concept of the potentially infinite in quantity
(“[which] has only being in the making or potentially”) to
a concept of the quantitatively infinite in act (“a whole
[which] has nothing outside itself”) by imagining that the
succession of parts constituting the potentially infinite
quantity “were taken at once or that they remained in
existence simultaneously.”384 If we then wish to think of
something that is actually infinite with respect to its
being, we likewise think of something that is whole and
384

Quotation from Frank 1995, 152.
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perfect in the sense that its qualities cannot be exceeded
intensively.385 In brief, says Scotus, “[f]rom the notion of
the infinite in the Physics, then, applied imaginatively to
something infinite in quantity, were that possible and
applied further to something actually infinite in entity,
were it possible, we can form some sort of idea of how to
conceive a being intensively infinite in perfection and
power.”386
Some have cast doubt on Scotus’s contention that we
can move from the quantitative to the qualitative infinite.
Citing the example of infinite whiteness, Locke argued that
“properly speaking, we can add infinity only to those
things with parts […] it doesn’t make sense to speak of
infinite whiteness or infinite sweetness: to the perfectest
idea I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another of a
less or equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I
cannot add the idea,) it makes no increase and enlarges not
my idea at all.”387 Further, as we have noted in a previous
chapter, critics have questioned Scotus’s assumption that
ontological analogy could be compatible with conceptual
385

Unlike the quantitatively infinite in act, however, an actually
infinite being cannot be construed as having parts each of which is
less than the whole. Infinite being must be metaphysically simple.
386
Frank 1995, 153.
387
1975, 221. Leibniz, in his response to this objection from Locke,
argues that “nothing prevents one from having the perception of a
whiteness more brilliant than one at present conceives.” Nevertheless,
he goes on to argue that the example of color is misleading since we
can have only a confused idea of it (1981, 158).
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univocity. Whatever the merits of these critiques, Scotus’
account shows at the very least that it is not obvious that
we cannot construct proper concepts of actually infinite,
qualitatively distinct divine properties from concepts of
creaturely ones.

A defender of CPP would need to explain

why the qualitative distinction between divine and
creaturely properties constitutes an insuperable barrier to
constructing proper ideas of divine properties from ideas
of creaturely ones but does not prohibit deriving concepts
of creaturely properties from concepts of divine ones. To
merely affirm, as Descartes does, the scholastic principle
that knowledge of what is not cannot bring us to knowledge
of that which is, is to assume a relationship between the
conceptual and ontological that Scotus flatly denied.388

C. Generalizing the Argument from CPP
Descartes may be right that our ability to conceive of
the divine perfections reached through (a purely heuristic
process of) amplification presupposes an implicit awareness
that the creaturely properties thus amplified are imperfect
388

Again, Scotus agrees that there is a qualitative distinction between
creaturely and divine properties and that our proper notions of each
are only analogically related to the other. Because we can form a
univocal notion of a property by prescinding from its grade of
perfection, however, this ontological diversity does not impede our
moving from a concept of the creaturely property to a proper concept of
the divine one.
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in the absolute sense. Yet if this argument is the sole
support for the premise that we apprehend ourselves as
absolutely imperfect, then CPP rests on a poor foundation
indeed. Apart from the problems raised by Scotus and
others, there is the fact that the argument against
amplification can have purchase only for the few who engage
in philosophical theology and attain the alleged insights
into the divine nature in the manner described. In defense
of CPP, it may be true that there are other contexts in
which philosophical theology seems to presuppose an
awareness of the divine nature. Gilson, in his analysis of
Bonaventures’ account of CPP,389 observes that the premises
of cosmological arguments often seem to involve knowledge
of the very features of God that they are invoked to
establish:
We think we are starting from strictly sensible data
when we state as the first step in our demonstration
that there are in existence beings mutable, composite,
relative, imperfect, contingent: but in actual fact we
are aware of these insufficiencies in things only
because we already possess the idea of the perfections
by whose standard we see them to be insufficient. It
is only in appearance and not in reality that our
reasoning begins with sense data. Our awareness,
389

For Bonaventure’s accounts of CPP, see Aersten 2012, 147-60; Cullen
2006, 61-6; and Gilson 1965, 108-25. Though Bonaventure argued that we
conceive of infinite being by virtue of conceiving of being, he held
that our concepts of all the other divine attributes are derived from
experience. The tendency of divine illuminationists, especially later
ones such as Ghent, to fold aspects of Aristotelian empiricism into
their accounts of ideogenesis makes it difficult to draw historical
parallels between their accounts of CPP and that which is found in
early modern rationalism.
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apparently immediate and primary, of the contingent
implies a pre-existent notion of the necessary.390
Though such cosmological arguments may indeed presuppose
notions of divine properties, the purported awareness of
absolute imperfection is here limited to the questionable
insights of a small group of theologians and
metaphysicians. Even if their alleged awareness of absolute
imperfection does indeed presuppose prior ideas of the
perfect, the argument from CPP would be stronger, and have
greater significance, if it could be shown that an
awareness of absolute imperfection is implicated in more
universal and mundane features of human experience.
We have, to some degree, done this in our analyses of
top-down analogical derivation. Harshorne’s insight into
the radical imperfection of human knowledge and love may be
a common, if not quite universal, experience. According to
this analysis, our original, unexamined notion of knowledge
is one characterized by conclusiveness and immediacy; it is
when we, as adults, begin to examine our so-called
knowledge that we see, as the narrator does in the
Meditations, that our justifications actually lack the
definitive nature we had (implicitly) assumed they had, and
that our very need to appeal to (and remember) these

390

1965, 115.
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justifications is a sign of our absolute imperfection as
knowers. Similarly, it is perhaps the notion of a love
unconditioned by ego that we, in the best case scenario,
carry through childhood and believe is realized in our
parents’ regard for us. Experience is an education in the
limits of love, enabling us to apprehend even parental love
as at best an imitation of God’s love for us.
Our initial response to this disappointment may be to
dismiss our former notions of knowledge and love as
simplistic or naïve, and hence to classify the more complex
and comparatively imperfect forms as the genuine thing—we
might conclude that knowledge just is mediated; love just
is limited by the bounds of the self, and we were foolish
to think otherwise. But there are other cases where we seem
to resist this reclassification. Though we recognize that
human justice is inevitably imperfect, compromised as it is
by factors such as limited resources and limited knowledge,
we are not inclined to redefine our notion of justice
according to its human approximations. The notion of
absolute or perfect justice may be unrealistic from the
perspective of what is attainable within human society, but
we nevertheless recognize it to be something more than a
childhood fantasy. In his own analysis of Cartesian CPP,
James Lawler cites a child’s innate sense of fairness as a

331

consequence of her possessing a standard of perfect
justice:

The child who has no distinct idea of perfection
nevertheless knows when something goes wrong or is
inadequate to its way of looking at things. It’s not
fair, the sister says when her brother gets more than
she does. She has no distinct idea of fairness which
she can articulate consciously, but nevertheless
operates in the light of an idea that, in a maledominated society, may never have been taught to her.
The idea of fairness is only a particular expression
of the more general idea of a truth or standard or
ideal by which all things are variously evaluated.391
The girl’s apparently naïve notion of fairness enables her
to identify injustices that her community does not
recognize. More importantly, we can imagine that this same
notion would eventually enable her to recognize the
imperfection of what passes for justice in human society
more generally. Since this notion of absolute justice is an
ideal inspiring us to improve our own systems of justice,
however, we resist redefining it in terms of its imperfect
forms.392
Another candidate for a nearly universal awareness of
absolute imperfection is the sense of metaphysical
contingency that we discussed in the context of Descartes’
391

2006, 338.
What is the qualitative distinction between divine and creaturely
justice? Part of the distinction might be the inherently restorative,
rather than merely retributive, nature of divine justice. Since human
justice can be restorative as well, however, one would need to
distinguish divine restoration from its human counterpart.
392

332

analogy of causation. According to this analysis, our
original notion of existence is of metaphysically necessary
existence following from purely creative power, and it is
only because we possess these concepts that we can become
aware of the absolute imperfection of creaturely
(contingent) existence and creaturely (constructive) power.
It is perhaps such an implicit concept of necessary
existence that enables many of us, usually at some point in
late childhood, to achieve the (often startling) insight of
our own powerlessness and consequent dependence. The shock
of this realization and the anxiety it inspires has not
only been a major theme of art and literature for millennia
(as well as an important theme in psychology), but it can
be understood to inspire that most basic religious and
philosophical question, often first asked in early
adolescence, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”
Given sufficient reflection, we may attribute our
contingency to the fact that the reason or cause for our
existence lies outside ourselves. This realization may, in
turn, give rise to an explicit notion of a more perfect
form of existence enjoyed by a metaphysically necessary
being, i.e., a being that neither came into existence nor
could cease to exist since the foundation of its existence
lies within itself. Such a being would exhibit not merely a
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very low degree of contingency, but absolutely no
contingency at all. Yet if CPP is correct, this apparently
negative concept of necessary existence—expressed
grammatically as the negation of dependent existence (i.e.,
in-dependent existence)—is in fact our original, positive
notion of existence, and it is only because we already
possess such a concept that we can apprehend our own kind
of (contingent) existence as imperfect in the first place.
Yet if an implicit awareness of absolute imperfection
were a universal feature of human nature, one would expect
it to play some role in shaping human desire and aspiration
more generally. There is some suggestion of this at the end
of the Third Meditation, where the narrator states that the
idea of God—a “mark of the craftsman stamped on his work […
which] need not be anything distinct from the work itself”—
shapes human nature by serving as an implicit object of
human desire. Our awareness of a being possessing every
perfection “not just indefinitely and potentially but
actually and infinitely” explains why we aspire “without
limit to ever greater and better things” (CSMII 35,
emphasis mine). Lawler thus argues that, for Descartes, the
idea of perfection is “the better, or the best, that stands
above pleasure and pain and allows us to be discontent with
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our contentment.”393 Malebranche too asserts that the
inexhaustible nature of human desire ought to be attributed
to an implicit awareness of the absolute inadequacy of
creaturely goods in comparison to God: “The inclination
toward the good in general [i.e., God] is the source of the
restlessness of our will. Everything the mind represents to
itself as its good is finite, and everything finite can
momentarily distract our love, but cannot hold it
permanently.”394 These claims are surely reminiscent of
Augustine’s famous observation, in the Confessions, that
“our hearts are restless until they find their rest in
thee, O Lord.”
Unfortunately, arguments intended to show that an
awareness of absolute imperfection is implicated in more
universal and mundane features of human experience are
susceptible to objections similar to those raised against
arguments that appeal to the more recondite insights of
philosophical theology. Though an unceasing restlessness,
for example, may indeed be a universal feature of human
nature, this is not an uncontroversial fact. There are
certainly some, like Saint Augustine, for whom a perpetual
dissatisfaction with finite goods seemed to be an explicit
and dominant feature of their psychology; angst-ridden
393
394

2006, 338.
1997, 269.
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characters such as these have also been a staple of 19th and
20th century literature. Yet how does one explain the
equally, if not more, common phenomenon of human quietude,
of apparent satisfaction with worldly goods, knowledge, and
love? It is true that such satisfaction may be merely
apparent, and it is one of the achievements of 20th century
psychology to show how unconscious discontentment and
anxieties can broil beneath even the most placid surfaces.
Yet it follows that appeals to chronic disquietude or other
ostensibly universal signs of an awareness of absolute
imperfection can be persuasive only in the context of
further assumptions about human psychology and behavior.
Further, even if we grant that such infinite restlessness
is a universal feature of human nature, it is not obvious
that this cannot be explained without appealing to an
implicit awareness of absolute imperfection. Perhaps this
restlessness can be sated—it is just that we have not found
the finite good or set of goods that will do it.
Descartes undoubtedly believed that we all possess an
innate idea of God and that we all, at least implicitly,
apprehend ourselves as radically imperfect in light of this
standard. He did not, however, feel it necessary to provide
independent arguments for the premise that we apprehend
ourselves as absolutely imperfect. This is perhaps due to
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the fact that his appeal to an awareness of absolute
imperfection (as well as his claim that this awareness
presupposes a robust idea of God) may have been intended to
have probative force only for the suitably trained and
properly disposed meditator.395 Like his rationalist
successors, Descartes was often at pains to emphasize that
anyone can discover the innate truths ‘within’ so long as
they follow the correct method of philosophizing (e.g.,
turn away from the deliverances of the senses towards the
intelligible realm, withhold judgment in the absence of
clear and distinct conceptions, etc.)

396

In response to

Burman’s repeated objections concerning the apparent
absolute perfection (infinity) of the human will, Descartes
asserts that “there is no point in arguing like this on
these matters. Let everyone just go down deep into himself
and find out whether he has a perfect and absolute will,
and whether he can conceive of anything which surpasses him
in freedom of the will. I am sure everyone will find that
395

In the preface to the Meditations, Descartes states that “I would not
urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to
meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses
and from all preconceived opinions. Such readers, as I well know, are
few and far between” (CSMII 8).
396
It is difficult, however, to reconcile the rationalists’ confidence
in their own methods with the fact that scores of intelligent,
sympathetic inquirers have followed these methods and failed to attain
the same insights, much less the fact that the rationalist themselves
did not always agree. To cite a famous case, Leibniz argued that
Descartes’ ontological argument was incomplete because it failed to
demonstrate that God’s existence is non-contradictory (as it would be
if, for example, certain perfections were incompatible). See, for
example, Leibniz 1981, 437.
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it is as I say” (CSMK 342). Presumably the same sort of
introspection would enable us to see how our other
attributes fall short absolutely of their divine
correlates. This would suggest that if we are capable of
going “down deep” into ourselves, our absolute imperfection
will be obvious and independent arguments for the claim
unnecessary. Conversely, if we are not properly disposed
for such meditation, the implication seems to be that
further argumentation would be pointless. That we possess
an idea of the infinite in comparison to which we judge
ourselves to be absolutely imperfect is a truth that, like
the cogito, we have to discover for ourselves, if at all.

II. The Ontology and Cognition of Primitive Resemblance
CPP assumes that the imperfect is qualitatively
distinct from the perfect. An imperfect circle is judged to
be imperfect insofar as it fails to be a circle. Yet we
have noted that the argument also assumes a positive
(resemblance) relation between the two: an imperfect circle
is apprehended as being in some way like a circle. In the
case of things like circles, this resemblance could be said
to supervene on more basic features of qualitative
identity. When it comes to the resemblance relationship
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between God and creatures, however, divine simplicity and
transcendence were traditionally taken to rule out any form
of qualitative identity. We have therefore argued that CPP,
as it applies to the perfections of God and creatures,
assumes a form of analogical resemblance that is primitive
or irreducible in nature. We used the apparently primitive
similarity of scalar properties such as the resemblance of
different shades of a single color to illustrate how this
similarity might be cognized.
A problem for Descartes’ account of CPP that we have
not yet addressed, however, is that examples such as these
involve a resemblance between two simple phenomenal
properties. In the case of God and creatures, however, the
ontological picture appears to be one in which numerous
qualitatively distinct, individually complex creaturely
properties bear a primitive (analogical) resemblance to a
single, metaphysically simple thing—the divine essence.
Unlike Leibniz, Descartes endorsed the traditional theory
of divine simplicity, which entails that the divine
attributes themselves are, in reality, identical to the
divine essence and hence identical to each other.

397

397

We have

See “Divine Simplicity” in vol. 8 of the Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, (784). According to Adams, Leibniz “speaks without
embarrassment of God as having a plurality of distinct properties. He
maintains that God is simple, but in the same sense in which all the
monads or fundamental substances of his system are simple—that is, in
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noted on numerous occasions that a commitment to a strong
version of divine simplicity was, for many scholastic
thinkers as well as for Descartes, a primary reason for
rejecting univocal predication of God and creatures. Yet if
divine Goodness, Justice, and Wisdom are in reality
identical, then what basis is there for apprehending
creaturely goodness as imperfect goodness rather than
imperfect justice or wisdom? The identity of the divine
attributes would seem to entail that an analogically
similar instance of, for example, creaturely goodness must
resemble divine wisdom in precisely the same way it
resembles divine goodness. If the divine attributes are not
qualitatively distinct, then it appears to follow that
creaturely pure perfections are not either.398
Descartes follows the scholastic tradition in holding
that divine simplicity is compatible with conceiving of God
the sense of having no parts that are or could be substances.
Properties, distinct from each other as they may be, do not count for
Leibniz as parts that could disturb the simplicity of a substance”
(2008, 105).
398
Scotus faced a similar problem in his account of univocal
predication. If “good” can be predicated univocally of both creatures
and God, and God’s goodness is identical with his wisdom, it would
entail that creaturely goodness is identical with creaturely wisdom. He
attempted to reconcile divine simplicity with univocal predication by
invoking a weaker form of divine simplicity. Though the divine
attributes are not really distinct, he claimed that they were “formally
distinct” insofar as they admit of different definitions. The formal
distinction of the divine attributes is not something that is imposed
by the intellect but is a feature of the divine nature itself. Scotus
thought he could thereby affirm that divine wisdom is really identical
with divine goodness, and that both “good” and “wise” can be predicated
univocally of creatures and God, without accepting the absurd
conclusion that creaturely wisdom is the same as creaturely goodness.
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in terms of a diversity of attributes. He argues that it is
due to a “defect of our intellect,” rather than an actual
metaphysical complexity within God himself, that we ascribe
attributes to him in a “piecemeal fashion, corresponding to
the way in which we perceive them in ourselves” (CSMII 98).
It may appear that he has backed himself into a corner
here, for how can he maintain that we possess proper
concepts of God if we are conceiving of him as though he
exhibits a metaphysical complexity he actually lacks? In
fact, Descartes did not believe that the distinctions we
make between the divine attributes are to be attributed
solely to our own intellects. Rather, he suggests that such
distinctions always have some basis in the reality
conceived.399
Indeed, on this score Descartes appears to follow
Aquinas, who believed that the distinctions we make between
God’s (really identical) attributes have a foundation in
his incomprehensible nature: Given God’s transcendent
greatness, we, finite beings that we are, cannot comprehend
his essence with a single concept.400 As we noted in the
399

“I call it a conceptual distinction—that is, a distinction made by
reason ratiocinatae. I do not recognize any distinction made by reason
ratiocinantis—that is, one which has no foundation in reality—because
we cannot have any thought without a foundation” (CSMK 280). See Skirry
2005, 39-69.
400
Aquinas’ account thus falls between those that invoke a purely
conceptual distinction that has no foundation in reality and the
Scotistic formal distinction, in which our concepts correspond to
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second chapter, Descartes believed that our inability to
comprehend the divine essence with any given concept does
not entail that our concepts of God are improper; rather,
our need to conceive of God in terms of a diversity of
attributes is, like our inability to grasp everything
contained in our concepts of these attributes, a sign that
the object of our thought is the divine essence itself.401
Descartes could therefore argue that even though creaturely
pure perfections resemble the same, metaphysically simple
thing—the divine essence—we apprehend this resemblance only
by conceiving of God in terms of various qualitatively
distinct attributes. We apprehend an instance of creaturely
goodness as an instance of imperfect goodness rather than
an instance of imperfect justice or wisdom because it
resembles the divine essence as conceived as perfect
goodness, not as conceived as perfect justice or perfect
wisdom.
Yet even if we may conceive of the divine essence in
terms of qualitatively distinct attributes, one might still
formalities that are really identical yet differing in terms of their
definitions.
401
Beyssade, who emphasizes the positive nature of divine
incomprehensibility for Descartes in a number of articles, puts it this
way: “[I]ncomprehensibility is not an obstacle or a limit to our
intellectual understanding of God; on the contrary, it reveals God in
his truth, in his real and positive transcendence. This
incomprehensibility does not reveal a regrettable and provisional
failure of my limited mind, but instead a necessary incommensurability
between the infinite and any finite mind, even one more perfect than my
own, even the mind of an angel” (1993, 89). See also 1996, 192-3.
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question whether the example of scalar magnitudes is
appropriate given the complex nature of the creaturely
attributes in question. How could we grasp a primitive
resemblance relation between a complex (creaturely)
property and a metaphysically simple (divine) one? If the
divine nature can be legitimately conceived in terms of a
diversity of attributes, one might argue that these
attributes themselves may be legitimately conceived as
exhibiting the same complexity as their creaturely
correlates. Yet this solution will not work if conceiving
of these attributes as though they were complex involves
ascribing to God more basic attributes that are, in fact,
not pure perfections. The complex property of creaturely
knowledge, for example, involves a psychological state of
belief that many have argued is incompatible with divine
perfection; we cannot conceive of divine knowledge as
involving belief without thereby conceiving of God as
something that is less than perfect. Alternatively, one
might argue that only some of the (simple) parts of complex
creaturely properties resemble the divine attributes.402 The
problem with such an account, however, is that we are not
then justified in apprehending the entire (complex)
creaturely property as a pure perfection.
402

For example, creaturely knowledge features thought, which is itself a
perfection.
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A more promising explanation for how we might
apprehend a primitive resemblance between a complex
(creaturely) property and the metaphysically simple divine
nature (conceived with respect to individual properties)
would appeal to our ability to view the complex creaturely
property holistically. If we can conceive of that which is
simple as though it were complex, perhaps we can conceive
of what is complex as though it were simple. Even if none
of the parts of a creaturely property resemble the divine
nature when taken in isolation, the suggestion here is that
they do when taken together as a whole. Though the
traditional accounts of analogy of attribution and
proportionality often appear to be insufficiently precise,
their generality could perhaps be attributed to the fact
that the analogical resemblance they express lies, as it
were, on the surface and so cannot be uncovered through
further precision. We apprehend human knowledge as a
likeness of the divine quality not by recognizing that
various aspects of the complex property resemble the divine
quality, but by noticing a resemblance when viewing the
property holistically.403

403

Such an account of resemblance could apply even to cases where there
is some form of underlying qualitative identity. Perhaps it is true
that two shades of green resemble each other by virtue of some
qualitative identity, but it does not follow that we recognize their
resemblance by (implicitly or unconsciously) apprehending this
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A final respect in which the primitive resemblance of
scalar properties fails to capture all the features of
transcendental resemblance is the assumption that God, as
what Descartes termed a “total cause,” cannot be said to
lack any reality or perfection found in creatures. What
distinguishes creaturely properties from divine ones is
merely an absence of some sort. Though this is stretching
things a bit, there is a sense in which the containment of
one analogue in another can be applied to scalar
properties. A shade of dark green might be said to
‘contain’ everything found in the lighter shades from which
it is created. We might further imagine that these lighter
shades are apprehended as imperfect versions of the darker
one –i.e., resembling it, but nevertheless qualitatively
distinct. The problem here, however, is that the lighter
shades aren’t features of the darker shade considered as a
phenomenal property. The darker shade can no more be said
to ‘contain’ the lighter ones than the latter can be said

identity. Rather, it is the primitive resemblance that they bear to one
another when taken as phenomenal gestalts. To use Reid’s example, even
if two resembling faces really feature elements of qualitative
identity, it does not follow that our apprehension of their resemblance
must be ascribed to an unconscious awareness of this identity, for
another possibility is that we apprehend a resemblance between the two
faces regarded holistically.
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to ‘contain’ the former for, when considered phenomenally,
the constituents of their composition are irrelevant.404
Though it is admittedly difficult to provide a
satisfying account of transcendental analogical
resemblance, perhaps this should be unsurprising. Why
should we expect that the resemblance relation that holds
between complex creaturely properties and the
metaphysically simple divine essence would be similar to
any of the more familiar kinds of resemblance found between
creatures? Whether or not we find the above or any other
theory of analogical resemblance plausible will hinge, to a
large extent, on whether we accept the apparently
404

The traditional claim that the resemblance relation between God and
creatures is asymmetric—viz., that creatures can be said to be ‘like’
God but God cannot be said to be ‘like’ creatures—does not appear to be
based upon the ontological supremacy of the divine analogate or any
other feature unique to the resemblance relation itself, but is rather
attributed to the fact that creatures are created by God in his own
image. Aquinas, for example, suggests that the impropriety of likening
God to creatures is akin to the impropriety of likening an image to the
man who served as its model: “[I]t is more fitting to say that a
creature is like God rather than the converse. For that which is called
like something possesses a quality or form of that thing. Since, then,
that which is found in God perfectly is found in other things according
to a certain diminished participation, the basis on which the likeness
is observed belongs to God absolutely, but not to the creature. Thus,
the creature has what belongs to God and, consequently, is rightly said
to be like God. But we cannot in the same way say that God has what
belongs to the creature. Neither, then, can we appropriately say that
God is like a creature, just as we do not say that man is like his
image, although the image is rightly said to be like him. All the less
proper, moreover, is the expression that God is likened to a creature.
For likening expresses a motion towards likeness and thus belongs to
the being that receives from another that which makes it like. But a
creature receives from God that which makes it like Him. The converse,
however, does not hold. God, then, is not likened to a creature;
rather, the converse is true” (SCG 1.29.139). I don’t take Aquinas here
to be denying that resemblance is always transitive, but merely to be
observing that we usually don’t express the resemblance of an image and
its model by saying the model is like its image.
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incompatible theological intuitions analogy was invoked to
reconcile. If we agree that divine simplicity and
transcendence preclude any form of qualitative identity
between God and creatures and yet nevertheless believe that
creation is in some sense an image and likeness of God,
some explanation has to be provided of how this can be
so.405 Though we have shown that a top-down account of
analogical derivation may have some epistemological
advantages over the more traditional bottom-up version, it
does nothing to render analogical resemblance any less
mysterious.

405

While Scotus denies that the absence of qualitative identity is
incompatible with univocal predication, he never shows that it is
compatible with some form of resemblance.
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